VZCZCXRO3634
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1563/01 2811008
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 081008Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8734
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0244
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001563 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND AF/SE 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN AU SU LY
SUBJECT: S/E NATSIOS MEETS WITH UN ENVOY ON EVE OF STRATEGY 
RETREAT 
 
REF: A. KNOPF-AF/SPG E-MAIL 10/04/2007 
 
     ¶B. KHARTOUM 01548 
 
KHARTOUM 00001563  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) On the eve of a UN and AU retreat in Addis Ababa to 
strategize on the Darfur political process, UN Envoy Jan 
Eliasson told S/E Natsios that the first order of business 
for the Darfur peace negotiations will be achieving a 
cessation of hostilities.  It is important to "stay the 
course" despite the myriad obstacles facing the peace 
process, according to Eliasson, who suggested that the UN and 
AU are now working in concert with the SPLM to organize a 
preparatory meeting for Darfur's rebel movements within the 
week.  Eliasson requested a statement by the UN Security 
Council in support of the Libya talks.  Fostering the 
participation of civil society, traditional leaders, and Arab 
groups also remained a priority.  S/E Natsios encouraged 
Eliasson to offer an "international guarantee" that the 
negotiations would include discussion of compensation, the 
disarmament of the Arab militias, and land returns if the 
Fur, most of whom support intransigent rebel leader 
Abdulwahid al Nur, participated in the talks.  S/E Natsios 
cautioned Eliasson against setting artificial end dates for 
the process, noting that it should be inclusive in order to 
be sustainable.  Eliasson said that the focus remained on 
"compact negotiations."  End summary. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Talks' Priority: Cessation of Hostilities 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) A cessation of hostilities will be the first order 
of business at the UN/AU-sponsored Darfur peace talks 
scheduled to begin in Libya at the end of October, UN Special 
Envoy for Darfur Jan Eliasson told S/E Natsios on October 5 
in Khartoum.  The UN and AU are working to develop a draft 
text for the cessation of hostilities and are also 
considering proposals from the international partners, 
including the UK and France, for a credible monitoring 
mechanism (Ref. A).  The UN and AU will be holding a retreat 
in Addis Ababa from October 6 to 9 to develop a concrete 
strategy for the negotiations, to include defining the role 
of the regional governments (Chad, Libya, Eritrea, and Egypt) 
and the rest of the international community.  The "Tripoli 
Format" will, however, be the "main point of reference" for 
international engagement in the peace process. 
 
-------------------- 
"Staying the Course" 
-------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) While the process faces a variety of obstacles, 
Eliasson emphasized that it is important "to stay the course 
as we approach the moment of truth."  He predicted that the 
majority of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatory 
movements will attend the talks, with the exception of Sudan 
Liberation Movement (SLM) faction leader Abdulwahid al Nur. 
Claiming he was reticent to wade into the internal politics 
of the UN Security Council, Eliasson nonetheless said that a 
formal statement of support for the UN/AU negotiations, 
perhaps in the form of a Presidential Statement, would be 
welcome prior to the start date of October 27.  (Note: 
Eliasson plans to brief the UN Security Council on October 
¶24.  End note.) 
 
------------------------- 
Another Try with the SPLM 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Acknowledging that much work remains to prepare the 
rebel movements for negotiations, Eliasson explained that the 
UN and AU are supporting the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement (SPLM) in organizing a discrete preparatory meeting 
for the Darfur rebel movements in Juba on October 8.  "We're 
helping them very concretely," said Eliasson.  If the 
movements are still unable to unite around a negotiating team 
and a platform, the UN/AU will then "make a fair analysis" of 
who should attend the talks.  The UN and AU planned to hold a 
series of workshops in Libya for the Darfur movements 
beginning October 17 but adjusting this time-frame is 
 
KHARTOUM 00001563  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
possible pending the success of the SPLM meeting, according 
to Eliasson.  (Note: The UN's main interlocutor with the 
Darfur rebel groups told Poloff on October 4 that he was 
optimistic that the UN could persuade the majority of rebel 
groups to attend a meeting in Juba within the next week, with 
the exception of Abdulwahid loyalists and the 
Islamist/separatist Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).  End 
note.) 
 
-------------------- 
Advantages of Libya? 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) While Libya is a problematic venue for the 
negotiations, Eliasson said that it has some advantages. 
First, it is "close to the ground," making it easier to bring 
representatives from Darfur to the negotiations.  Second, the 
Sudanese Government sees the talks as an opportunity to 
increase the chance of "Libyan good behavior" and tie Tripoli 
to the outcome of the negotiations.  Eliasson characterized 
MFA Secretary for African Affairs Ali Treiki as "a reasonable 
guy" and joked that "we should pray for his health" to offset 
the less constructive elements of the Libyan government. 
 
------------------------------- 
Participation Beyond the Rebels 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Participation among civil society, traditional 
tribal leaders, and Arab groups was critical but difficult to 
manage, said Eliasson.  Abdul Mohammed, the head of the 
Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) and an advisor 
to the UN/AU team charged with the peace process, described a 
formula for capturing these groups that would include 
inviting the legitimate tribal leaders of the Fur, the 
Southern Riziegat, the Massalit, the Berti, and the Zaghawa 
plus one other tribal representative each of their choosing. 
Arab groups would be invited through civil society 
organizations that had arisen in opposition to the Sudanese 
Government. 
 
------------------- 
Including the Arabs 
------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) S/E Natsios recalled his recent meetings with the 
Northern Rizeigat and Turjum tribes in South Darfur and said 
that the Northern Riziegat--who had participated in the 
Government-backed militias and were now fighting other Arab 
tribes--should be included in talks (Ref. B) to ensure that a 
political settlement is sustainable.  Both the Northern 
Rizeigat and the Turjum had told S/E Natsios that they would 
commit to a cessation of hostilities and were composing 
delegations to represent them at the negotiations. 
 
------------------ 
Persuading the Fur 
------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) S/E Natsios recommended that the UN and AU consider 
issuing an "international guarantee" that compensation, 
disarmament of the Arab militias, and land returns--the 
priorities of the Fur IDPs that they have characterized as 
"pre-conditions" for their participation in the UN/AU 
process--will be discussed during the talks if the Fur 
attend.  While a symbolic gesture, such a guarantee might 
provide an incentive for the Fur, many of whom espouse 
Abdulwahid's maximalist demands, to participate.  Eliasson 
welcomed the idea, suggesting that the UN/AU could consider 
putting such a statement in the declaration of objectives for 
the talks. 
 
------------------- 
Avoiding Absolutism 
------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Cautioning the UN/AU against setting an artificial 
end date for the negotiations, S/E Natsios counseled Eliasson 
to avoid "absolutist statements" that would exclude the 
participation of vital constituencies.  Eliasson agreed that 
the situation was complex but noted that the UN/AU wanted to 
focus on "compact negotiations."  He and AU Special Envoy for 
Darfur Salim Ahmed Salim would remain "responsible for the 
 
KHARTOUM 00001563  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
process" but are seeking a mediator to manage the 
"day-to-day" negotiations.  (Note: A UN official told Poloff 
on October 6 that UN Acting Special Representative of the 
Secretary General Taye Brooke-Zerihoun had accepted an 
 
SIPDIS 
appointment as the mediator for the Libya negotiations.  The 
UN will not make a public announcement about the appointment 
to avoid the appearance that Taye was abandoning the UN 
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).  End note.) 
 
¶10. (U) S/E Natsios' staff cleared this message. 
 
¶11. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
FERNANDEZ