VZCZCXRO1323
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #5031 2900440
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 170440Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4658
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 4631
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 2486
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 2784

UNCLAS MOSCOW 005031 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR OES/IHB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO PTER RS
SUBJECT:  BIOTERRORISM: ENHANCING BILATERAL EFFORTS 
 
REFS:  A. 2006 MOSCOW 4312 
   ¶B. 2006 STATE 98525 
   ¶C. 2006 STATE 178100 
   ¶D. STATE 30370 
   ¶E. STATE 112547 
 
Sensitive but unclassified.  Please protect accordingly. 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Department biodefense experts met in Moscow 
October 10 to discuss bilateral bioterrorism cooperation with the 
MFA Department of New Threats and Challenges.  MFA reported some 
confusion about the topics and experts needed for a proposed second 
bilateral meeting of bioterrorism experts to be held under the 
auspices of CTWG.  MFA supports the idea of a separate bilateral 
meeting of WMD experts in Washington on or about December 7.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) On October 10, Marc Ostfield and Lindsey Hillesheim of the 
Department's Office of International Health and Biodefense (OES/IHB) 
and Embassy Science Officer met with Vladimir Titorenko, Deputy 
Director of the MFA's Department of New Challenges and Threats 
(DNV), and Vladimir Prokhorov, DNV officer, to discuss bilateral 
cooperation on bioterrorism under the U.S.-Russia Counterterrorism 
Working Group (CTWG).  The discussion provided a useful introduction 
for Titorenko to Ostfield, the U.S. POC on bilateral cooperation on 
combating bioterrorism, and allowed an opportunity for U.S. 
officials to hear Russian thoughts about potential next steps in 
this work. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Titorenko indicated that there was some confusion on the 
Russian side as to the new format and included topics of the CTWG. 
He understood that in the most recent meeting between U/S Burns and 
Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak, there had been no mention of any 
CTWG-related issues.  Titorenko hoped the anticipated November 
meeting in Brussels between Special Representative Anatoly Safonov 
and U.S. Counterterrorism Coordinator Ambassador Dell Dailey would 
allow for discussion of CTWG content and structure and help clear up 
any GOR confusion. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Echoing GOR statements over the past few years (Ref. A), 
Titorenko gave the familiar refrain that bioterrorism is "a virtual 
threat", explaining that "it's not like putting a bomb near the 
Minister."  He added that "a biological weapon is one of rich 
countries not poor countries," since poor countries, even with 
advanced knowledge are not able to produce anything but "primitive" 
biological weapons. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Addressing the longstanding U.S. proposal (Refs. B-D) to 
hold a second bilateral meeting of bioterrorism experts under CTWG 
auspices as a follow-on to the productive Moscow meeting in 2006 
(Ref. A), Titorenko said that GOR technical agencies had difficulty 
delineating the difference between bioterrorism, state-run 
biological weapons programs, and legitimate research into biological 
agents either for scientific knowledge or to develop medical 
countermeasures (e.g., vaccines) and thus were unsure what sort of 
experts, from a range of sectors, should be involved in the proposed 
bilateral bioterrorism meeting.  Titorenko suggested that a letter 
from the U.S. side spelling out the kind of GOR interagency expert 
participation envisioned would help move things forward in Moscow, 
preferably if conveyed prior to or at the anticipated Safonov-Dailey 
meeting in November. 
 
¶6. (U) Titorenko also echoed the message the State Department 
received in September about a possible bilateral meeting of WMD 
experts in Washington on or about December 7.  As Russia sees it, 
this meeting would help move forward CTWG work in this area once 
CTWG content and structure are finalized.  The Russian proposal for 
such a CTWG-related meeting in Washington is convenient since 
Russian WMD experts from several technical agencies are traveling to 
Canada in early December as part of Russia-Canada work on WMD. 
Given the unique nature of bioterrorism, Titorenko indicated that a 
separate bioterrorism-related meeting in DC at that time might be 
useful. 
 
¶7. (SBU) On another bioterrorism-related issue, Prokhorov briefly 
discussed GOR views of the United Nations Department of Disarmament 
Affairs (UNDDA) July meeting in New York on setting up a possible 
bio-incident database (Ref. E).  The GOR is concerned that this may 
be a duplication of effort with respect to the mechanisms in place 
as part of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) 
(although he noted that the BWC has "no control mechanism") and that 
Russian experts were concerned about the lack of definition as to 
what constitutes a bio-incident (for example, where hoaxes fit in). 
 
BURNS