VZCZCXRO6108
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1639/01 2951532
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 221532Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8898
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001639 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG AND S/CRS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO AU UN SU
 
SUBJECT: AFTER CONVINCING CFC REPS, AGWAI PRESENTS MSA PLAN TO 
DONORS 
 
REFTEL: KHARTOUM 1610 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) AMIS Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai and Joint Special 
Representative Rudolphe Adada have requested donor assistance to pay 
CFC representatives four months of arrears of the monthly 
subsistence allowance (MSA) and then suspend the CFC.  While the CFC 
representatives expressed no opposition to this plan, according to 
Agwai, AMIS needs approximately 4.6 million dollars in donor support 
to pay the arrears.  Adada and Agwai presume that the 
UN/AU-sponsored negotiations scheduled to begin in Libya on October 
27 will result in agreement on new security arrangements between the 
Sudanese Government and Darfur's rebel movements.  The UK asked that 
an audit of previous donor funding to the AU be completed by the end 
of 2007.  CDA Powers questioned whether Agwai's plan would alleviate 
the threat to AMIS and UNAMID in the long term given the movement's 
lack of resources and noted that presumably CFC restructuring would 
require the approval of the signatories to the Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA).  End summary. 
 
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AGWAI's PLAN 
------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) Meeting with representatives of the Tripoli Format 
governments in Khartoum on October 18, AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 
Force Commander Agwai and Joint Special Representative Adada have 
requested donor assistance to pay four months of arrears in the 
monthly subsistence allowance (MSA) to Cease-fire Commission (CFC) 
representatives at the original rate and then suspend the CFC. 
Agwai and Adada made the original proposal during an October 12 
meeting of the Tripoli Format, where Agwai asserted that the MSA 
issue posed a threat to AMIS forces and that the UN-AU Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID) should be free of "baggage" from AMIS as it deploys 
(reftel). 
 
¶3. (SBU) Agwai proposed payment of half of the arrears in the near 
term and the remainder after the movements' representatives return 
vehicles stolen from the AU; provide leads on attacks against AMIS 
assets; and turn in their AU berets, armbands, and insignia.  The 
party representatives would also have to sign a statement 
acknowledging payment of the MSA in full through September 30, 
accept the cessation of the MSA payment beginning October 1, and 
agree to vacate occupancy of facilities within AMIS camps.  The 
movements would no longer be expected to participate in the CFC 
after October 1 and only a limited number of "liaison" 
representatives (likely 10), located in El Fasher, would be 
accredited to AMIS. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Agwai explained that he does not want UNAMID to have any 
responsibility for the support of the party representatives nor for 
them to be considered UN employees.  (Note: As the UNAMID Chief of 
Plan acknowledged during a recent meeting, the AU's May 28, 2004 
agreement with the parties on the modalities of the CFC can be 
interpreted as indicating that party representatives are CFC 
employees funded by AMIS.  End note.)  Based on reports of "inside" 
assistance to the perpetrators of the early October attack on an 
AMIS camp near Haskanita and other threat information, Agwai also 
wants to limit representatives' access to AMIS sites. 
 
¶5. (SBU) According to Agwai, the CFC representatives expressed no 
opposition to his plan during an October 16 meeting in El Fasher, 
including a suspension of their participation in the CFC.  Agwai 
committed the AU to pay one month of MSA arrears during the week of 
October 22.  Agwai believes he has established credibility with the 
representatives and that they will comply with this proposal.  He 
also noted that, without the representatives, the CFC is able to 
conduct more rapid and efficient investigations of potential 
cease-fire violations. 
 
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CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROPOSAL 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Representatives of the UK and the Netherlands, which have 
funded MSA payments in the past, expressed concern over the lack of 
sufficient accountability for previous funds allotted.  The UK 
Defense Attache said there was no accounting document for payments 
made between January and March, 2007 nor an explanation as to why 
there were as many as 87 SLM representatives to the CFC in El 
Fasher.  Regardless of Agwai's new plan, he requested that an "audit 
trail" be completed before January 1, 2008 when AMIS would cease to 
exist.  The Dutch Ambassador concurred.  They also asked if other 
donors would be willing to meet the additional funding request. 
Given the lack of preparedness for making a commitment, no offers 
 
KHARTOUM 00001639  002 OF 002 
 
 
were forthcoming, although there was consensus that the briefing 
statement would be shared with capitals. 
 
¶7. (SBU) CDA Powers questioned whether Agwai's plan would alleviate 
the threat to AMIS posed by disaffected and under-resourced rebels 
in the long term.  It is worth noting that while the CFC is 
dysfunctional, it is founded in the DPA and the Ndjamena 
Humanitarian Cease-fire Agreement.  Presumably, CFC restructuring 
would require the approval of the agreements' signatories. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Responding to a question from the UK Defense Attache, Agwai 
said that the AU has the resources and "strength" to investigate 
potential ceasefire violations independently until a new security 
monitoring mechanism can be established through the UN/AU peace 
process.  Adada acknowledged that the UK and France had presented 
the UN/AU with a model for such a mechanism for the interim period, 
which is being reviewed in New York and Addis Ababa. 
 
POWERS