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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 003969 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM KE PGOV PHUM
SUBJECT: KENYA ELECTIONS: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 
 
REF: A. NAIROBI 3897 AND PREVIOUS 
 
     ¶B. NAIROBI 3675 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The protagonists in Kenya's election drama 
have known one another for decades.  At various times they 
were both allies and rivals.  Incumbent President Mwai Kibaki 
will present himself as a stable, mature and dependable 
leader who reversed Kenya's downward spiral under Moi and is 
above tribalism.  Challenger Raila Odinga will present 
himself as the champion of the common man against the forces 
of the elite.  He (or his lieutenants) will also play on 
anti-Kikuyu resentments, especially in vote-rich districts 
where Kikuyu "settlers" are resented by "locals," such as 
Kalenjin areas of Rift Valley Province.  Third place Kalonzo 
Musyoka will strive to capture all of the ethnic Kamba vote 
(8 percent of projected voters) and have his allies elected 
as MPs from Kambaland, but is unlikely to register 
significant support elsewhere in the country.  The election 
may be closer than many observers expected.  This calls for 
even closer scrutiny of the process and intense advocacy for 
free, fair and peaceful conduct of the elections.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) Ref A provides a projection of likely voters and 
references for previous election-related messages. 
 
Changing Dance Partners 
----------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) In 2002, President Daniel arap Moi, in his 24th year 
of rule and recently term-limited, announced to startled 
leaders of his party that Uhuru Kenyatta, a relative 
political newcomer and son of the founding President, was his 
chosen successor.  This led to a walk-out of the party by 
those who insisted that the ruling party candidate be chosen 
by a secret ballot at a party convention.  The leader of the 
walk-out was Raila Odinga, then one of Moi's ministers and a 
former Moi regime political prisoner.  In the 1960s, Odinga's 
father had served as a prominent minister in Kenya's first 
post-independence government, alongside Moi, before the elder 
Odinga had a bitter falling out with the elder Kenyatta. 
Among those who followed Odinga out of the party was Kalonzo 
Musyoka.  Earlier, Musyoka had made his name in the ruling 
party by vociferously defending Moi and calling for Odinga's 
imprisonment for subversive activities, a reference to 
Odinga's agitation for multiparty democracy and against 
Kenya's one-party constitution in force at that time. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Late in 2002, Odinga helped unite the opposition 
behind a single candidate: Mwai Kibaki.  The opposition had 
lost Kenya's first two multiparty elections, in '92 and '97, 
largely due to their failure to unite (and Moi's willingness 
to use violence against entire communities of presumptive 
opposition supporters).  Kibaki had served in parliament 
since independence in '63.  He had served as a minister under 
both Jomo Kenyatta and Moi.  He spent 10 years as Moi's 
Vice-President.  In 1982, he gave an impassioned speech in 
parliament about the necessity of moving Kenya from a de 
facto one-party state to a de jure one-party state, and then 
formally made the motion in favor of the one-party amendment 
to the constitution.  Nine years later, Kibaki left the 
ruling party to enter opposition politics.  On occasion he 
was beaten by police while leading anti-Moi, pro-democracy 
demonstrations. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Fast forward to 2007:  Former 2002 allies Kibaki, 
Odinga and Musyoka are now running for President against one 
another.  Their opponents from 2002, Moi and Uhuru Kenyatta, 
are now allied to Kibaki.  Odinga and Musyoka (along with 
their allies) fell out with the President when Kibaki reneged 
on promises he had made to them about the positions they 
would hold in government.  The moral of the story is that 
while Kenya's senior politicians all know one another quite 
well, there are no permanent allies or enemies, only 
permanent interests, particularly when it comes to preserving 
or improving one's position within the ranks of the 
traditional political elite. 
 
Unspoken Political Motivations 
------------------------------ 
 
NAIROBI 00003969  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Among Kenya's politicians, the three largest land 
owners, according to widespread public perception, are 
Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki, in that order.  The Kikuyu and 
their close socio/linguistic/political allies and Mount Kenya 
neighbors, the Meru and the Embu, together make up about 
one-third of registered voters.  The next largest group of 
registered voters is the Kalenjins, at only 13 percent of 
registered voters.  The Kikuyu are Kenya's best educated, 
most commercially active and most dispersed community.  They 
have a strong cultural imperative to acquire land.  They are 
often resented by "locals" when they acquire land, businesses 
and jobs outside their home districts.  Kikuyus have a 
linguistic and cultural affinity with Kenya's other Bantu 
ethnic groups.  Together, the Bantus make up 67 percent of 
Kenya's population.  Anti-Kikuyu sentiments are less 
pronounced among their fellow Bantus than among the Nilotes 
(Maasais, Luos, Kalenjins and others). 
 
¶7. (SBU) Kikuyu interests are 1) retain control of the 
government, 2) maintain social peace (good for business and 
necessary to protect Kikuyu minorities living throughout 
Kenya), and 3) improve the business climate (through better 
government services and infrastructure).  Many Kikuyu were 
dispossessed of their lands in the 1990s through violence and 
intimidation organized by President Moi (an ethnic Kalenjin), 
yet there is very little appetite among the Kikuyu political 
elite to redress this injustice.  Elites fear an 
across-the-board review of the land issue, such as in the 
commissioned, but never implemented, Ndungu Report.  Several 
Kikuyu land barons, whose acquisitions date back to the 
Kenyatta era, could be threatened by such a legal review. 
Revisiting the land issue is widely considered by the Kenyan 
elite to be "dangerously destabilizing." 
 
¶8. (SBU) Odinga is the uncrowned King of the Luos.  He has 
committed and nearly universal backing from his community. 
The Luos are a highly homogenous group (as distinct from such 
heterogeneous groups as the Luhyas, Kalenjins and Mijikendas) 
with a strong identity and cultural features that distinguish 
them from the rest of Kenya.  They see themselves as 
chronically oppressed underdogs whose leaders are 
assassinated (Tom Mboya, Robert Ouko) or chased from power 
(Jaramogi Odinga, Raila's father).  Raila presents himself as 
a national leader with a vaguely social democratic agenda, 
ready to fight the traditional elite on behalf of ordinary 
Kenyans.  He is linked to the failed '82 coup attempt against 
Moi.  He played an important role in the fight for multiparty 
democracy in Kenya and is closely associated with the high 
hopes and expectations for dramatic reforms that 
characterized the Kenyan public after the 2002 election. 
However, he is also viewed as an untrustworthy political 
opportunist.  He has a strong motivation to play on 
anti-Kikuyu resentments, especially among the Kalenjin, the 
coastal communities and among his own Luos. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Kalonzo Musyoka has seen his political standing and 
poll numbers tumble over the past year.  He began his 
political career in KANU under Moi.  He then switched to the 
Liberal Democratic Party alongside Raila Odinga in 2002.  He 
joined the victorious NARC coalition and was made a minister 
in Kibaki's first cabinet.  He joined Raila Odinga and other 
fellow ministers in campaigning against the draft 
constitution backed by the government he was serving in. 
When the draft constitution was voted down in the referendum, 
handing Kibaki a demoralizing defeat, Musyoka, Odinga and 
others were dismissed from government.  Following their 
referendum victory, Musyoka and Odinga formed a new party, 
the Orange Democratic Movement of Kenya (ODM-K).  (Uhuru 
Kenyatta of KANU initially joined up with ODM-K, but later 
switched to Kibaki's coalition at Moi's insistence.)  Musyoka 
sought the ODM-K presidential nomination, but saw that 
Odinga's supporters had captured all the party machinery. 
His attempt to block Odinga's nomination for the ODM-K 
presidential candidacy, led Odinga and nearly all other 
prominent ODM-K leaders to decamp to yet another party, the 
Orange Democratic Party (ODM).  That move left Musyoka 
holding onto ODM-K, which was reduced to a regional/ethnic 
party consisting only of his own Kamba ethnic group (8 
percent of projected voters).  It is assumed Musyoka plans to 
 
NAIROBI 00003969  003 OF 004 
 
 
elect a slate of members of parliament loyal to him, whom he 
can then use to bargain for a prominent cabinet position from 
either Kibaki or Odinga.  No objective observers are 
predicting a Musyoka victory at this point. 
 
The Two Major Campaigns: Narratives & Strategies 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Noting that a presidential candidate need only 
obtain a plurality of the vote plus at least 25 percent of 
the vote in five of Kenya's eight provinces to win, here is 
how we see the campaigns: 
 
Kibaki and his Party of National Unity coalition 
 
Strengths:  Growing economy, introduction of free primary 
education with promise of free secondary education as well, 
appreciation for Kibaki's dismantling of Moi-era abuses (cult 
of personality, systematic torture, political detainees, 
etc.), expansion of democratic freedoms, traditional Kenyan 
cultural deference toward elders (at 76, Kibaki is by far the 
oldest of the three candidates).  Allegiance of the largest 
ethnic voting bloc, Kikuyus and their close allies, at about 
one-third of registered voters. 
 
Weaknesses: Widespread perception of favoritism toward fellow 
Kikuyus, indulgence of high-level corruption, continued high 
rates of violent crime, poor infrastructure. 
 
Campaign narrative:  When my government came to power, the 
national economy was shrinking, the treasury was empty and 
the country had suffered years of social and political 
turmoil.  I have revived the economy, brought stability, 
greatly increased revenue collection, introduced free primary 
education and improved the incomes and living standards of 
the eighty percent of Kenyans who live in rural areas.  I am 
well known to you.  I am moderate, stable and honorable.  You 
can depend on me to maintain our country's stability and keep 
the economy growing.  Mine are a safe pair of hands.  Some of 
my ministers may have said or done things that offended some 
of you.  They did not take these positions at my instruction. 
 Note that these hardline, controversial figures (all 
Kikuyus) are not among my leadership team in the Party of 
National Unity coalition.  (This team features balanced 
regional/ethnic representation and does not include such 
controversial figures as Internal Security Minister Michuki 
or Justice Minister Karua.  This public re-election committee 
does not necessarily reflect who actually has the president's 
ear.) 
 
Strategy:  Begin with the 40 percent of the vote from the 
November 2005 referendum (Kikuyu, Embu, Meru, principally), 
add KANU's residual support, which polls at about 3 percent. 
Increase support from Coast Province by recruiting small 
regional parties to the coalition and through distribution of 
land titles to squatters.  Increase support in Western 
Province through vigorous campaigning.  Minimize the number 
of Kikuyu faces in the campaign team.  Attempt to undermine 
Odinga's position among Coast and Western Province Bantus. 
Count on Moi (an ethnic Kalenjin) to increase support for the 
presidential coalition among Rift Valley province Kalenjins. 
As long as Musyoka stays in the race, a score of at least 47 
percent would do.  A Musyoka switch to Kibaki ensures 
victory. Do not name a running mate, hold the slot open for 
Musyoka in case he can be enticed to serve as Vice-President. 
 
 
Odinga and his Orange Democratic Movement 
 
Strengths:  Inspiring orator, brilliant campaigner, 
represents for many Kenyans the high hopes of the 2002 
election, compelling campaign biography of "lifetime of 
struggle for democracy and justice," natural pick for Kenyans 
who resent perceived Kikuyu commercial and government 
dominance. 
 
Weaknesses:  Anti-Luo sentiments are nearly as common as 
anti-Kikuyu sentiments.  History of changing parties and 
supporting 1982 coup attempt leave image of recklessness, 
untrustworthiness and opportunism.  Strongly distrusted by 
 
NAIROBI 00003969  004 OF 004 
 
 
the private sector.  Country's largest ethnic community, the 
Kikuyu/Embu/Meru, is opposed to him. 
 
Campaign narrative: My father was one of the leaders who made 
Kenya independent.  He was betrayed by President Jomo 
Kenyatta (a Kikuyu), thrown out of the government and the 
party and persecuted all of his days.  He taught me to fight 
for the people.  I suffered imprisonment under the Moi regime 
as a result of my leadership in the fight for multiparty 
democracy.  My team is made up of leaders from every part of 
the country.  I am a Kenyan nationalist, a reformer and a 
champion of the common man against the traditional elite.  I 
will right all the wrongs, without causing instability.  I am 
young and energetic.  I am ready to lead the country to the 
next level of development.  Kibaki's economic gains are only 
enjoyed by the rich.  I will fight to bring prosperity to all 
Kenyans. 
 
Strategy:  Begin with the 60 percent "Orange" vote in the 
November 2005 referendum.  Subtract those who have now 
publicly switched to the Kibaki camp (principally KANU, 3 
percent), and also subtract Musyoka's Kambas (8 percent). 
That comes to 49 percent, more than enough to win in a three 
way race.  (Evidence indicates that the 60 percent "Orange" 
vote in 2005 also included pro-Kibaki voters who disliked the 
draft constitution due to perceived privileges granted the 
Muslim community.  These voters can be expected to line up 
with Kibaki during the election.)  Undermine Moi's position 
in Kalenjin-populated regions of Rift Valley Province by 
fanning traditionally high anti-Kikuyu sentiment and calling 
into question his reasons for supporting a Kikuyu government 
that has "chased the Kalenjin from power."  (The Kalenjin 
account for 13 percent of projected voters, the second 
largest group after Kikuyu/Embu/Meru).  Keep Musyoka in the 
race, since his voters would likely otherwise vote for Kibaki. 
 
Comment:  Shifting Alliances 
---------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) In 2002, the election did not come into focus until 
about one month prior to voting, once the pro-Kibaki 
coalition was formed.  Apparent bitter political rivals 
becoming close allies overnight is a common occurrence in 
Kenyan politics.  Over the next few weeks we will see 
defections and reunions aplenty, especially following the 
fights over who gets the nod to compete for parliamentary 
seats on behalf of each coalition.  The election may be 
closer than many observers expected.  This calls for even 
closer scrutiny of the process and intense advocacy for free, 
fair and peaceful conduct of the elections. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Our greatest concern at this point is that ethnic 
rhetoric will get out of hand and lead to serious violence. 
We are taking a number of initiatives to discourage this, 
including a youth-centered concert series on the theme of 
peaceful political participation.  We are also speaking out 
against every prominent act of political violence that occurs 
(ref B). 
 
RANNEBERGER