Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1653, SPLM TO DIPLOMATS: NCP MUST ACT ON OUR DEMANDS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07KHARTOUM1653.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1653 2007-10-24 14:21 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO8119
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1653/01 2971421
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 241421Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8919
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001653 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF SE NATSIOS 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU
SUBJECT:  SPLM TO DIPLOMATS: NCP MUST ACT ON OUR DEMANDS 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  SPLM leaders, principally Deputy Chairman Malik 
Agar, told members of the diplomatic community that the SPLM 
believed that they had no choice but to suspend ministerial level 
participation in the GoNU in order to pressure the NCP to act on 
SPLM core issues.  The SPLM blamed NCP obstructionist tactics that 
undermined progress in implementing the CPA for the SPLM suspension. 
The SPLM wants NCP action on SPLM core issues, and to be treated as 
equal partners, in order to resolve the situation. End Summary. 
 
SIMMERING INACTION 
------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) On October 23, Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) 
leaders, including Deputy Chairman Malik Agar, National Assembly 
Deputy Speaker Atem Garang, and Kosti Manibe told members of the 
diplomatic community the reasons for the SPLM's ministerial level 
suspension of participation in the Government of National Unity 
(GoNU). 
 
3. (SBU The situation leading up to the SPLM's action was not one 
day in the making, said Malik.  He said that even as the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was concluded, as the SPLM 
attempted to work within the accords, it became evident that one of 
the CPA's weaknesses included no specific mechanism to resolve 
issues.  Malik said that the SPLM tried to work with the National 
Congress Party (NCP) on a host of issues with only "a heap of 
resolutions" as a result. "Practically speaking, the letter and the 
spirit of the CPA have not been followed." 
 
ENOUGH IS ENOUGH 
---------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Malik said that despite the inaction, "the SPLM continued 
to work with the NCP, but meetings were really only PR."  He said 
that after one and half years, with little movement, the SPLM were 
faced with two choices: "continued dialogue until something 
happens," or say "enough is enough." 
 
NCP SEEN AS OBSTRUCTIONIST 
-------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) As an example of the NCP's method of obstruction, Malik 
said that of the eleven CPA commissions, "six of them are not 
functioning. They lack either funding, human resources or facilities 
in order to conduct their operations." The NCP would claim progress 
in fulfilling the CPA with the establishment of eleven commissions, 
but we say "yes, but look how they are functioning." 
 
6. (SBU) Malik charged that the NCP has held up progress on a number 
of CPA issues. "We asked the NCP two and half months ago to 
reshuffle the cabinet, as is the right of the First Vice President, 
but they did do not anything.  There are only seven laws that have 
been enacted.  The Attorney General is sitting on the others. In two 
National Assembly sessions, nothing has been done.  We want the laws 
tabled." 
 
7. (SBU) The NCP seems to have "predetermined" how far the CPA 
should progress, with significant negative consequences, Malik 
asserted.  For example, the census must be adequately funded, as 
wealth calculations depend on its outcome, which in turns leads to 
social development, he said.  He added that the census form needs 
urgent attention in particular in regards to ethnicity information. 
"We have to get the census right the first time, we can't do it 
twice." 
 
SELECTED CORE ISSUES MADE UP SPLM DEMANDS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) The SPLM developed a limited list of demands that made up 
"selected core issues," said Malik, so that any NCP action would 
result in some meaningful progress on these core issues. For 
example, he said that the SPLM selected the Abeyi issue as a demand 
for its economic importance. 
 
9. (SBU) Malik said that when the SPLM raised an Abeyi compromise 
with the NCP, the NCP pretended it was not a problem that needs to 
be addressed. "That is when we in the SPLM knew it was a problem 
issue for them."  He added that to resolve the problem, "the SPLM 
offered to provide a fixed schedule of payments, from the Abeyi oil 
revenues, so whether the South secedes or not, the north gets a 
share. But they repeatedly declined to discuss the issue." 
 
10. (SBU) As for oil revenue transparency, Malik conceded that the 
south does get 50 percent of the oil revenues, but "no one knows 
what constitutes the 100 percent. We want to see the number of 
barrels, have access to information such as recovery costs. We have 
eyes, but there is a lack of NCP political will to share the 
information." 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001653  002 OF 002 
 
 
MALIK: WE WANT TO BE EQUAL PARTNERS 
----------------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) Malik said he remained committed to the implementation of 
the CPA and to the NCP-SPLM partnership, "but as equal partners." 
As for secession, Malik denied that the SPLM acted as a possible 
pretext for a premature separation.  "No one is looking for a 
premature separation, what we want is implementation of the CPA." 
 
NEXT STEPS: MORE AGGRESSIVE INTERNATIONAL ACTION 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
12. (SBU) Asked about next steps, Manibe said that the SPLM cannot 
implement the CPA alone.  He appealed to the diplomatic community to 
be more aggressive in their involvement, particularly in the 
Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC).  He said that the NCP 
has a "phobia" about third parties, adding without the involvement 
of the international community, there is no other way other than a 
return to conflict. 
 
13. (SBU) Manibe said that the AEC is supposed to be an independent 
body.  However, "some Sudanese have terrorized the foreigners, with 
the result that some of the foreigners act as if they are not full 
members."  This reduces the commission to two parties, who are 
incapable of moving things forward, said Manibe. 
 
NCP MUST ACT ON OUR DEMANDS BEFORE WE RETURN TO THE CABINET 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
14. (SBU) Asked what it would take for the ministers to return to 
the cabinet, the SPLM leaders responded that, "All of the issues 
have been talked to death. We need to see action."  Malik said that 
the SPLM actions are changeable but the SPLM ministers will not go 
back unless something happens. 
 
CLASHES SO FAR ARE LOCALIZED AND CONTAINED 
------------------------------------------ 
 
15. (SBU) Manibe said that there have been clashes between SAF and 
SPLA forces but so far they have been localized and contained.  "In 
these instances, we did not instruct our forces to take action, but 
the clashes could obviously lead to more incidents," said Manibe. He 
stressed that these localized incidents are "not a declaration of 
war."  Atem Garang added, "We can not think of war, as there is no 
benefit to us." 
 
16. (SBU) Malik added,"we will try to control our soldiers, but our 
control has its limitations.  For generals on the ground, protection 
of their men is paramount.  We will do our best not to go to war." 
 
 
POSSIBLE OPENING 
---------------- 
 
17. (SBU) Deputy Speaker Atem Garang said, "The SPLM was thinking of 
not attending the October 23 opening session of the National 
Assembly, but we attended the session to hear the President's 
speech."  If he was serious about implementing the CPA he would form 
a committee of the GoNU to look into resolving the current 
situation, said Garang. 
 
18. (SBU) Note: Shortly before the end of the meeting, SPLM Deputy 
Secretary General Yasir Arman arrived and commented on the recent 
 
SIPDIS 
SPLM sponsored conference in Juba saying that more work needs to be 
done with the Darfur rebels movement. End Note. 
 
19. (SBU) Comment: The SPLM's frustration with NCP obstructions and 
inaction was evident during the course of this two hour long meeting 
attended by representatives from the U.S., Canada, Norway, the EU, 
and Italy. Based on this meeting, the SPLM appears resolved to 
suspend participation in the GoNU until the SPLM acts.  While the 
discussion of potential clashes between SPLA and SAF seems ominous, 
the tone was sober and matter-of-fact.  Malik summed up the possible 
recourse to a return to open conflict, "We were warriors, now we are 
politicians."  Post takes heart in the discussion about possible 
openings that NCP might take advantage of to resolve the situation. 
 
 
POWERS