VZCZCXRO4236
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #1237/01 3041242
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311242Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7064
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 001237 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AID/W FOR AFR/EA, DCHA/OFDA, DCHA/CMM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MOPS PGOV MARR KPKO CG
 
SUBJECT: LAURENT NKUNDA SITUATION - PERSPECTIVES ON DDR OF HIS 
TROOPS 
 
Summary.  A joint USAID-UNDP Mission traveled to Goma October 16-18. 
 The purpose was to determine:  The number, composition and location 
of Nkunda's troops in North Kivu; the numbers expected to elect for 
DDR or incorporation into the FARDC; and options for managing the 
DDR caseload (if/when it materializes.  3,000-5,000 is the estimated 
total men under arms at the current time.  Approximately 1,400 FARDC 
deserters and others who had voluntarily or involuntarily joined 
Nkunda have escaped or surrendered over the last two weeks, and are 
being transported to Kamina and Katona for ad-hoc brassage.  Of the 
3,000-5,000 troops, 1,500-2,000 are thought to be hard-core Nkunda 
Tutsi loyalists.  There are 1,000 troops originally from the FARDC 
battalions that were "mixed" with Nkunda's forces.  Finally, there 
are an additional 1,000 bandits, thugs, mercenaries and forced 
conscripts.  The Nkunda forces are currently in three areas of south 
North Kivu.  The FARDC has succeeded in interposing itself between 
the troop concentrations so that they are physically isolated from 
each other. 
 
The deserters (i.e., those troops who were originally FARDC and then 
were "mixed" with Nkunda's battalions, will mostly choose the FARDC 
over DDR.  The child soldiers will choose DDR.  The bandits, thugs, 
mercenaries and opportunists will mostly choose DDR.  The forced 
conscripts will choose DDR.  Nkunda's loyalists will probably 
overwhelmingly choose DDR.  They would be very happy to elect to 
remain in the FARDC if they were guaranteed that they could stay in 
North Kivu, but the GDRC is not/not offering this.  The total 
estimated DDR caseload is 2,500-3,000.  The FARDC buildup continues, 
with daily arrivals of troops and ammunition in Goma.  FARDC has 
25,000 men under arms in the province.  Both of their two attack 
helicopters are now operational.  MONUC is providing heavy logistics 
support. 
 
Subsequent to the Mission, the team learned that the current GDRC 
plan is to send all of Nkunda's forces to Kamina or Kitona.  They 
will all go into nine weeks of brassage, following which they will 
all receive three months of MONUC military training.  Subsequent to 
that, they will choose to stay in the FARDC or go into DDR.  This 
plan, if they stick to it, will mean that any DDR for those who want 
to go this route will be four-five months into the future. 
 
There are a number of design issues for a DDR program for these 
troops:  A. Timing of DDR - as yet quite unclear; B. Content of the 
reintegration package - need to reconcile UNDP and MDRP packages; C. 
The role of UNDP; D. The role of NGOs in reintegration; E. Inclusion 
of Mayi-Mayi troops in the program; F. the role and funding of the 
MOD project implementation unit.  Planning should move forward for a 
DDR program for 3,000 ex-combatants from Nkunda's forces, plus an 
additional as yet unspecified number of Mayi-Mayi troops.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. A joint USAID-UNDP Mission traveled to Goma October 16-18.  The 
team was composed of: Nicholas Jenks, USAID Program Officer; Cheryl 
Anderson, USAID Peace and Security Team Leader; Fernando Larrauri, 
UNDP; and Menada Wind-Andersen, UNDP. 
 
¶3. The team met with: MONUC/North Kivu Head of Office; MONUC 
Political Officer; MONUC North Kivu Force Commander; Governor of 
North Kivu; Commander of the FARDC 8th Military Region (North Kivu); 
Minister of Defense; Director of the Congolese DDR Agency; UN 
Agencies; and NGOs. 
 
¶4. The purpose was to determine:  The number, composition and 
location of Nkunda's troops in North Kivu; the numbers expected to 
elect for DDR or incorporation into the FARDC; and options for 
managing the DDR caseload (if/when it materializes. 
 
¶5. Military Situation.  The situation is tense and fragile. The 
fragility is in essence coming from an emerging belief that a 
decisive victory by FARDC is needed to resolve the stand-off between 
FARDC and Nkunda's forces, and that the prospects for victory are 
far from certain. The FARDC is fundamentally weak. In the recent 
battle for Sake, where the 15th and 16th integrated brigades (IBs) 
were used, the 15th IB essentially ran away, and MONUC had to step 
in to keep Nkunda forces from taking the town. However, there are a 
number of factors in the GDRC's favor. The 15th IB has been replaced 
by the 116th regular brigade; the GDRC is sending in a continuous 
flow of reinforcements, and with comprehensive logistical support 
from the North Kivu MONUC Bgde, the FARDC is poised to take 
Mushake. 
 
KINSHASA 00001237  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶6. Some observers believe that Nkunda is low on ammunition. If his 
forces cannot re-supply, the consensus is that FARDC will win, 
though it may take two months. Supply lines have been cut, evidenced 
by the fact that Nkunda is targeting FARDC ammunitions caches, while 
conserving ammunition whenever engaging. However, should Nkunda be 
re-supplied, the conflict could extend by up to a year. 
 
¶7. Even should Nkunda be re-supplied, the dynamic is changing on the 
ground. Approximately 1,400 FARDC deserters and others who had 
voluntarily or involuntarily joined Nkunda have escaped or 
surrendered over the last two weeks, and are being transported to 
Kamina and Katona for ad-hoc brassage. The GDRC is actively 
encouraging this by paying surrenderees 20,000 Congolese Francs 
($40). 
 
¶8. Number of troops.  3,000-5,000 is the estimated total men under 
arms at the current time.  It is noted that desertion (whereby 
Nkunda's troops steal away from the rebellious units and surrender 
or otherwise present themselves to the FARDC) and recruitment (both 
forced and mercenary recruitment) is ongoing.  The desertion rates 
have led observers to believe that the force - at one point 6,000 
strong, now comprises 5,000 or fewer.  Approximately 1,400 have 
deserted to date. 
 
¶9. Composition of the troops.  Organizationally, the force is 
composed of 14 operational and two HQ battalions of between 300-400 
men each.  Of the 3,000-5,000 troops, 1,500-2,000 are thought to be 
hard-core Nkunda Tutsi loyalists.  Of the remainder, 300-900 are 
child soldiers (although this number is on the increase); very few 
are female.  There remain 1,000 troops originally from the FARDC 
battalions that were "mixed" with Nkunda's forces, which are not 
sympathetic to Nkunda's agenda; this is the group that is currently 
in the process of deserting/surrendering to the FARDC/MONUC and they 
are sometimes referred to as "hostages."  Finally, there are an 
additional 1,000 bandits, thugs, mercenaries and forced conscripts. 
In summary form: 
¶A. Nkunda Tutsi loyalists: 1,500-2,000 
¶B. FARDC troops (mixed with Nkunda's): 1,000 
¶C. Bandits, thugs, mercenaries and forced conscripts: 1,000 
¶D. Child soldiers: 300-900 
 
¶10. The forces are marked by a strict command and control structure, 
led by a small inner-circle of commanders. Four members of this top 
leadership have either ICC or GDRC warrants against them.  They are 
currently divided into three groups, but all are under the command 
and control of Nkunda through his lieutenants.  Some Rwandan 
uniforms have been reported. 
 
¶11. Location of the troops.  The Nkunda forces are currently in 
three areas of south North Kivu.  The FARDC has succeeded in 
interposing itself between the troop concentrations so that they are 
physically isolated from each other.  Nkunda's troops are in the 
areas defined as follows: 
¶A. From Bunangana (on the Rwandan border) to a point east of 
Rumangabo 
¶B. North of Sake as far as Mweso extending east towards by not 
reaching Rutshuru 
¶C. West of Muksake extending to Gungu 
 
¶12. Numbers that will choose incorporation into the FARDC or DDR. 
The various sub-groups of which Nkunda's force is composed will make 
different choices.  The deserters (i.e., those troops who were 
originally FARDC and then were "mixed" with Nkunda's battalions, 
will mostly choose the FARDC.  The child soldiers will choose 
(actually the choice will be made for them) DDR.  The bandits, 
thugs, mercenaries and opportunists will mostly choose DDR.  The 
forced conscripts will choose DDR.  Nkunda's loyalists will probably 
overwhelmingly choose DDR.  They would be very happy to elect to 
remain in the FARDC if they were guaranteed that they could stay in 
North Kivu, but the GDRC is not/not offering this.  The message 
currently is unequivocal - if they choose the FARDC they will be 
brassaged, and subsequently assigned, outside - probably far 
outside, North Kivu.)  In summary, estimated DDR caseload: 
2,500-3,000. 
 
¶13. Caveat on the above.  There is a lack of consensus on how many 
of Nkunda's forces would choose brassage, and how many would choose 
reintegration. FARDC sources indicate that not more than 15%-20% 
 
KINSHASA 00001237  003 OF 004 
 
 
would choose brassage, while other sources suggest that between 90% 
and 50% would do so. Coloring the debate is the fact that 30% of the 
Ituri DDR participants were expected to choose reintegration into 
FARDC, based on global rates under the National DDR Plan. In fact, 
none of the Ituri participants chose to join the army 
 
¶14. Situation of the "deserters."  They are deserting for two 
reasons:  A. They do not back Nkunda's agenda, and/or, B. The 
conditions are poor (and deteriorating) in the bush were they 
are/were located.  Nkunda's commanders and officers exercise heavy 
command and control of their forces, and kill deserters if they can. 
 It is estimated (by the FARDC force commander) that 30% of 
deserters are killed. 
 
¶15. The wave of deserters is being dealt with by the SMI (Military 
Integration Structure, the FARDC entity responsible for the 
logistics of forging the new integrated FARDC.)  The principle of 
one man, one weapon, is not being applied, because many have arrived 
without weapons, and it is clear that Nkunda is not permitting his 
men to hold weapons at all times. Additionally, the FARDC tactical 
strategy is to reduce Nkunda's troop strength as well as weapons 
stores.  The ex-combatants are being regrouped in Kituku transit 
site, and sent to Kamina once 100 persons are present. The rationale 
for the transport to Kamina is safety, in that Kituku is part of an 
active operational theatre. They are being informally registered, 
and although the SMI says that they will be given a choice of 
brassage or reintegration into civilian life once they arrive in 
Kamina, the element of coercion is certainly a strong possibility. 
The UEPN-DDR Director has proposed setting up formal registration 
with the IRIS system at both Kituku and Kamina using equipment which 
would be brought in from the Ituri DDR sites. This would allow the 
transition to a formal DDR process, and mitigate the coercive 
element.  (However, this may not happen - see para 20.) 
 
¶16. Negotiated solution or a military solution?  Depends on whose 
crystal ball you choose.  MONUC force commander (North Kivu) says 
that the Nkunda hard core will not give up, and it will be a 
military solution.  The Commander of the 8th Military Region says 
they do not want war, and are using a combination of measured 
military pressure on Nkunda and negotiation.  Kabila extended the 
10/15 deadline for ten days, for further evaluation at that time. 
He has also said that this situation must be resolved before the end 
of the year.  Finally, he said publicly that he has given the green 
light to preparations for a military assault if negotiations do not 
resolve the situation. 
 
¶17. The GDRC is pursuing three simultaneous tactics. Against Nkunda 
loyalists, it appears committed to forceful disarmament. The "give 
peace a chance" rhetoric and lack of immediate offensive appears 
designed to appease the international community, allow FARDC to 
reinforce and regroup, and facilitate the hemorrhaging of 
non-loyalists elements from Nkunda. At the same time, the GDRC is 
actively negotiating with other negative forces in North Kivu, to 
prevent to all too frequent alliance-hopping that has marked the 
conflict from reinforcing Nkunda. Reportedly, ranks have been 
provided to the Jackson Mai-Mai and 775 of his troops surrendered in 
Bingi. 
 
¶18. The door to a negotiated settlement with Nkunda has perhaps 
closed. The GDRC's position is that Nkunda has a criminal warrant 
against him, and therefore, should he go into exile, the GDRC would 
seek his extradition. On his part, Nkunda has reportedly stated that 
he would rather commit suicide than surrender.  There is the 
possibility that Nkunda's core group could splinter into hardliners 
and those willing to disarm. One source indicated that not all of 
the loyalist leadership agree that fighting to the end is the 
correct course. 
 
¶19. FARDC buildup.  This continues, with daily arrivals of troops 
and ammunition in Goma.  FARDC has 25,000 men under arms in the 
province, and they figure that they need six attackers per defender. 
 Both of their two attack helicopters are now operational.  MONUC is 
providing all logistics support short of arms and ammunition, attack 
helicopters and tanks. 
 
¶20. Sequencing of FARDC integration and DDR.  Subsequent to the 
Mission, the team learned that the current GDRC plan is to send all 
of Nkunda's forces to Kamina or Kitona.  They will all go into nine 
weeks of brassage, following which they will all receive three 
 
KINSHASA 00001237  004 OF 004 
 
 
months of MONUC military training.  Subsequent to that, they will 
choose to stay in the FARDC or go into DDR.  This plan, if they 
stick to it, will mean that any DDR for those who want to go this 
route, will be four-five months into the future.  (This new 
information reportedly comes from Kabila, passed through the SRSG 
and on to us.) 
 
¶21. The dynamics in relation to other Negative Forces.  There is a 
very strong consensus that all negative forces must be included in 
North Kivu DDR, not just Nkunda's men. There are five armed Mai-Mai 
groups, and three non-FDLR militias (ADF-NALU, RUD, and RPR) also 
present and active. Some of them have linked their disarmament to 
that of Nkunda's factions, and some, such as Jackson's Mai-Mai's, 
having made that linkage in the past, have proceeded even without 
this pre-condition being met. Estimates are that with the inclusion 
of these groups, the total number of potential participants in a 
brassage/DDR process jumps to 14,000-19,000. Not all of these 
persons would be eligible for the PNDR, raising the point that 
careful coordination from the earliest stages is necessary to ensure 
that eventual World Bank funding can be applied to aspects of the 
program. 
 
¶22. The reintegration package.  GDRC officials spoken with all 
vigorously opposed "safety net" cash payments as part of a DDR 
package. This is part of the National DDR Program (PNDDR) in place 
through the World Bank, which is currently without funding. There 
appeared to be a widespread misapprehension that the PNDR does not 
have a livelihoods-based reintegration element, or that this was or 
is a failure. The Governor of North Kivu raised the argument that 
when the safety net payments exceed what a soldier is paid, this 
serves as a draw to choose civilian life, whether of not the 
participant fully understands the choice. As a result, when the 
funds run out, so does the commitment to remain in civilian life. 
The current situation is that the GDRC (or at least the MOD and the 
DDR Agency) and UNDP want to use a different package than has been 
used by the MDRP/CONADER in the past.  Reintegration package 
harmonization and public sensitization is required. 
 
¶23. Capacity to implement DDR.  The SMI is currently implementing 
ad-hoc proto-DDR with FARDC funding. The UEPN-DDR has administrative 
structures in place in North Kivu and nationally. However, while 
staff are still working, they have not been paid, and the 
electricity at the North Kivu office has been cut for non-payment. 
MONUC has the capacity, and the will to stand up the necessary 
disarmament points and regroupment camps, and conduct disarmament. 
UNDP has the capacity, if not the funding, to effectively implement 
demobilization. 
 
¶24. The capacity for reintegration is mixed. UNDP is willing to 
manage an Ituri model reintegration program, but has yet to 
illustrate its effectiveness. The UNOPS capacity to provide HIMO 
appears adequate, even for the higher number. Among the NGOs already 
present in North Kivu, a sampling of those most likely to have the 
capacity to implement a reintegration/expanded reintegration program 
shows absorptive capacity sufficient for approximately 3,500 adult 
XCs.  This means that in order to ensure sufficient reintegration 
program capacity on the ground for Nkunda's forces, other armed 
groups that choose to join the process, and the remaining 4,500 in 
UEPN-DDR prior caseload in North Kivu who have not yet received 
 
SIPDIS 
reintegration assistance, additional capacity will need to be 
mobilized. 
 
¶25. Design issues for a DDR program for these troops: 
¶A. Timing of DDR - as yet quite unclear 
¶B. Content of the reintegration package - need to reconcile UNDP and 
MDRP packages 
¶C. The role of UNDP 
¶D. The role of NGOs in reintegration 
¶E. Inclusion of Mayi-Mayi troops in the program 
¶F. Role and funding of the MOD project implementation unit 
 
¶26. Bottom line.  Planning should move forward for a DDR program for 
3,000 ex-combtants from Nkunda's forces, plus an additional as et 
unspecified number of Mayi-Mayi troops.  Howeer, concrete plans 
cannot be finalized until som of the important variables (above) 
are better defined.  USAID will actively monitor the situation, nd 
continue to push DDR planning for this group forward. 
BROCK