VZCZCXRO9265
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1612/01 2880522
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 150522Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8838
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001612 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF A/S FRAZER, S/CRS, AF SE NATSIOS 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
NSC FOR HUDSON AND SHORTLEY 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU
SUBJECT:  GOS MINISTERS URGE SPLM TO RETURN TO DIALOGUE 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  On October 13, the MFA convoked the diplomatic 
community in Sudan to a briefing at the MFA focusing on the 
Government's reaction to the Communique issued on October 4 by the 
SPLM Interim Political Bureau (IPB).  The briefing was chaired by 
State Minister Ali Karti with the participation of Sayed El Khatib, 
Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, and Driss Abdelgadir, 
State Minister at the Presidency.  El Khatib addressed what he 
believed to be the most critical accusations in the SPLM Communique 
of October 4, namely, violations with respect to obstruction of 
democratic transformation, lack of initiation of national 
reconciliation and healing process, non-implementation of the Abyei 
Protocol, non-completion of SAF re-deployment, lack of transparency 
in oil sector operations, inadequate funding of census process, 
delay of North-South borders demarcation, and inaction on the SPLM 
reshuffle list in the Government of National Unity.  He further 
underscored the Government's concern with the temporary withdrawal 
of SPLM members from their functions at the national level, and 
urged them to return to their ministerial positions and re-engage in 
dialogue in order to get beyond this impasse which will surely 
further hamper CPA implementation. End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On October 13, State Minister Ali Karti opened a briefing 
for the diplomatic community in Sudan on current issues hampering 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation.  He began with a 
brief overview of how the CPA itself was achieved following years of 
dialogue and negotiations, resulting in the end of a long war in the 
south.  He stated that the Assessment and Evaluation Commission 
(AEC) is the primary mechanism for assessing AEC implementation, and 
emphasized that this implementation is underway after just more than 
two years out of a foreseen 6-year period.  Admitting that there 
were initial delays, he underscored that, notwithstanding this, 
"many problems were solved." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Minister Karti then passed the floor to Sayed El Khatib, 
Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, who responded in a 
methodical manner to the allegations of non-CPA implementation 
raised by the SPLM in its communiqu of October 4.  El Khatib stated 
that the National Congress Party (NCP) had refrained from leveling 
any accusations against the SPLM during a "three year fast," for it 
believed that "it doesn't serve a purpose to engage in a war of 
words" and that doing so would "not bode well for good management of 
the CPA, even if the accusations were true." 
 
¶4. (SBU) El Khatib stated that the briefing had been called because 
of the need to explain and define the NCP's position against such 
"false accusations."  He thereafter addressed the NCP's responses to 
the violations raised in the SPLM communiqu initially in English 
and then in Arabic, an exercise lasting more than an hour.  In 
stating that the NCP is devoted to implementation of the CPA, he 
repeated that raising accusations was "not in anyone's interest." 
He reiterated that it is the mandate and responsibility of the AEC, 
"the most important commission" stemming from the CPA to assess and 
monitor implementation by both parties. In speaking not in his 
capacity as an AEC member, but in speaking on behalf of the GNU and 
NCP, he repeated that the AEC is the proper mechanism for verifying 
CPA implementation. 
 
Obstruction of democratic transformation 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) El Khatib intoned that promoting a democratic process must 
be "done in partnership," and "cannot be done by the NCP alone."  He 
asserted that there were clear-cut steps for advancing the 
democratic process, including, in part, endorsement of the Political 
Parties Act, Election laws, the Election Commission, and the 
undertaking of a census.  These steps, he felt, were "all being 
followed very responsibly," and he had little doubt that "general 
elections are going to be held."  To prove that things were "in 
course," a packet of documents were distributed at the end of the 
briefing to all attendees, enabling them to "judge for themselves" 
whether there are failures and who is responsible for them. 
 
Process of national reconciliation 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) In ending what El Khatib characterized as one of the 
"ugliest wars on the African continent," he stated the Government's 
aim had been one of "inclusiveness."  He stated that the Government 
had "knocked on everyone's door to join the GNU," not necessarily to 
give every political party "its imagined weight," but to allow them 
to be included in the GNU.  Those who wished to participate could 
choose to do so.  Underscoring that steps had been taken with 
respect to national reconciliation, he repeated that "negative talk 
doesn't serve the cause of national unity." 
 
Non-implementation of Abyei Protocol 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) El Khatib admitted that the Abyei Protocol is a "major 
 
KHARTOUM 00001612  002 OF 003 
 
 
problem" and the Government has neither disguised nor concealed this 
fact.  He repeated that the report of the Panel of Experts was 
"legally flawed and unbinding," and that the Government is not bound 
to accept something "essentially flawed." In stating that the 
Experts had exceeded their mandate, he concluded that their having 
followed "neither the spirit nor the letter of the CPA," could 
undermine the CPA itself.  He indicated that the parties had held a 
Leadership Meeting in order to move forward on the Abyei issue, 
which had been aimed at engaging the parties politically and in 
looking for a creative way to get around this stumbling block, 
including the possibility of arbitration.  El Khatib emphasized that 
the parties have agreed to pursue a political solution to the Abyei 
question and are engaged in discussion.  He further stated that some 
ideas are being considered by an Executive Committee chaired by the 
President and the First Vice President, including the dispatching of 
a joint technical team to the area.  El Khatib believes that this 
issue can be resolved, but that the NCP cannot do this alone, and 
called for dialogue with the SPLM on this issue.  The Government, 
however, is unwilling to accept a "flawed report." 
 
Non-completion of SAF redeployment 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Limiting himself to noting that a UN report had cited 87% 
SAF redeployment in comparison to only 6.7% SPLA redeployment with 
respect to the 1956 line, El Khatib urged the international 
community to review the document itself.  He added, however, that 
there are fewer than 3,600 SAF troops south the of the border line, 
and primarily in those areas where there are oil installations.  "We 
are ready and willing to withdraw" even these troops, he stated, 
once the Joint Integrated Units (JIU) are ready to cover these 
areas. 
 
Lack of transparency in oil sector operations 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) El Khatib stated that there is an agreed formula for 
apportioning oil revenues, and a Committee which meets periodically 
to implement this formula.  He offered to make available records of 
the Committee meetings and minutes of these meetings bearing the 
signatures of both parties.  The report for the August 2007 meeting 
was distributed in a packet at the end of the briefing to all 
attendees. 
 
Inadequate funding of census process 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) Admitting that the Government had not met its obligation 
one hundred percent, El Khatib noted that the mapping phase of the 
pre-census is complete with two major exceptions: Darfur and 
Southern Sudan. 
 
Delay in demarcation of North-South borders 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (SBU) El Khatib intimated that the Commission's work is delayed 
due to the absence of an SPLM representative at the meetings for 
many months, along with delays due to the Commission's inability to 
undertake its work during the rainy season.  He stated, moreover, 
that some of the teams sent to the area have been attacked, bullied, 
and asked not to do their work.  In responding to his own query "Who 
is responsible for this," he replied "You'd be surprised." 
 
Inaction on the SPLM re-shuffle list in GNU 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶12. (SBU) El Khatib spoke at length about  the role of the President 
with respect to the Council of Ministers.  He urged that the CPA 
"does not bind the President or the NCP to do the SPLM's job" (i.e., 
asking their minister-appointees to resign, if they so choose).  El 
Khatib explained that if the SPLM is not satisfied with their 
ministers' performance, it is up to them to "deal with him according 
to their party charter."  "This is not our failure," he stated.  "If 
removing someone is a dirty job, then the President is not going to 
do someone's dirty work; ...It's unfair to ask the President to fire 
someone."   According to El Khatib, the NCP doesn't have to be 
involved; ...it's one hundred percent up to our partner." 
 
Need for a strengthened partnership between NCP and SPLM 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) El Khatib concluded his exhaustive briefing in urging both 
parties to work together to, at a minimum, manage the interim 
period.  He admitted that he felt that the SPLM "has been very 
lukewarm about this partnership," but repeated that the GNU wants 
the partnership to hold.  In very strong language, he stated that we 
"don't want it to be a card for blackmailing the other party" and 
held that "ultimatums are not acceptable to us."  Given the nature 
of the tension and accusations made, El Khatib stated that it would 
 
KHARTOUM 00001612  003 OF 003 
 
 
take some weeks to resolve problems.  He urged the international 
community to impress upon the SPLM that they cannot be interested in 
maintaining a partnership if they are threatening to pull out of its 
most important forum at the same time.  "Is pulling out of the 
Government going to help resolve these issues?," he queried. 
 
Questions and Answers 
--------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) An opportunity was afforded to the diplomatic community to 
raise questions and make comments at the end of the briefing.  In 
response to a query as to whether the Salva Kiir himself is pulling 
out of the Government, El Khatib noted that the Communiqu does not 
indicate this, but suggested that only the SPLM could clarify this 
point.  As to whether these developments would have an impact on the 
Tripoli Talks, El Khatib stated that such "bombshell" would cast a 
shadow on the talks.  He reiterated, however, that, notwithstanding 
the "bad timing," the Government is committed to going to Tripoli. 
In response to a concern raised by CDA Powers with respect to 
whether the Government is prepared to take measures to reduce the 
tension, El Khatib insisted that the beginning of a solution is the 
return of the ministers.  He underscored his belief that this crisis 
cannot be resolved with the SPLM walking out from the Council of 
Ministers.  A solution is not possible without engagement and 
dialogue.  For this reason, he stated that a "significant step would 
be a return to talks."  Lastly, in response to the Kenyan 
Ambassador's question as to whether the Government might foresee 
resorting to IGAD arbitration as a possible remedy, El Khatib 
replied that "We will abide by the CPA and will look to it for 
remedies; our priority is reopening dialogue.  We are not going to 
leave any rock unturned in our search for a solution." 
 
¶15. (SBU) In closing, State Minister Karti challenged the 
international community to reflect on this recent development: "If 
someone is complaining, then why send such a negative message on the 
eve of the Tripoli talks?" 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Comment:  On October 16 (after the Eid), the coordinators 
of the AEC Working Groups, will meet to discuss ways to respond to 
this current crisis and, more particularly, ways to ensure more 
effective AEC monitoring of CPA implementation by both parties. 
 
 POWERS