VZCZCXRO4070
OO RUEHBZ RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1581/01 2820901
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 090901Z OCT 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8779
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001581 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND AF/SE 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN SU
SUBJECT: UNMIS HEAD TO S/E NATSIOS: SPLM MUST EMPOWER ITSELF 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 01557 
 
     ¶B. KHARTOUM 01569 
     ¶C. KHARTOUM 01563 
 
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Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The SPLM must develop strategies that empower the 
party within the Government of National Unity over the next 
three years or risk irrelevance, UNMIS head Taye 
Brooke-Zerihoun told S/E Natsios.  Support for the SPLM is 
"wide and deep" in Northern Sudan and the movement must "flex 
its muscles" on national issues to exploit the weaknesses of 
the NCP.  Instead of stumbling toward elections in political 
stasis or pursuing a course of action that could result in a 
unilateral declaration of independence for Southern Sudan, 
Taye said that the UN was encouraging the SPLM to look 
forward in their own self-interest rather than "complaining 
to the international community" that CPA implementation has 
stalled.  S/E Natsios said that there had been improvements 
in Southern Sudan since the signing of the CPA, even if 
development was slow.  He described a proposal for enhancing 
CPA implementation that he had broached with both SPLM and 
NCP officials and warned of "centrifugal forces" that were 
pulling Sudan apart.  Referring to the upcoming Darfur peace 
negotiations set to begin in Libya, Taye said that an 
agreement could be reached quickly with the combination of a 
single UN/AU mediator, proper sequencing, and the "right mix 
of participants."  Within hours of the meeting, the UN Envoy 
for Darfur appointed Taye as the UN mediator for the talks. 
End summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
SPLM Needs Three-Year Strategy 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) is pressing the 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to develop 
strategies for the next three years, UN Acting Special 
Representative of the Secretary General Taye Brooke-Zerihoun 
told S/E Natsios on October 5.  Support for the SPLM in the 
North is "wide and deep," according to Taye, who said that 
the National Congress Party (NCP) needs the SPLM to survive 
given the strict competition among the Northern political 
parties.  However, the SPLM cannot continue to deal with the 
NCP in a "static manner" and just "complain" to the 
international community, including the UN and the U.S., when 
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
stalls.  The SPLM has not taken full advantage of the real 
opportunities the CPA provides it on the national stage.  The 
SPLM should develop policies to empower itself within the 
Sudanese Government--"with the UN's help," said Taye. 
"They're either in or out of the Government of National Unity 
(GNU)," said Taye.  He noted that "there was an abundance of 
self-righteousness within the SPLM, which was common to 
liberation movements." 
 
----------------- 
"Flexing Muscles" 
----------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Taye called for the SPLM to "flex its muscles" on 
national issues.  He criticized the SPLM for its complacency 
during cabinet meetings, saying that "they have half of the 
cabinet posts, regardless of whether (SPLM turncoat) Lam Akol 
holds the Foreign Ministry."  Taye was confident the SPLM 
could gain concessions from the NCP through a sophisticated 
political strategy because of the fundamental inequality in 
the relationship: While the NCP "never said anything about 
Southern issues" (the NCP has essentially "written off" most 
of the South, except for the oil areas), the SPLM was 
well-placed to intervene in political decisions affecting the 
North.  By underscoring with the NCP, which Taye 
characterized as "threatened," that it needed the SPLM, the 
SPLM could exchange political engagement for policies that 
would make North/South unity attractive. 
 
---------------------------- 
Declaration of Independence? 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) UNMIS had developed three scenarios to anticipate 
the period leading up to and including the elections 
scheduled for 2009: 1) A smooth transition, with minor 
 
KHARTOUM 00001581  002 OF 002 
 
 
"hiccups," to elections that are accepted by both parties, 2) 
Continuation of the "status quo" beyond 2011, which would 
fail to transform the political dynamic in Sudan, and 3) 
Southern Sudan using the 2009 elections to make a unilateral 
declaration of independence in violation of the CPA.  Taye 
inferred that growing support in Southern Sudan for the third 
option was naive.  The Government of Southern Sudan was 
dependent on the oil revenues generated through refineries 
and pipelines located in the North.  "The SPLM can't walk 
away from the NCP," said Taye, underscoring that the SPLM had 
never disputed reports in August that it had received 153 
million in oil revenues.  "The 1.2 billion dollar budget for 
the Government of Southern Sudan is better than Ethiopia's," 
he said, referring to his home country. 
 
------------------------------ 
Improvement if Not Development 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) S/E Natsios characterized as inaccurate SPLM claims 
that there was no peace dividend following the CPA.  He 
reported that Blue Nile State Governor Malik Agar was "somber 
and brooding," alleging that since the South had gained 
nothing after the war it would lose nothing if it returned to 
conflict.  Few post-conflict countries had access to the 
funds that the Government of Southern Sudan now possessed, 
said S/E Natsios, and while there may not be widespread 
development, improvement was evident throughout the South 
compared to his first visit to the region 18 years ago. 
"There is no starvation or war for one thing," said S/E 
Natsios. 
 
----------------- 
Enhancing the CPA 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) However, the international community needs to take 
action to get the CPA back on track, according S/E Natsios. 
He reported on his recent discussions with Assistant to the 
President Nafie Ali Nafie and State Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Samani Al Wasila, during which he presented a 
proposal for enhancing CPA implementation (Refs. A and B). 
Both Nafie and Wasila agreed that trust between the NCP and 
the SPLM had broken down but blamed the situation on the 
SPLM.  Referencing the possible secession of Southern Sudan, 
Nafie made an analogy to a cancer that should be excised. 
S/E Natsios expressed concern about the "acceleration of 
centrifugal forces that could pull Sudan apart" as violence 
simmered in Eastern Sudan and the Nubian areas while conflict 
endured in Darfur. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Taye recalled a conversation he had with the 
archbishop of Khartoum during a visit to Sudan in the 1990s. 
The Archbishop said that three groups make up the social 
fabric in Sudan: 1) Arab Muslims, 2) African non-muslims, and 
3) African Muslims.  The tendency in Sudan was for the first 
two groups to pull the country apart, but according to the 
Archbishop, the third group kept the other two tied together. 
 The NCP recognized this conundrum, which explained its fear 
of losing Darfur and other "non-Arab" Muslim areas such as 
Nubia, Blue Nile, and the East. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
One Darfur Negotiator Equal Quick, Credible Process 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) According to Taye, success or failure in the Darfur 
peace process hinges on the skill of the negotiator, adding 
that the talks scheduled to begin in Libya at the end of 
October would lose credibility without a single mediator. 
With the "the right mix of participants" and the correct 
sequencing, Taye predicted that there could be a quick 
agreement.  Hold-out rebel leader Abdulwahid al Nur would be 
challenged by a credible process followed by a robust public 
affairs campaign that was absent after the signing of the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).  (Note: Per Ref. C, Taye was 
subsequently selected to serve as the UN mediator for the 
Libya talks after Russia had objected to the selection of UN 
SRSG for Georgia Jean Arnault.  End note.) 
 
¶8. (U) S/E Natsios did not have the opportunity to clear this 
message prior to departure. 
FERNANDEZ