VZCZCXRO3581
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1556/01 2810654
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 080654Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8712
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001556 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU SU UN
SUBJECT: FUR SHURA COUNCIL TO S/E NATSIOS: WE NEED GUARANTEES BEFORE 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: In an October 4 meeting with Special Envoy 
Natsios, members of the Fur Shura Council in Khartoum claimed that 
Darfur rebel leader Abdul Wahid Nur would attend negotiations in 
Libya if he had 'guarantees' that Fur rights, such as compensation, 
security and return, would be satisfactorily addressed during the 
talks. S/E said that while Libya was a problematic venue, a Fur 
presence was key to the talks' success. S/E suggested that a broad 
statement of principles would be useful before the talks and 
encouraged the council to press Abdul Wahid to send senior 
representatives to Libya if he himself would not attend. End 
summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
FUR PRESENCE CRUCIAL TO TALKS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In his October 4 meeting with five representatives of the 
Fur Shura Council in Khartoum, S/E Natsios expressed reservations 
about the choice of Libya as the venue for the upcoming 
negotiations, but stressed the need for Fur leader Abdul Wahid to 
attend. "Why is he so absolutely opposed to negotiations?" he asked. 
His long litany of pre-conditions to the talks was unrealistic, he 
said. The U.S. could pressure the Sudanese government to attend, but 
if the Fur weren't represented -- the most politically sophisticated 
tribe in Darfur -- negotiations could not succeed. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Thanking the S/E for U.S. continued support for the people 
of Darfur in a time when they couldn't help themselves, one 
representative said that only a few factions on the ground in Darfur 
truly represented the people there; the others were manipulated by 
the government. The Fur, and Abdul Wahid, were not in principle 
opposed to negotiations, but objected to having been excluded from 
any planning consultations. Libyan involvement in Darfur was at the 
root of the conflict going back decades, he continued, and the 
regime was known for pitting Arab tribes against Africans. The 
conflict in Darfur was first and foremost an issue of land, he said, 
but the government had transformed it into something else. The Fur 
were the true, real representatives of Darfur, he insisted, and 
Abdul Wahid was only seeking to preserve their basic rights. Abdul 
Wahid was not setting pre-conditions when he said that negotiations 
should not take place without issues such as security, compensation 
and return being resolved first. "These are not pre-conditions -- 
these are rights!" 
 
------------------------------ 
GUARANTEES BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) CDA Fernandez pointed out that there was a difference 
between being present at negotiations and giving up one's rights. 
The U.S. wanted attendance but was not demanding acquiescence with 
Khartoum. While agreeing, the group said that that the Fur couldn't 
enter negotiations without at least guarantees that their rights 
would be met during the talks. But these rights were already 
guaranteed in the DPA, S/E countered. The problem was 
implementation, he said. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Abdul Wahid's popularity increased tenfold after the "late" 
Abuja agreement, one representative said, and the government 
benefited as well. Others who cooperated with the government, like 
janjaweed militias and former rebels like Minni Minawi, had also 
profited.  They were given key positions in the judiciary, the 
police and the army, while indigenous Darfuris were kicked out. The 
government was also controlling the African Union, he said. The 
international community had not implemented any of the UN 
resolutions, he continued, and not one of those who committed crimes 
in Darfur had been brought to justice. The Sudanese Government was 
hoping for agreement in Libya, as then there would no longer be any 
need for the hybrid, he claimed. 
 
¶6. (SBU) UNSCR 1769 was adopted in order to implement a peace 
agreement, not to precede one, S/E said, and neither the presence of 
UN nor hybrid forces on the ground would guarantee total security in 
Darfur. If there were a strong statement of principles before the 
negotiations, S/E asked, would Abdul Wahid attend? "We will tell him 
to do so," the group said. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Even the former wali of South Darfur had admitted that 
seventy-five percent of weapons in Darfur came from the government, 
a representative from Zalengei said. "We need the rule of law, not 
the rule of the gun." The Fur would never regain all that they'd 
lost in Darfur, he said; Abdul Wahid simply wanted to see 
guarantees. "Guarantees are our only card to play." Those Darfuris 
who had aligned with Minni Minawi (who he characterized as 
'illiterate' and 'ignorant') had forgotten a crucial truth, he 
asserted: the land was named 'Dar Fur,'(Darfur means "home of the 
Fur") not 'Dar Zaghawa.' The only movements who really represented 
Darfur were JEM and SLA/Abdul Wahid, he said. The others were either 
aligned with the government or too weak to matter. 
 
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KHARTOUM 00001556  002 OF 002 
 
 
IF NO ABDUL WAHID, THEN SEND REPRESENTATIVES 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) There had been an attempt to arrange an SLM strategy 
meeting in Mombasa with the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, S/E 
said, but Abdul Wahid refused to attend, fearing he'd be replaced by 
his own commanders. We need a political process, S/E argued, and 
Abdul Wahid's continued opposition was not helpful. "What will 
happen if IDPs stay in the camps for five or ten more years? And who 
will give you the guarantees you want?" CDA asked. The international 
community should, the group said, as they did in Navaisha after the 
signing of the CPA. At first arguing that the DPA itself should be 
abandoned, the group scaled back its position a bit and said that 
the DPA could be the basis for negotiations, but it must be amended, 
like when the flawed and failed accord with Lam Akol (the Khartoum 
Agreement of 1997) eventually led to the 2005 CPA. 
 
¶9. (SBU) S/E agreed that a broad statement of principles would be 
useful prior to talks, but the details should be worked out during 
negotiations. Libya was only the beginning, he said; there would be 
other conferences after. If Abdul Wahid wouldn't come, he continued, 
then he must allow some of his trusted senior commanders and 
political leaders to represent him. "We will take note of this," the 
group said. The longer these talks continued, S/E warned, the less 
likely they would succeed. Success before the 2009 elections would 
let you vote for your own parties, he told them. Only extremists 
were interested in elections, one of the representatives argued; 
"people sitting in IDP camps have other concerns." The group had one 
final request of the S/E: "Put pressure on the government to accept 
hybrid troops from outside of Africa." 
 
¶10. (SBU) Comment: Abdul Wahid Nur's influence reaches even into 
Khartoum as these Fur leaders were strongly in his corner. They were 
somewhat more flexible than their ostensible leader in his 
comfortable Paris exile but their positions underscore the need for 
Fur buy-in with any future agreement. With about seventy percent of 
IDPs belonging to the Fur, their boycott would derail any real 
chance of peace and reconciliation in Darfur. End comment. 
 
¶11. (U) S/E Natsios did not clear this cable before his departure.