VZCZCXRO4222
RR RUEHHM RUEHLN RUEHMA RUEHPB RUEHPOD
DE RUEHMO #5221/01 3041319
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311319Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4956
INFO RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 0041
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 2812
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 2500
RUEHZN/EST COLLECTIVE
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 005221 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RUS 
USAID FOR GH, E&E 
HHS FOR OGHA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO SCUL PREL SOCI CH RS
SUBJECT: THE EASTERN FRONT OF RUSSIA'S DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS 
 
REFS: A. Vladivostok 114 
  ¶B. Vladivostok 094 
  ¶C. Moscow 654 
  ¶D. Vladivostok 032 
  ¶E. St. Petersburg 045 
       ¶F. Moscow 1834 
 
MOSCOW 00005221  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT 
ACCORDINGLY. 
 
¶1. (U) This is a joint message from Consulate General Vladivostok 
and Embassy Moscow. 
 
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY:  The population in the Russian Far East (RFE) and 
Siberia is continuing to decline, due both to a long-term trend of 
"Western Drift" (internal migration from east to west within Russia) 
and the serious but somewhat less acute fertility and mortality 
problems that plague Russia as a whole.  GOR efforts to counteract 
these trends have failed to reverse population loss east of the 
Urals, and strict immigration policies have limited the number of 
foreigners who could replace the shrinking Russian population.  Many 
local officials and demographers recognize the threat of Chinese 
immigrants overrunning the RFE and Siberia is greatly exaggerated, 
and that a more relaxed immigration policy and gradual economic 
integration with China and the rest of the Asia-Pacific region could 
lead to economic opportunities and improved social conditions.  It 
appears, however, that policymakers in Moscow have yet to recognize 
that China could be more of an opportunity than a threat on the 
eastern front of Russia's demographic crisis.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------- 
GIANT SUCKING SOUND IN THE EAST 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) As of January 1, 2007, the population of the RFE stood at 6.5 
million people, 18.8 percent less than in 1990.  Siberia lost 7.2 
percent of its population over the same period, and now has 19.6 
million inhabitants.  (Russia's population as a whole declined by 
3.7 percent over that period.)  The steep decline in the eastern 
population can be explained by both natural population loss (more 
deaths than births) and "Western Drift." 
 
¶4. (U) Many younger Far Easterners are moving west for more and 
better job opportunities.  Russia's Central Region (18 Oblasts 
located west of the Urals, including Moscow City and Oblast) suffers 
from low fertility and high mortality and has a more elderly 
population than the area east of the Urals.  As a result, the 
Central Region has supported an influx of working-age inhabitants 
from across Russia.  According to demographers, 43 percent of the 
internal migration to the Central Region has come from the RFE and 
Siberia, making those regions the principal population "donors" to 
the center. 
 
¶5. (U) At the same time, many in Siberia and the RFE feel that their 
social and economic conditions lag those of the rest of the country. 
 In addition to the difficulties of a harsher climate and, in many 
areas, geographical isolation, wages in the RFE and Siberia are 
lower than the Russian average, while the cost of living is higher. 
While demographic decline has tapered off considerably in recent 
years after the big losses of the 1990s, a number of trends lead 
demographers, economists, and policymakers to worry anew about 
population loss.  According to economist and governor of Khabarovsk 
Viktor Ishayev, the gross regional product (GRP) per capita -- used 
by economists as a proxy for regional well-being -- of the RFE and 
the Transbaykal region (Chita Oblast and Buryatiya) stood at 89.5 
percent of the national average in 2005, having fallen from 117.5 
percent seven years before.  Ishayev said that consumer prices in 
eastern Russia remain on average one-third higher than they are in 
the country as a whole (Ref A). 
 
¶6. (SBU) The consensus among demographers is that the Central Region 
will need at least 6 million migrants through 2026, either from 
within Russia or from other countries, to compensate for its labor 
resource losses.  They predict that Siberia could lose an additional 
one million people and the RFE at least another half million people 
over the next 20 years to feed this need.  Even government 
forecasters are projecting that both regions east of the Urals will 
each lose 11 percent of their population over that period.  The 
prospect of replenishing these areas from other Russian regions or 
from the CIS countries is unrealistic, according to many experts, 
who say that China is the only genuine source of labor for the RFE 
 
MOSCOW 00005221  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
and Siberia. 
 
¶7. (U) With a current population of 13.9 million, the prospects in 
Southern Siberia (Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, Omsk 
and Tomsk oblasts) seem relatively brighter than those of the rest 
of Siberia and the RFE, with large urban centers and established 
industrial, academic and scientific bases stretching from Omsk and 
Novosibirsk to Tomsk and Irkutsk.  Southern Siberia is also itself a 
recipient of internal migration from northern Siberia and the RFE. 
 
----------------------------- 
CHINA: OPPORTUNITY OR THREAT? 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) Sensationalist Russian press accounts in the early 1990s 
warned that millions of Chinese would overrun eastern Russia in a 
matter of decades.  Based solely on comparative population, the 
fears have some merit.  Experts call the RFE and Siberia a 
"demographic desert."  Only 5.5 million people live in the five 
Russian regions bordering Northeast China (not including Altay, 
which shares a small border with Northwest China), while over 90 
million people live in the three Chinese provinces bordering the 
RFE.  The population density in the RFE as a whole is 1.4 people per 
square kilometer, and is 2 to 3 people per square kilometer in the 
four RFE regions along the Chinese border, but the population 
density is 20 times greater on the Chinese side. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Despite the stark comparison, demographic experts say there 
are far fewer Chinese in Russia than the press would leave many to 
believe.  According to Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya of the Institute of 
Economic Forecasting, Russia's leading expert on the issue of 
migration, the Chinese population in Russia is concentrated mainly 
in the RFE and Moscow, and accounts for less than one million total, 
up from 200,000 to 300,000 ten years ago.  According to Yuriy 
Avdeyev, Director of the Institute of Regional Projects at the 
Pacific Center for Strategic Development, the vast majority of the 
Chinese in the RFE come for relatively short visits and are not 
interested in staying longer.  To some extent this is a function of 
the current visa regime: obtaining a one-month tourist visa to 
Russia is not that difficult, and may be all the time a laborer 
needs to work one planting or harvest season.  A researcher who 
spent a year interviewing Chinese laborers on both sides of the 
Russia-China border said that most Chinese workers are not 
interested in working more than a few years in Russia, even if they 
could get longer visas. 
 
¶10. (U) Rather than fearing a population invasion from China, many 
experts and Russians living in the RFE and Siberia believe that 
Chinese labor is absolutely crucial for the region.  A report 
developed by the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Far East 
Economic Research characterizes Chinese immigration as an important 
factor in the region's development and calls for easing customs and 
border controls along the border and removing administrative 
barriers for immigration.  Similarly, recent surveys indicate that 
50 percent of respondents in the RFE have a neutral or positive 
attitude towards the presence of Chinese, compared to 25 percent a 
decade ago. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Despite the need for foreign labor, the Russian government 
continues to maintain low quotas for guestworkers.  The nationwide 
quota for non-CIS guestworker visas was 308,842 for 2007 -- down 6 
percent from the previous year.  The share of the quota for the nine 
regions of the RFE was 56,501 workers, nearly 4 percent lower than 
¶2006.  In Primorye, last year's quota was 16,500 laborers, while 
this year it is only 6,701.  According to regional labor experts, 
Primorye needs 200,000 guestworkers (Ref B).  Indeed, a number of 
employers from restaurants, construction companies, and farms have 
told USCG Vladivostok that there is not enough labor to meet their 
needs.  (Note: Separate and much higher quotas are in place for 
workers from the CIS, but demographers and labor experts say that 
CIS countries do not have enough skilled workers to send to Russia. 
Thus, much of the RFE remains reliant upon Chinese and other 
workers.  End note.) 
 
¶12. (SBU) Anatoliy Vishnevskiy, Russia's leading demographer and 
head of the School of Demographics at the Higher School of Economics 
in Moscow, believes the GOR is wary of loosening immigration 
policies because it could lead to instability and exacerbate 
existing social problems, such as xenophobia and ethnic conflict. 
In his view, the Russian popular psyche is simply not ready to 
accept immigrants, and they would "never" be considered Russian -- 
 
MOSCOW 00005221  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
nor would their children or grandchildren.  (Note: This could be the 
case both de facto and de jure, since citizenship is not acquired 
automatically by being born in Russia, and the naturalization 
process is difficult.  End note.) 
 
¶13. (SBU) Nevertheless, Vishnevskiy acknowledged that the Kremlin 
would not be able to completely stem migration from China, even if 
it wanted to.  Illegal migration will continue due to economic 
opportunities and the huge population density disparity between the 
RFE and Northeastern China.  Overall, however, both legal and 
illegal Chinese migration will remain at a relatively low level, he 
said, and there is no danger that Chinese will overrun the RFE. 
 
-------------------------------- 
IF YOU BUILD IT, WILL THEY COME? 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (U) President Putin stated on October 18, in his annual on-line 
question-and-answer session with the Russian people, that stopping 
the sharp population decline in the RFE is one of the government's 
top priorities.  One of the major goals behind the federal 
government's recently-announced 566 billion ruble (22.6 billion USD) 
development plan for the RFE and Trans-Baykal region is to stem 
out-migration and make settlement in the area more attractive. 
Potential projects include the construction of new oil refineries, 
ports, train lines, shipbuilding centers, hospitals, schools, and 
industrial plants.  The Kremlin has also drawn up a plan to help 
ethnic Russians living outside of Russia settle in targeted areas of 
the country.  Some regional politicians harbor their own grand 
schemes, such as Primorye Governor Sergey Darkin, who has revived 
Soviet-era plans to turn Vladivostok into a "megalopolis" of 2 to 3 
million people, despite the fact that the city and its surrounding 
suburbs currently have fewer than 750,000 inhabitants (Ref B). 
 
¶15. (SBU) Little headway has so far been made.  At their most 
optimistic, regional officials in Primorye and Amur Oblast are 
anticipating just a few thousand new settlers in the next five years 
-- not nearly enough to turn the demographic tide.  But even these 
expectations are not being met, because of a lack of adequate 
housing, schooling, and jobs.  It was recently reported that 
although Primorye planned to welcome 1,000 new Russian migrants in 
2007, only sixty people have so far applied to settle in the region, 
due to inadequate housing and low pay.  For example, while 
Krasnoarmeyskiy Rayon in northern Primorye has 255 employment 
vacancies, they can only provide newcomers and their families with 
rooms in hostels.  And a mining company in Dalnegorsk (northeast 
Primorye) is failing to entice migrants with monthly salaries of 
3,000 rubles (120 USD). 
 
¶16. (SBU) Most demographers doubt that current government programs 
can counteract the prevailing population trends.  Vishnevskiy told 
us that although depopulation east of the Urals is one of the most 
serious aspects of Russia's demographics crisis, "no one knows what 
to do about it."  He is skeptical that heavy industrial and 
infrastructure megaprojects would have any impact on improving the 
situation.  Because of technological advances, fewer people are 
needed for oil and gas extraction, which remains the region's most 
auspicious economic activity, and there has been little attempt to 
develop processing and refining capacity east of the Urals (though 
this is part of future development plans). 
 
¶17. (SBU) Vladimir Shkolnikov, a leading Russian demographer at the 
Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research in Rostock, Germany, 
agreed that the GOR has no coherent strategy for dealing with the 
depopulation of the RFE and Siberia.  He expects the huge 
out-migration from the RFE and Siberia to continue indefinitely, 
except in a few pockets where core populations will remain to work 
in oil and gas extraction.  "Demographic osmosis" will continue -- 
as great disparities in population density exist between the RFE and 
northeastern China, people will move from more densely populated 
China to the more sparsely populated RFE.  Russian populations that 
are on the map for primarily political or military reasons will not 
survive under "market conditions" and will have to be artificially 
supported for years to come.  Still, Shkolnikov believes that the 
RFE could be economically developed by simply accepting the 
inevitable and fostering greater economic ties with Northern China, 
though he doubts that the GOR would ever seriously embrace such a 
plan. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
 
MOSCOW 00005221  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) While demographers and many Russians living in the RFE and 
Siberia realize that Chinese migration and greater economic 
integration with the Asia-Pacific region is both inevitable and 
beneficial, it is clear that policymakers in Moscow have not yet 
accepted this view.  Quotas on guestworkers continue to decline, and 
new federal laws have emerged limiting employment opportunities for 
foreigners (Refs D, E, F).  The Kremlin is faced with a fundamental 
contradiction between its political goals and economic reality: it 
wants to maintain its population east of the Urals as a bulwark 
against China and an outlet to the Pacific, but despite grand 
development plans, the economic incentives for living in the region 
remain lacking.  Reconciling this contradiction may require some 
counter-intuitive thinking.  Maintaining the RFE as a vital and 
vibrant part of Russia may actually depend upon inviting foreign 
workers to help develop the economy. 
 
BURNS