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Viewing cable 07MOSCOW4958, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: ST.

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW4958 2007-10-11 12:11 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXYZ0023
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #4958 2841211
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 111211Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4546
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS MOSCOW 004958 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/MHAMES/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: ST. 
PETERSBURG PHYSICS AND TECH CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND 
EDUCATION, ST. PETERSBURG, RUSSIA, LICENSE NO. D371956 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel 1 requested a Post-shipment verification to 
determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end- 
user, St. Petersburg Physics and Tech Center for 
Research and Education, St. Petersburg, Russia. The 
company is listed on BIS license application D371956 
as the ultimate consignee of one Gen. III MBE System 
per quote no: NPG061006 and serial no: 703, one 8200 
cryopump compressor, one CT-8 cryopump and two 40' 
helium lines.  These items are controlled for national 
security and anti-terrorism reasons under ECCN 3B001. 
The licensee is Veeco Instruments Inc., 100 Sunnyside 
Boulevard, Woodbury, NY 11797. 
 
3. On September 28, 2007, Export Control Attache 
Donald Pearce and FSN Natalya Shipitsina met with 
Anton Egorov, Chief Scientist, St. Petersburg Physics 
and Technical Center for Research and Education of the 
Russian Academy of Science (PTC), St. Petersburg, 
Russia. The meeting was conducted in the lobby of the 
Angleterre Hotel in central St. Petersburg. 
 
4. Mr. Egorov stated that due to a visit by a 
delegation from the Federal Security Service of the 
Russian Federation (Russian abbreviation FSB), it was 
impossible to utilize the center's meeting room. 
Additionally, as the security clearance for ECO Pearce 
had not been granted, access to the storage area where 
the commodities are being stored was denied.  Mr. 
Egorov offered to allow FSN Shipitsina to gain access, 
however, due to the contract agreement the shipping 
cartons would have to remain sealed. 
 
5. NOTE: Prior to the scheduled meeting, FSN 
Shipitsina was advised that applications for security 
clearance required for access to the PTC facilities, 
and was told the required permits would arrive in time 
for our visit.  On September 27, after arriving in St. 
Petersburg, we were informed that those permits were 
not yet approved, and that the meeting facilities at 
the center were going to be used by the FSB 
delegation.  We agreed to meet Mr. Egorov at the hotel 
and requested he bring documents to establish the bona 
fides of the transaction and the organization.  END 
NOTE. 
 
6. The Ioffe Physical-Technical Institute of the 
Russian Academy of Science established the PTC in 2004 
to consolidate research projects, organize 
conferences, and provide specialized educational 
facilities for students of physics.  The PTC is headed 
by Nobel laureate Zhores Alfiorov, who also serves as 
Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Science and a 
member of the Duma, the legislative body of the 
Russian Federation. The center has programs for 
students in 9th through 12th Grades as well as at the 
University and Post-Graduate levels.  Up to 250 
students per semester attend classes and perform 
experiments in the centers laboratories. 
 
7. The equipment in reftel is to be installed in the 
semiconductor laboratory, which is located in the 
second building of the PTC.  The laboratory currently 
contains a Riber 49 MBE system for production of 
epiwafers used in the fabrication of electronic, 
optoelectronic and laser devices.  The equipment in 
reftel will be assembled by representatives of Veeco, 
with a target date of December, 2007 for the 
installation.  A post-shipment verification could be 
easily accomplished during the installation process. 
 
8.Recommendations: While Post believes that the St. 
Petersburg Physics and Tech Center for Research and 
Education, St. Petersburg, Russia would be a reliable 
recipient of sensitive U.S. origin commodities, the 
findings are severely limited as no site visit was 
allowed, the commodities are still in portable form, 
and no verification could be conducted by the ECO. 
ECO recommends a follow-up PSV be conducted concurrent 
with the installation of the equipment. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/DPEARCE) 
BURNS