VZCZCXRO9259
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1608/01 2880519
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 150519Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8829
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001608 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF/SE NATSIOS, AF/AS FRAZER 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UN SU
 
SUBJECT: HEAVY SUPPORT PACKAGE UPDATE 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary. In an October 4 report, the Chief of Plans for 
UNAMID Transition, Colonel Johnstone, in El Fasher, North Darfur, 
described current UNAMID deployment status.  He termed GOS 
cooperation to date as "reasonable," noted the complexity of the 
transition, provided a rundown of troop contributions to date, and 
cited the lack of helicopters as negatively affecting their 
capabilities. End Summary. 
 
GOS COOPERATION: REASONABLE 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) He described GoS efforts to facilitate deployment of the 
Heavy Support Package (HSP) as 'overall reasonable.'  He said there 
were a few problems with local authorities, but felt these problems 
stemmed from issues over payment and proper paperwork, not from any 
GoS policy of obstruction.  Other problems, he said, were due to the 
sheer complexity and magnitude of the deployment operation. 
 
AN EXTREMELY LARGE, COMPLEX UNDERTAKING 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Observers and many UNAMID officers believe that the 
AMIS-UNAMID transition is the most complex operation in UN history. 
No matter how cooperative and supportive the GoS chooses to be, the 
enlargement of a 7,000 person AMIS force into a hybrid force of over 
23,000 soldiers plus thousands of civpols and civilians, in a large, 
remote area with little water and natural resources faces a number 
of logistical and organizational challenges.  Darfur is already 
straining to support the indigenous population, and is still 
undergoing desertification. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Water will be a limiting factor, and UNAMID is in the 
process of obtaining permission to use the required tracts of land. 
While African nations have pledged significant numbers of infantry 
units to maintain UNAMID's 'African character,' the UN is focused on 
recruiting larger units (800 instead of 680 man battalions), and, 
perhaps more importantly, ensuring that they are adequately 
equipped.  The HSP still has insufficient pledges for medium 
transport helicopters, tactical helicopters, and heavy ground 
transportation assets.  Finally, the UN has not yet signed contracts 
for the support and maintenance at its camps. 
 
ISSUES WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) At the same time, there are small but important issues 
related to deployment of UNAMID troops that need to be resolved. 
Local officials at Port Sudan's Port Authority have raised concerns 
with the Ministry of Interior and other ministries over who will pay 
for the port service fees associated with use of the port.  Local 
officials in El Fasher have demanded to know the UN's authority to 
operate communications equipment in Sudan.  Johnstone dismissed this 
issue as already being covered in their Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA).  He further stated that this issue requires time and effort 
to reach a mutually satisfactory understanding with local officials. 
 
 
 
HEAVY SUPPORT PACKAGE UPDATE 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) In an October 4 AMIS report, AMIS described the Heavy 
Support Package (HSP) selected, and accepted Troop Contributing 
Countries (TCC): 
 
Military Assets    Strength   Accepted TCC 
 
SECTOR: NORTH/NORTH DARFUR 
-------------------------- 
 
Multi-Role Engineer    275   Pakistan 
Signal Company     150   Egypt 
 
SECTOR: SOUTH/SOUTH DARFUR 
-------------------------- 
 
Multi-Role Engineer    275   China 
Heavy Transport    200   Egypt 
Multi-Role Logistics   300   Bangladesh 
Utility Helicopter 
(SIX Helicopters)    160   NONE 
Air Recon 
(THREE Aircraft)    50   Pakistan 
Light Tactical Helicopter  200   NONE 
 
KHARTOUM 00001608  002 OF 002 
 
 
(SIX Helicopters) 
Level III Hospital    120   Pakistan 
 
SECTOR: WEST/WEST DARFUR 
------------------------ 
Multi-Role Engineer    275   Egypt 
Level II Hospital    60   Nigeria 
 
 
TOTAL      2065 
 
TOTAL WITH FORCE PROTECTION  2250 
 
¶7. (SBU) The AU-UN agreed Troop Contributing Countries, pending 
Pre-Deployment Visits are: 
 
-- Burkina Faso  - Infantry Battalion 
-- Egypt   - Infantry Battalion 
-- Ethiopia  - Infantry Battalion 
      - Multi-Role Logistics Company 
      - Recon Company 
      - Medium Heavy Transport Company 
- Gambia   - Force HQ Company 
    - Recon Company 
- Ghana   - Infantry Battalion 
- Kenya   - Military Police Company 
- Malawi   - Infantry Battalion 
- Mali   - Infantry Battalion 
- Nigeria   - Recon Company 
    - Sector Reserve Company 
- Senegal   - Infantry Battalion 
- Bangladesh  - Sector Reserve Company 
- Jordan   - Multi-Role Logistics Company 
- Nepal   - Force Reserve/Special Forces Co. 
    - Sector Reserve Company 
- Netherlands  - Level II Hospital 
- Nordics   - Multi-Role Engineer Company 
- Thailand  - Infantry Battalion 
 
Note: While the report lists Nordic and Thailand troops as 
"accepted," we understand that the GoS has not accepted these 
troops. End Note. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The report identified several shortfalls in critical areas: 
three Medium Utility Wings, two Medium Heavy Transportation 
Companies, and a Light Tactical Helicopter Wing.  UNAMID said the 
shortfalls will have a negative impact on operational and logistical 
capabilities. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The UN faces enormous challenges in Darfur, but, so far, 
the obstacles to deployment of the AU-UN Hybrid force are more 
logistical and organizational than political.  According to UN 
commanders, GoS has been reasonable in facilitating this operation. 
 
POWERS