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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1680, UNREST AND TURMOIL IN CAMPS CREATE SUSPICIONS OF GOS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1680 2007-10-30 11:15 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2822
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1680/01 3031115
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301115Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8982
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001680 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI UN SU
SUBJECT:  UNREST AND TURMOIL IN CAMPS CREATE SUSPICIONS OF GOS 
MOTIVES 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1659 B) KHARTOUM 1661 
 
KHARTOUM 00001680  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.(SBU) On October 20, the Governor of South Darfur announced plans 
to divide Kalma internally displaced person (IDP) camp into nine 
smaller camps outside of Nyala.  Kalma Camp has been the site of 
rioting by majority Fur against minority Zaghawa African tribes, 
exacerbated by tensions between non-signatory and signatory rebel 
groups (chiefly SLM-Minawi).  The proposed plan would separate the 
92,000 IDPs that live in Kalma along ethnic lines and move IDPs 
closer to their areas of origin.  The humanitarian community is 
extremely concerned over the government's plan to relocate IDPs from 
Kalma because it opens the door for non-voluntary returns and is not 
implemented in accordance with humanitarian principles, which 
mandate that new sites be assessed for suitability and that IDPs 
should be allowed to freely `choose whether or not to move.  The 
Sudanese Government has denied to us that this is their intention. 
A simiar situation has unfolded in Hamadiya IDP camp in Zalingei, 
West Darfur, in recent days, leading many within the humanitarian 
community to fear that we are seeing the beginning of a larger 
relocation trend in Darfur.  End Summary. 
 
------------- 
Kalma IDP Camp 
-------------- 
 
2.(SBU) Following several days of interethnic fighting in Kalma 
camp, Sudanese government forces, repelled at first by IDPs, entered 
Kalma on October 19 and began shooting, burning structures, and 
arresting IDPs suspected of participating in the tribal 
bloodletting.  The USAID-supported Justice and Confidence Center and 
other USAID partners' facilities are believed to have been damaged 
or destroyed.  Deaths have been confirmed in the camp, but detailed 
figures are not yet available. 
 
3.(SBU) As a result of the interethnic fighting in the camp, an 
estimated 30,000 IDPs have left the camp.  Aid agencies report that 
the predominantly Zaghawa sectors of 4, 7, and 8 are nearly empty, 
but 60,000 IDPs remain in Kalma camp, as of October 24.  Between 500 
to 600 IDPs are now living around the camp, an estimated 4,000 
people have arrived in Otash IDP camp, and approximately 100 people 
have arrived in Al Salam IDP camp.  Agencies estimate that more than 
1,800 people are residing in Nyala town.  Other IDPs are believed to 
be moving to neighboring towns, such as Mukjar or Ed Al Fursan. 
 
4.(SBU) Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in Darfur have 
stated that they cannot take a position on the proposed division of 
the camp as that would further strain their relationship with the 
government and jeopardize their ability to continue to provide 
humanitarian services in Darfur.  The UN is drafting a common 
position on the issue and has briefed donors on the situation. 
 
5.(SBU) The lack of a camp coordinating agency in Kalma continues to 
be a problem.  Kalma has not had a camp coordinator since November 
2006 when the Norwegian Refugee Council pulled out of Darfur due to 
repeated suspension of their activities by government officials. 
Currently, the Government of National Unity (GNU) is blocking the 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) from 
expanding and providing camp coordination in North and South Darfur. 
 Without a camp coordinator, Kalma camp does not have a focal point 
for resolving disputes in the camp, ensuring the safety of 
vulnerable groups, and liaising with the government on camp issues. 
 
 
6.(SBU) The humanitarian community has raised concern over several 
of the sites proposed by the government for relocation because they 
are located in insecure areas making them harder for the 
humanitarian community to access.  The GNU has stated that it is 
unable to set up now camps without the support of the international 
community.  CDA Fernandez assured the Sudanese MFA that any 
unilaterally declared new camps would have no US support, and we are 
the largst donor. UN agencies and the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) plan to assess the proposed sites to determine their 
suitability in the coming days.  However, the assessment has been 
 
KHARTOUM 00001680  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
repeatedly delayed.  In the meantime, aid agencies may set up a 
transitional area in Nyala that would function for two months and 
provide services to 20,000 people.  Additionally, an investigation 
is needed to determine the extent of damage to the camp, further 
risks for IDPs remaining in Kalma, and the motivation for violence. 
Medecins Sans Frontieres recently visited Kalma to provide immediate 
life-saving services.  However, it is still unclear when other 
relief agencies will be able to return. 
 
----------------- 
Hamadiya IDP Camp 
----------------- 
 
7.(SBU) On October 20, a 10-vehicle convoy of Sudanese Armed Forces 
(SAF) surrounded Hamadiya IDP camp, shooting guns and arresting some 
IDPs.  This incident was triggered by the murder of an SAF soldier 
in the camp earlier that day.  Arab militias surrounded the upper 
part of the camp.  Unconfirmed reports indicate that four IDPs were 
killed and four SAF were also killed in the fighting.  On October 
21, the camp was reportedly calm, but increasingly militarized IDP 
youth had mobilized to patrol the camp. 
 
8.(SBU) On October 23, the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) in 
Zalingei locality issued a letter forbidding all NGO activities in 
Hamadiya camp.  The letter also forbids all humanitarian activities, 
except for water and health services, in other Zalingei-area camps. 
In subsequent meetings, the HAC indicated plans to move IDPs from 
Hamadiya into smaller camps in other locations. 
 
 
 
----------------------- 
Part of a Larger Trend? 
----------------------- 
 
9.(SBU) With back to back incidents in Haskanita, Muhajeria, Kalma, 
and Zalingei, many within the humanitarian community are wondering 
if we are seeing the implemtation of a larger strategy on the part 
of the government to break up the IDP camps in Darfur.  In October, 
civilian casualties are markedly higher than in previous months, 
according to the UN, and displaced populations in Kalma, Muhajeria, 
and Haskanita have dispersed due to attacks.  The recent fighting 
led 30,000 people to leave the Haskanita area and at least 15,000 to 
leave Muhajeria.  The violence in Kalma has also displaced at least 
30,000 people.  While new displacement (for a variety of reasons, 
including fighting between pro-government Arab tribes) has been a 
steady trend throughout 2007, the recent escalated violence could be 
related to broader changes on Darfur's political horizon. 
 
10.(SBU) One can only speculate what the causes of the recent 
upsurge in violence are linked to -- the upcoming peace talks in 
Libya, the deployment of the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the 
upcoming census, or the Sudanese government's desire to strengthen 
their control over humanitarian operations.  The implications of 
what we are seeing on the ground with the recent attacks, require 
further analysis to determine which groups are being displaced and 
for what reason. 
 
-------- 
Comments 
-------- 
 
11.(SBU) It is critical that the humanitarian community stress to 
the government the need for IDPs to be allowed to freely choose 
whether or not to move to the proposed new locations.  Any new 
proposed sites for IDPs must meet all international humanitarian 
standards and any transition must not further expose IDPs to 
violence, exploitation, or health risks (Embassy makes these points 
to MFA and will continue to do so).. 
 
12.(SBU) On October 25, CDA Fernandez raised these issues with 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials (REF B).  In the 
meeting, the MFA registered surprise and doubt that these incidents 
were part of a government policy and proposed forming a committee 
with the HAC to discuss the events unfolding in Darfur. 
 
13.(SBU) While there is increasing ethnic turmoil among IDPs,rising 
 
KHARTOUM 00001680  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
crime, and militarization within these camps, these events should 
not mask or excuse SAF/GOS attempts at score-setting or disguised 
forced re-settlement of IDPs.  End comments. 
 
FERNANDEZ