VZCZCXRO9253
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1610/01 2880520
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 150520Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8833
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0250
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AU COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001610 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AU UN KPKO SU
 
SUBJECT: UN ENVOY, AU BRIEF ON DARFUR VIOLENCE, POLITICAL PROCESS 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001610  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
REFTEL: 10/11/2007 LARSON E-MAIL TO AF/SPG AND AF/SE 
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Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (U) Please see action request para. 13. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Briefing the "Tripoli Format" on October 12, UN Envoy Jan 
Eliasson and AU officials called for "maximum restraint" among the 
belligerents and international condemnation as violence escalates in 
Darfur in advance of peace talks, with one diplomat reminding the 
group that "if there is no peace to be kept, there can't be a 
peacekeeping force."  The peace negotiations will first focus on a 
cessation of hostilities, and Eliasson asked for the explicit 
endorsement of the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security 
Council before the start of negotiations.  AU officials--including 
AMIS Force Commander Agwai and Joint Special Representative 
Adada--appealed to the international community to pay the arrears of 
the monthly subsistence allowance for Cease-fire Commission 
observers and then suspend the CFC in an effort to make a clean 
break between AMIS and UNAMID.  As the UN/AU process moves forward, 
the negotiators and the political leaders on the ground continue to 
support the suspension of certain DPA provisions and call for a "new 
agreement."  The USG needs to focus attention on articulating what 
degree of change to the DPA we will accept--and view as useful.  End 
summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
Call for Maximum Restraint 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Briefing the Khartoum representatives of the "Tripoli 
Format" governments on October 12, UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson 
called for "maximum restraint" among the warring parties in Darfur 
to create an environment in which peace negotiations--scheduled to 
begin in Libya on October 27--can take place.  While troubled by the 
recent military escalation, he said that the negotiations would 
proceed on schedule and that the increased violence could not be a 
pretext for any of the parties to avoid the Libya talks.  "No one 
can shoot his way into negotiations, and no one can shoot his way 
out of negotiations," said Eliasson. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Sam Ibok, the co-chair of the Joint Mediation Support Team 
(JMST) leading the negotiations, cited two tendencies in the lead up 
to the Libya negotiations: 1) fighting on both sides as the parties 
position themselves for negotiations and 2) individuals, such as 
Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) faction leader Abdulwahid al Nur, 
threatening the process by discouraging participation.  "If these 
are not addressed, we can give up on the talks," said Ibok.  Ibok 
criticized the international community--particularly African 
governments--for being "indulgent" with the parties as both the 
Government of Sudan and the rebel movements increase the tempo of 
fighting.  "The sense is they can get away with anything," he said. 
"People forget that if there is no peace to be kept, there can't be 
a peacekeeping force.  If anything, the situation will get worse, 
and we must stand against this." 
 
---------------------------- 
Mediation Strategy Finalized 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) According to Eliasson, the UN and AU finalized their 
mediation strategy during the recent retreat in Addis Ababa.  While 
an internal UN/AU version would remain confidential, an external 
draft will be circulated to the international community in the 
coming days.  He characterized the October 10 meeting with a 
delegation from the "regional actors" (Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, and 
Libya)-which included Libya's Ali Treiki and Eritrea's Abdullah 
Jabr--as constructive.  "Negotiations cannot be successful without 
the cooperation of the regional countries," said Eliasson. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Participants: Those Who Affect Security 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Invitations to the negotiating parties will focus on "those 
who influence the (security) situation on the ground," said 
Eliasson.  He asserted that all of the rebel factions, with the 
exception of the one led by Abdulwahid al Nur, plan to attend the 
Libya talks.  (Note: We know of no rebel faction that has yet 
pledged to participate in the negotiations.  End note.)  The UN/AU 
are working with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to 
organize a meeting of Darfur's rebel factions in Juba within days 
and will await the outcome of this meeting to issue the 
 
KHARTOUM 00001610  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
invitations. 
 
---------------------------- 
Civil Society/Tribal Leaders 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The UN/AU has also developed a strategy for including civil 
society and tribal representatives as "privileged observers" at the 
talks who will attend plenary sessions during the negotiations and 
be included as issues of particular concern to them are discussed. 
Eliasson emphasized that the UN/AU are planning for more than 
symbolic representation for these groups at the talks.  "They will 
not be full fledged negotiating powers but will be listened to at 
various points," he said (reftel). 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Cessation of Hostilities, Backed by UNSC 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Echoing recent comments of other UN/AU officials, Eliasson 
said that the first phase of the negotiations will concentrate on 
achieving a "credible" cessation of hostilities.  A draft of this 
document is being reviewed in New York and Addis Ababa.  Eliasson 
called on the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the AU Peace and 
Security Cuncl (AU PSC) to "send a message of cooperation with the 
talks and the expectation that a cessation of hostilities must be 
respected."  An effective monitoring mechanism will be critical to 
verifying compliance with the cessation of hostilities, explained 
Eliasson, and the UN/AU are reviewing proposals from partner 
governments--including the UK and France--for such a mechanism.  He 
hoped that the UNSC and AU PSC will make clear that "there is a high 
political price" for breaches of the agreement. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
All Tripoli Format Invited, With Conditions 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Eliasson announced that the UN/AU will invite all of the 
countries of the Tripoli Format to attend the talks and will be 
sending a note verbale within days.  He cautioned, however, that the 
relationship between the negotiators and the international community 
during the Abuja process had not been well-defined, which had led 
the parties to "forum shop" and weakened the negotiators' leverage. 
The UN/AU want to avoid a repetition of this problem.  The 
international community will have access to the plenary sessions and 
regular briefings by the UN/AU and will be "called upon as needed." 
"Yes, we need you there," said Eliasson, "but in close cooperation 
with the mediators.  The core of the negotiations will be left to 
the UN/AU lead." 
 
----------------------------- 
Monthly Subsistence Allowance 
----------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Force Commander Martin Luther 
Agwai and Joint Special Representative Rudolphe Adada also briefed 
the Tripoli Format representatives on the ongoing dispute between 
AMIS and the DPA signatories on the monthly subsistence allowance 
(MSA).  The issue wasted his "precious time," said Agwai, and put 
his troops at risk.  He called AMIS headquarters in El Fasher "not 
defensible" and warned of another "Haskanita," referring to the 
early October attack on an AMIS camp in South Darfur that left 10 
peacekeepers dead.  "There are people in Darfur who are willing to 
kill for five dollars," said Agwai, noting that command within the 
SLM/Minawi has collapsed and that there is a disconnect between the 
movement's political and tactical leaderships. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) needs to free itself 
from both the political and security "baggage" of AMIS as it 
deploys, said Agwai.  The Libya negotiations are an opportunity "for 
a complete break" with the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) structure that 
has left armed rebel groups "working and living among my troops, 
with the same ID cards, the same arm bands."  Ibok said that his 
personal recommendation is to "suspend" the CFC and allow Agwai to 
develop "new arrangements." 
 
--------------------------------- 
Agwai Proposes Pay-off, Statement 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Agwai proposed that the donors pay the arrears of the MSA 
at the original rate--totaling approximately 4.5 million dollars-and 
then issue a written statement abolishing the MSA.  CDA Powers 
explained that paying the arrears without a more comprehensive plan 
 
KHARTOUM 00001610  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
for the movements to sustain themselves into the future would not 
solve the problem in the long term.  The French Ambassador 
concurred, predicting the same problems would arise again.  Agwai 
said that the first step is "to close the door" on the MSA issue and 
then address the underlying problems, which could include providing 
support to the movement's leadership--rather to individuals--to 
distribute among their partisans.  The group decided to review the 
issue with capitals, and the AU will schedule a follow-up meeting 
after the end of Eid al Fitr.  At the request of the UK, the AU will 
circulate a white paper on the issue prior to the meeting.  (Note: 
In addition to the SLM and the Declaration of Commitment 
signatories, the Sudanese Government's representatives to the CFC 
receive the MSA.  End note.) 
 
-------------------------- 
Comment and Action Request 
-------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Recent events have given the DPA non-signatories more 
reason to believe that a sustainable political settlement with 
Khartoum cannot be reached and will not be honored: 1) The recall of 
the SPLM's ministers from Khartoum and 2) The further weakening of 
the atrophied SLM led by Minni Minawi that has resulted from the 
blatant DPA violations in South Darfur.  Nonetheless, as the UN/AU 
process moves forward, the negotiators and the political leaders on 
the ground--including Adada--continue to support the suspension of 
certain DPA provisions and call for a "new agreement."  The USG 
needs to focus attention on articulating what degree of change to 
the DPA we will accept--and view as useful.  UNSCR 1769, the Addis 
Ababa agreement of November 2006 and the Tripoli communiques cite 
the DPA as the basis for the political process.  The suspension of 
DPA provisions, such as the CFC, has real political implications, 
and we should be prepared to comment on any proposals made.  In 
addition, Post requests the Department's guidance on responding to 
Agwai's proposal regarding the MSA.  End comment. 
 
¶14. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
POWERS