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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1648, UN/AU CONFRONT CHALLENGES TO PARTICIPATION IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1648 2007-10-23 11:34 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO6875
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1648/01 2961134
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231134Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8912
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0255
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001648 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: UN/AU CONFRONT CHALLENGES TO PARTICIPATION IN 
LIBYA TALKS 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 01646 
 
KHARTOUM 00001648  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) The UN/AU are confronting myriad challenges in 
securing inclusive participation in the upcoming Darfur peace 
negotiations, the UN/AU told the Khartoum diplomatic corps on 
October 21.  The majority of rebel factions have since 
announced that they will either abstain from the talks or 
attend at a later date.  Only Ahmed Diraige, who enjoys 
limited popular support and influence over armed elements in 
Darfur, and two JEM factions have confirmed their attendance. 
 While SLM faction leader Abdulwahid Al Nur maintains that he 
will not participate in the UN/AU process, many other rebel 
movements are demanding more time for discussions to mend 
internal rifts prior to the start of talks.  In addition, 
both the sole signatory to the DPA--the SLM led by Minni 
Minawi--and the SPLM are refusing to attend the negotiations 
as members of the Government of National Unity's (GNU) 
delegation.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Briefing the diplomatic community in Khartoum on 
October 22, the UN and AU team managing the Darfur peace 
process outlined the challenges of ensuring constructive 
participation at the upcoming Libya negotiations.  "Whatever 
happens, we will open the talks on October 27," said Sam 
Ibok, co-chair of the joint UN/AU team.  Added Moin Shrim, 
the senior UN political advisor to the team: "We did the best 
to get everyone to Serte, but we must warn that the 
challenges are great." 
 
------------------- 
Rebel Participation 
------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) On October 21, the UN/AU issued invitations to the 
following DPA non-signatory factions, according to Ibok: the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) of Khalil Ibrahim, the 
JEM of Bahar Abu Gharda and Abdullah Banda, the JEM of Idriss 
Azraq, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Unity of Abdulwahid al 
Nur, the SLA of Abdullah Yehia, the SLA of Ahmed Abdulshafie, 
the SLA of Khamis Abdullah, the National Movement for Reform 
and Development (NMRD) of Ahmed Diraige, and the United 
Revolutionary Front Force (URFF) of Abu Surra.  The UN/AU 
issued the invitations to those leaders who could directly 
affect the security environment and bring stability by 
negotiating a cessation of hostilities, the first item on the 
agenda for the talks.  The number of invitations issued to 
each faction varied based on the movements' internal 
leadership dynamics.  (Note: UN/AU officials in Khartoum and 
Juba admit that the varying number of invitations generated 
significant ill will among the movements toward the UN/AU. 
End note.) 
 
4. (SBU) "Abdulwahid has a clear position not to come," said 
Ibok, adding that some reports indicated that Abdulwahid was 
discouraging Fur tribal and IDP representatives from 
participating as well.  With the exception of Diraige, Ibok 
did not confirm the attendance of other rebel movements. 
While the UN/AU is attempting to include field commanders in 
the negotiations, Ibok explained that they will not be 
recognized as equal in status to the political leaders. 
 
5. (SBU) While Ibrahim, Diraige, and Abdulwahid's factions 
were present, over 80 representatives of the other rebel 
groups had been meeting in Juba under the auspices of the 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) for several days, 
said Ibok.  Despite UN/AU plans to transport them to Libya on 
October 23, the rebels requested additional time to prepare 
for negotiations before departing for the talks.  While the 
discussions had been positive, it was doubtful that more time 
would result in a unified platform, argued Ibok.  However, 
his personal view was that the UN/AU could organize further 
internal discussions in Libya among the factions.  "The 
movement's are too fragmented to have reasonable 
discussions," acknowledged Ibok. 
 
6. (SBU) (Note: According to ConGen Juba, SPLM interaction 
with the Darfur movements has been at the working-level only, 
with no policy-level engagement planned from the SPLM 
leadership.  Based on conversations with UN/AU officials in 
Juba, Acting CG reported on October 23 that Ahmed Abdul 
 
KHARTOUM 00001648  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Shafie announced that he will not attend the talks and that 
while Yehia will participate, he plans to drive to Libya over 
the course of several days.  Ibrahim confirmed his 
attendance.  Ibok told Poloff in Khartoum on October 23 that 
Abu Gharda and Banda also intend to participate in Libya. 
The UN/AU airlift from Juba to Serte is scheduled for 1400 
hours local time on October 23.  End note.) 
 
------------------------ 
SLM/Minawi Participation 
------------------------ 
 
7. (SBU) According to Ibok, the SLM faction led by Senior 
Assistant to the President Minni Minawi--the sole signatory 
to the DPA--is "strongly opposed" to attending the Libya 
talks as a member of the Government of National Unity's (GNU) 
delegation, fearing that it would lose credibility in Darfur 
through direct association with the National Congress Party 
(NCP).  The SLM instead proposed that it attend in its 
capacity as a signatory to the DPA and act as a facilitator 
to bring the hold-out rebel factions to the agreement 
(reftel).  However, the NCP is "very strong" in asserting 
that the SLM attend the talks as a member of the GNU 
delegation, said Ibok, which will be led by Presidential 
Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie. 
 
------------------ 
SPLM Participation 
------------------ 
 
8. (SBU) The UN/AU is "working together" with the SPLM to 
define the party's role in the negotiations, explained Ibok, 
but differences have emerged within the SPLM on its strategy. 
 One camp has indicated that it wants to share its 
experiences but avoid direct participation.  Ibok remarked 
that "just passing ideas to the movements will not help" and 
that the UN/AU has recommended that the SPLM participate in 
the GNU delegation.  (Note: ConGen Juba reported on October 
23 that, given the current political crisis between the NCP 
and the SPLM, the SPLM did not intend to participate in the 
GNU delegation to Libya.  End note.) 
 
------------------------------------- 
International Community Participation 
------------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) While restating the UN/AU formula that all members 
of the "Tripoli Format" are invited to Libya, Ibok said that 
the four regional countries (Chad, Eritrea, Libya, and Egypt) 
and four non-regional countries would play a special role in 
the talks "as envisioned by the Envoys."  He provided no 
additional details on which non-regional countries would 
assume this role nor specifics on the role they would play. 
 
10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
POWERS