VZCZCXRO3856
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #4807/01 2750325
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 020325Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4281
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 2447
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 2733
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 4570

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 004807 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM RS
 
SUBJECT:  Russian Human Rights Observers See Problems, Some Possible 
Solutions 
 
MOSCOW 00004807  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (SBU) During discussions with Embassy officers and EUR/RUS Human 
Rights Officer Mary Glantz from September 17-18, local observers of 
corruption issues, religious freedom, and media rights saw political 
and press freedoms shrinking within the country, but were guardedly 
optimistic about guarded optimism for change in some spheres. 
Yelena Panfilova of Transparency International described a host of 
problems related to corruption, but also voiced some hope for 
changes under the new Premier Zubkov.  In contrast, Lyudmila 
Alekseyevna took a much darker view of events and expected a 
downward trajectory.  On religious freedom, Geraldine Fagan of 
"Forum 18" reported that religious groups face considerable 
bureaucratic hurdles, but noted that the administration largely 
imposes those difficulties equally on all groups.  Andrey Richter of 
the Media Law and Policy Institute cited the need for legal reform 
to help guarantee press freedom, questioned whether the new Duma 
would be any more disposed towards creating such a system of laws, 
but pointed to positive steps by the Supreme Court to protect 
editorial opinion. 
 
------------------------------ 
Two Views on Corruption Trends 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Embassy interlocutors on corruption in Russia differed 
sharply in their assessments of recent developments.  Yelena 
Panfilova of Transparency International (TI) was realistic about the 
problems that corruption posed to Russian society, but expressed 
hope that the Duma would soon pass anti-corruption laws and start a 
reversal of Russia's current poor record.  Panfilova acknowledged 
that corruption in the country was endemic and pervasive, from the 
traffic police that collect 'on-the-spot' fines to university 
professors who provide a passing grade for a fee.  She further 
claimed that the inflows of money from global high oil and gas 
prices have intensified corruption in the country.  (The 
international parent organization of TI Russia issued its annual 
global corruption index on September 26 and "downgraded" Russia from 
121st to 142nd place -- ranking Russia below Cameroon and alongside 
Indonesia.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) Panfilova saw the fight against corruption as Putin's last 
unfinished business and posited that with only a few months left in 
office, he would need to address this problem seriously.  Otherwise, 
she believed Putin's place in history would always be marked with an 
asterisk, noting that he failed to address this basic problem in 
Russian society.   Panfilova drew some encouragement from the 
appointment of Zubkov as Prime Minister and the Russian Duma's 
consideration of a new anti-corruption bill.  She saw Zubkov's 
experience fighting financial crime as a plus; not only did he know 
where the bodies were buried, he also know how to dig them up. 
According to Panfilova, Zubkov would also need to create a "brand" 
for himself quickly to make his premiership successful.  If he could 
push through anti-corruption efforts, Russians would see him as 
heroic, assuring his future political (or non-political) career. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Panfilova did not see the entrenched bureaucracy as a 
problem in this battle.  In a sense, she argued, the vertical, 
top-down authority structure Putin has created would be an advantage 
-- those at the top would hardly be in a position to fight any 
anti-corruption plan.  Indeed, they would see active participation 
as a pre-requisite for continued participation in the government. 
She saw Putin's powers of summary dismissal as a strong tool that 
would intimidate any truculent bureaucrat from cabinet ministers to 
oblast governors and even to clerks issuing driver's licenses. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The main problem she saw with Russian anti-corruption 
legislation concerned the lack of basic legal definitions.   She 
said that Russian law has not defined illegal enrichment, conflicts 
of interest, or other forms of corruption.  However, she pointed out 
that in early October the Russian Duma would begin considering a 
draft law that would bring Russia into compliance with the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption by establishing what the 
courts will allow and setting punishments for violations.  Once 
anti-corruption laws are enacted -- an eventuality that she 
considered inevitable -- the pent-up frustrations of Russians would 
finally have a release.  She believed that as ordinary Russians 
began to understand there were mechanisms to control corruption, 
they would begin to avail themselves of the courts.  As she imagined 
the process developing, slowly but surely society would bring the 
bureaucrats to task on this issue. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Pamfilov's optimism contrasted sharply with the view of 
Lyudmila Alekseyevna of Moscow Helsinki group, who  dissident in the 
 
MOSCOW 00004807  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Soviet Union and viewed the current situation in Russia in stark 
terms.  She saw similarities between the current administration and 
the previous Soviet authorities, characterizing the courts as under 
the control of the bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy as clearly under 
the control of the president.  The elected Duma, she contended, does 
not and cannot express its own, independent will.  She did not see 
much hope for change in the upcoming December Duma elections and the 
March presidential elections. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Alekseyevna described the political situation in almost 
feudal terms, seeing the Kremlin keeping power close and 
distributing the benefits and proceeds to friends or relatives.  She 
said that the current situation is different from that under the 
USSR in that private property did not exist.  With current property 
laws, she said that those in power have the capability of gathering 
much more wealth than had been possible under the Soviet system. 
She said that those in the Kremlin basically run Russia as a private 
fiefdom for their own personal enrichment. 
 
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Freedom of Religion 
------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Geraldine Fagan of "Forum 18," a news agency that monitors 
religious freedom in the former Soviet Union, cautiously described 
the situation in the country as good, with no government policy of 
religious discrimination or preference.  She pointed out that while 
there are tendencies within society to advantage Russian Orthodoxy 
over other religions, she acknowledged that most efforts to 
institutionalize this preference were at the local level.  At the 
Federal level, she noted that Putin had resisted attempts to put 
Russian Orthodox culture and religion in the national school 
curriculum.  On September 13, Putin publicly said that any adoption 
of such a national policy on religion would require a constitutional 
amendment -- a step he considered ill-advised. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Despite the fact that some religious organizations have 
experienced problems (such as Jehova's Witnesses and the Salvation 
Army), Fagan pointed out that most organizations could operate 
unhindered in the country.  Fagan indicated that all religious 
organizations to one extent or another feel the burden of the 
bureaucracy, but she had seen few reports of administrative excesses 
that can be traced solely to an organization's religious status. 
She said that even under the new NGO law, most organizations have 
been able to register.  On the other hand, Fagan noted that 
burdensome registration and auditing demands seem to hit harder on 
smaller or less well organized religious organizations that do not 
have the resources and sophistication to manage the paperwork and 
other requirements.  She would not rule out that in the future, the 
government could use bureaucratic measures to target particular 
religious organizations. 
 
-------------------- 
Media Law and Policy 
-------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Andrey Richter of the Media Law and Policy Institute 
viewed the legislature as the biggest impediment to changing the 
situation for media freedom.  He described the Duma as unable or 
unwilling to pass needed legislation for an independent press to 
function.  Regarding print media, he noted that since 1991, some 
legislation has assured the editorial independence of newspapers and 
journals; however, this freedom has been eaten away as prosecutors 
(with the complicity of the courts) have used anti-terrorism and 
anti-extremism laws to cower the press.  Since the 2006 amendments 
to the extremism law, local prosecutors have found it easy to pursue 
"extremism" cases against media outlets.  Most such outlets quickly 
came to understand that the authorities could close their presses if 
they continue publishing controversial material.  Richter noted that 
currently few media outlets choose to publish articles critical of 
the current administration, and those that do serve mainly the 
larger cities, often only Moscow or St. Petersburg.  The remainder 
of the country lacks access to balanced news outlets. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Richter painted a more distressed situation regarding 
broadcast journalism, in large part because the Duma has not passed 
any legislation governing the use of public airwaves.  Richter said 
that as a result of this vacuum, only a presidential decree governs 
the distribution of spectrum and the regulation of television 
content.  Moreover, the government organization that regulates 
broadcasting serves mainly at the pleasure of the president; not 
only are the heads of this organization, Rossvyazokhrankultury, 
appointed by the president, but the organization can be changed 
fairly easily by presidential proclamation.  He characterized 
Rossvyazokhrankultury as "very political" and capricious in its 
decisions, since it can issue official warnings to broadcast 
 
MOSCOW 00004807  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
outlets, and these warnings cannot be appealed in court.  After two 
such warnings, the agency can close a given outlet. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Richter noted that the Supreme Court has aided the cause 
of press freedom.  The court ruled that lower courts must 
differentiate between fact and opinion in all press cases.  As a 
result, journalists can no longer be punished for editorial content. 
 Also, the court indicated that public figures, by virtue of their 
positions, can be subject to greater press criticism that other 
people.  Finally, Richter noted that the Supreme Court ordered lower 
courts also to consider the importance of media freedom when 
deciding a case. 
 
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Comment 
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¶13.  (SBU) Discussions with human rights experts illustrate the 
complex and nuanced aspects of Russia's difficult development path. 
Corruption in Russia poses significant challenges to Russians and 
those living or doing business in the country and it is difficult to 
predict how (or if) the government can meet this challenge. 
Moreover, there seems to be little political will to establish a 
legal framework that would strengthen media freedoms -- particularly 
over the coming months of the electoral season.  The bright spot 
appears to be religious freedom issues; ironically, all groups 
appear to be equally disadvantaged by the heavy burdens of the 
bureaucracy.