VZCZCXRO6646
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1548/01 2771323
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 041323Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8700
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0241
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001548 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND AF/SE 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: S/E NATSIOS MEETS WITH SOUTH DARFUR'S WARRING ARAB 
TRIBES 
 
KHARTOUM 00001548  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
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Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) In a visit to South Darfur, S/E Natsios met with 
representatives of two warring Arab tribes, the Turjum and 
the Rizeigat, to explore the antecedents to their 
internal-tribal conflict, discuss the prospects of 
reconciliation, and encourage a cessation of hostilities and 
support for the deployment of the UN-AU Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID).  The Turjum-Rizeigat conflict has resulted in the 
highest death toll from inter-Arab fighting in Darfur, 
according to the UN.  Over 500 people have died in this 
fighting in 2007, the worse violence in Darfur this year. 
The Rizeigat attributed the violence to a competition over 
resources and said that only development programs and the 
provision of basic services to the neglected Arab tribes 
could stabilize the troubled region.  The Turjum, by 
contrast, blamed the Rizeigat for mounting an "ethnic 
cleansing" campaign against them and the Fur, with direct 
support from the Sudanese military and intelligence services. 
 While the Turjum were more equivocal in their support for 
UNAMID than the Rizeigat, representatives of both groups 
pledged their support for a cease-fire if the other tribes 
respected it.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Rizeigat: Murders Spark Violence Over Scarce Resources 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Meeting with S/E Natsios in Nyala, South Darfur, on 
September 29, Northern Rizeigat leaders, representing the 
region's largest Arab group, explained that fighting had 
erupted with the rival Turjum tribe in 2005, after the Turjum 
murdered six Rizeigat they accused of robbery.  The Sudanese 
Government had intervened to negotiate the payment of "dia" 
(blood money) to the Rizeigat.  The Turjum had yet to pay 
despite a subsequent written agreement that the Rizeigat 
alleged had not been distributed at the "grassroots" level to 
prevent the nomads from continuing the fighting. 
Representatives of the two tribes had met again in 
mid-September and now planned to hold a reconciliation 
conference after the end of Ramadan, according to the 
Rizeigat. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Rizeigat admitted that they had begun to settle 
new lands in order to secure access to basic services, like 
education.  "We have a 99 percent illiteracy rate," said one 
Rizeigat representative.  They attributed the conflict with 
the Turjum to tensions over limited resources and a 
break-down in traditional conflict resolution methods, 
acknowledging that past violence had occurred only between 
the Rizeigat and the Fur or the Zaghawa.  "We're not proud of 
that," said the group's spokesman, "but it is true that as 
Rizeigat we have come into conflict with other tribes the 
most."  The Rizeigat noted that their dispute with the Turjum 
was just one of many ongoing conflicts between them and the 
Habaniya, Salamat, and Falata tribes.  A representative of 
the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) who facilitated the meeting 
explained, however, that the highest death toll from 
inter-Arab fighting resulted from the Turjum-Rizeigat 
conflict.  Northern Rizeigat have traditionally had no land 
of their own, a grievance that encouraged their entry into 
the ranks of the Janjaweed.  At the same time, they are both 
poor and proud, describing themselves as the "second largest 
Sudanese tribe after the Dinka." 
 
----------------------------- 
Development Requires Security 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) S/E Natsios emphasized that development could only 
occur within the context of security and asked if the 
Rizeigat would support a cessation of hostilities as part of 
the UN/AU-led Darfur peace process.  The tribe's 
representatives were unanimous in their support for an end to 
the violence.  "Immediately we will stop fighting and 
implement any resolutions that will bring peace," said the 
group's spokesman, adding that tribal leaders had agreed 
"last night" that continued fighting was "shameful."  He also 
explained that the Rizeigat were working to compose a 
delegation to participate in UN/AU-brokered negotiations, 
and, unlike the fractured African tribes, they would be able 
 
KHARTOUM 00001548  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
to elect representatives to attend the Libya talks scheduled 
to begin at the end of October. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Echoing the calls of Darfur's African tribes--many 
of whom see the USG as the guarantor of any peace 
agreement--the Rizeigat representatives asked for direct U.S. 
assistance to resolve the conflict.  They welcomed the 
opportunity for dialogue with the U.S., complaining that the 
international community was "biased" and had ignored the 
grievances of Darfur's Arab tribes.  "The U.S. can solve any 
problem," said one man.  "As the superpower, it must be fair 
in its treatment of all groups." 
 
¶6. (SBU) The U.S. could not solve Sudan's problems, which 
were the responsibility of the Sudanese people, said S/E 
Natsios.  The U.S. could, however, support the peace process 
and would be generous with reconstruction and development 
programs only after a sustainable peace agreement was 
achieved.  CDA Fernandez stated that all of Darfur's tribes 
were marginalized and that the U.S. wanted a "prosperous 
future" for all of the region's people.  He said that this 
meeting was the beginning of dialogue with the Arabs, which 
he hoped to continue.  He urged them to work toward a return 
to harmony with the Fur so that the Rizeigat "did not become 
the scapegoat" for the Sudanese Government. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Turjum: Rizeigat "Cleansing" To Seize Land 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) In a separate meeting, Turjum representatives 
characterized their conflict with the Rizeigat as a defensive 
struggle to maintain control of their traditional lands, 
which the Sudanese Government was attempting to give to the 
Rizeigat as compensation for their attacks on the Fur since 
¶2003.  The Rizeigat had begun attacking the Turjum in early 
2007 with the explicit support of the Government.  The Turjum 
claimed that they had found Government-issued documents on 
Rizeigat fighters identifying them as part of the Sudanese 
military and border intelligence units.  One Turjum man 
explained that the Rizeigat had launched the attacks in 
January "in many Turjum areas, at the same time, on the same 
day."  Other representatives said that the Rizeigat wanted to 
"ethnically cleanse" the region of the Fur and the Turjum, 
while the Turjum had protected the Fur.  One man asserted 
that there had been only a single attack against the Fur in a 
Turjum area, which members of the Mahamid tribe had 
perpetrated.  (Note: This statement seems to indicate a case 
of collective amnesia by the Turjum.  End note.)  S/E Natsios 
pressed the Turjum to provide direct evidence of the 
Rizeigat's collusion with the Sudanese Government, which they 
were unable to do. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Government Favors Turjum Over Rizeigat 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Responding to a question from CDA Fernandez, the 
Turjum acknowledged that they had supported the Sudanese 
Government in its campaign against the African-dominated 
rebel forces in Darfur but claimed that the "Rizeigat were 
more favored by the Government."  When then-South Darfur 
Governor Al Hajj Attal Manaan had met with representatives of 
the two tribes in January, he had said nothing while Rizeigat 
leaders asserted ownership of the Fur lands they had seized 
and told the Turjum to leave.  In late February, Manaan had 
brokered a deal for the Rizeigat to leave Turjum lands for 
two years, at which point the Government would re-examine the 
situation.  The Rizeigat, however, attacked the Turjum the 
following day, and the Government then pledged to separate 
the tribes with a military force.  Instead, it rehabilitated 
three Rizeigat villages in a Turjum-controlled area.  The 
Turjum have continued to run afoul of the Government, and the 
National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) arrested 
their Nazir (traditional leader) in recent weeks, a Nazir who 
the Government had appointed and who had been loyal to the 
National Congress Party (NCP).  One Turjum representative 
reported that the police had 500 open cases on Rizeigat 
tribesmen who had committed crimes against the Turjum but 
that they were not pursuing these cases. 
 
------------------------ 
Support for UNAMID Mixed 
 
KHARTOUM 00001548  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) A Turjum woman said that the humanitarian situation 
had declined in recent months, with the women and children 
assembling in the towns and the men preparing to fight.  The 
Turjum noted that they had received emergency help from Fur 
IDPs who had shared what little they had had.  The woman 
asserted that UNAMID has "a role in protecting us" and that 
the Turjum would welcome its deployment.  When S/E Natsios 
asked if the men of the tribe supported UNAMID as well, the 
other representatives were equivocal.  However, they were 
unanimous in their support for a cessation of hostilities, 
which they said could begin "before tomorrow" if the other 
tribes also respected it. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Both the Abballa (camel herding) Rizeigat and the 
Turjum participated in violent campaigns orchestrated by 
Khartoum in 2003-2005 against "disloyal" African tribes in 
Darfur like the Fur.  Now both are alienated by the regime's 
broken promises, with the far less numerous Turjum feeling 
particularly threatened by Darfur's shifting ethnic politics 
and Khartoum's murderous policy of divide and rule.  In 
Darfur today, even former Janjaweed are betrayed by the 
regime.  End comment. 
 
¶11. (U) S/E Natsios cleared this message. 
 
¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
FERNANDEZ