VZCZCXRO3643
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1564/01 2811020
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 081020Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8737
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0247
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001564 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND AF/SE 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: SLM SEEKS TO BE PART OF SOLUTION TO DARFUR, MINAWI 
TELLS S/E NATSIOS 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 01540 
 
KHARTOUM 00001564  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1, (SBU) In contrast to intransigent rebel leader Abdulwahid 
al Nur, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) seeks to be part 
of the solution to the Darfur conflict, SLM leader Minni 
Minawi told S/E Natsios on October 4.  While predicting that 
the UN/AU-sponsored talks in Libya would be a starting point 
rather than the stage for final talks with the DPA 
non-signatories, Minawi pledged the SLM's participation. 
However, the SLM called on the UN/AU to define its objectives 
for the Libya negotiations.  Noting that the concerns of the 
DPA non-signatories--compensation, disarmament of the Arab 
militias, and the return of IDPs--were already included in 
the agreement, Minawi emphasized that the problem was not the 
DPA but its implementation.  A prominent SLM field commander 
requested non-military logistical support and medical 
treatment for SLM members who had been wounded in the 
conflict to "rescue the agreement."  S/E Natsios called for 
an inclusive peace process, underscoring that the DPA was the 
basis for the negotiations and that a new agreement was 
"unacceptable."  End summary. 
 
------------------------- 
SLM: Part of the Solution 
------------------------- 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) Compensation, the disarmament of the Arab militias, 
and the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are not 
the exclusive concern of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 
non-signatory factions, Senior Assistant to the President and 
SLM leader Minni Minawi told S/E Natsios on October 4.  The 
SLM shares these priorities--all of which are already 
included in the agreement--and viewed DPA implementation 
supported by the international community as the vehicle for 
addressing them.  "We want to be part of the solution," he 
said, comparing his movement to the rebel faction led by 
Abdulwahid al Nur.  "He should be part of the solution too." 
 
----------------------- 
Abdulwahid's Propaganda 
----------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Instead, Abdulwahid's propaganda promised the IDPs 
10,000 dollars per person in compensation and a Western style 
villa until but only if they remained in the camps until the 
Sudanese Government agreed to these demands, according to 
Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) Secretary 
General Mohammed Suleiman.  Minawi confidant Ali Traio noted 
that Abdulwahid's intransigence and the additional delays in 
the Fur's return from the camps gave pro-Khartoum Arab tribes 
additional time to settle land they had occupied, making it 
more difficult to return as part of a peace settlement. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Libya: Starting Point Not Final Stage 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The UN/AU-sponsored negotiations set to begin in 
Libya on October 27 are a mechanism for bringing the 
non-signatories into the peace process--a starting point 
rather than the stage for final status talks, predicted 
Minawi.  If the talks did not undermine the DPA and if they 
included the "bulk" of the rebel movements, they could lay a 
foundation for jump-starting the political process.  Regional 
problems should also be addressed, particularly as Chad and 
Sudan continued to support rebel movements across each 
other's borders.  Minawi pledged that the SLM will attend the 
Libya talks, although he was not sure in what capacity. 
 
------------------------------ 
UN/AU Should Define Objectives 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) While the SLM supports any effort to make the DPA 
more comprehensive, the UN and AU have to define their 
objectives for the Libya negotiations, explained SLM 
power-broker Mohammed Tijani.  He criticized the UN and AU 
for attempts to bring the non-signatories into the DPA 
 
KHARTOUM 00001564  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
without consultation with the SLM and identified three 
weaknesses in the UN and AU's approach: 1) The absence of a 
strategy for the talks based on an assessment of the lessons 
learned from the Abuja negotiations, 2) The lack of criteria 
for determining which groups should participate in the 
negotiations, and 3) The tendency of the international 
community to "tribalize" the problems of Darfur, when 
movements such as the SLM represented a broad set of tribal 
groups. 
 
-------------------------- 
Field Commanders Essential 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Minawi added that the UN and AU has focused on a 
select group of non-signatories, neglecting the field 
commanders who control the security situation.  "If they're 
excluded, it will be a big problem," he said.  He noted that 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) commander Abdullah Banda, 
who split with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim in recent months, is 
forging an alliance with the Sudan Liberation Army 
(SLA)/Unity faction led by Abdullah Yehia, a union that will 
be a critical element for inclusion in the peace process. 
Minawi inferred that elements of SLA/Unity and JEM had 
perpetrated the September 29 attack on the AU Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS) group site near Haskanita, South Darfur.  He 
reminded S/E Natsios that he had sent a letter to AMIS and 
the UN several months ago indicating that the area (then 
controlled by Minawi) had been over-run by DPA non-signatory 
groups which could threaten AMIS.  Minawi said he had never 
received a response. 
 
------------------------------- 
Delays in International Support 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) A prominent field commander told S/E Natsios that 
the SLM had signed the DPA under "serious pressure" from the 
international community, which had promised support for the 
movement.  While acknowledging that the international 
community moved slowly, he said, "by this time, I would have 
thought there would be some support for DPA implementation." 
Of particular concern were the SLM members who had been 
wounded during the conflict and had not yet received proper 
medical care: 200 in Khartoum, 150 in El Fasher, 150 in 
Nyala, 150 in El Geneina, and "thousands in the field." 
Before signing the DPA, the SLM had obtained logistics and 
support from raids on Government forces, according to the 
commander.  Despite DPA provisions of support for the 
signatories, however, "nothing was coming." 
 
---------------------------- 
New Agreement "Unacceptable" 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) S/E Natsios called any talk of a new agreement 
"unacceptable."  Thirty countries had endorsed the DPA as the 
basis for the peace settlement, a position codified in the 
Addis Ababa agreement of November 2006, the Tripoli Consensus 
of April 2007, and UN Security Council Resolution 1769.  "We 
never agreed to a new, comprehensive agreement," said S/E 
Natsios. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Describing his recent trip to Zalingei, West Darfur, 
S/E Natsios reported that Fur IDP leaders had presented their 
pre-conditions for attending peace negotiations (reftel).  He 
had explained that the full deployment of the UN-AU Mission 
in Darfur (UNAMID) would take several months, during which 
time the peace process should not stagnate.  The political 
process is the mechanism for addressing the non-signatories' 
concerns, and the Fur would miss the opportunity to 
participate in the 2009 elections if they remained in the IDP 
camps. He said that it was important to balance the need for 
inclusive dialogue with the practicalities of selecting a 
manageable group of representatives to "make a deal."  The 
Arab tribes, including those who had perpetrated some of the 
violence, would also need to be part of an agreement or "the 
whole process will collapse." 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001564  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) The frustrations that Minawi and his forces feel 
with marginalization and lack of support (especially with the 
wounded or illiterate former fighters) will only be magnified 
by any future peace accord, which will add thousands more 
angry young men and their families looking for help. 
SLM/Minawi's cloudy fate is an object lesson to future 
signatories of any new and amended DPA.  End comment. 
 
¶11. (U) S/E Natsios did not have the opportunity to clear 
this message before departure. 
 
¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
FERNANDEZ