VZCZCXRO0613
RR RUEHGI RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #1595/01 2891252
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 161252Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9497
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0662
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 0456
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 3379

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 001595 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL MOPS UG SU CG
SUBJECT: UGANDA: THE INTERNATIONAL COMPONENT OF PRESIDENT MUSEVENI'S 
IN-BOX 
 
¶1.   (SBU) Summary:  A look inside Ugandan President Yoweri 
Museveni's in-box reveals a range of international and regional 
issues, many where the U.S. also has interests.  Museveni's 
immediate "to-do" list includes repairing relations with the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, to gain its cooperation to resolve the 
21-year-old conflict with the Lord's Resistance Army currently 
camped out in Garamba National Park, Congo; countering the 
activities of the Khartoum Government through support for the 
Government of Southern Sudan and the faltering Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement; and establishing security and a political transition in 
Somalia.  His longer-term in-box includes strengthening the 
leadership of like-minded African countries, East African economic 
integration, and combating climate change through poverty 
alleviation.  Museveni's domestic priorities include readying the 
playing field for a fourth presidential term and preparing to host 
the Commonwealth Heads of State Meeting.  Museveni never hesitates 
to find platforms to explain his deeply-held positions and actions 
on his priority items.  End Summary. 
 
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CONGO: ACTION ITEM ONE 
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¶2.  (SBU)  Museveni believes the resolution of the 21-year-old 
conflict with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) depends on assistance 
from Khartoum and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  Over a 
year into the peace process, Museveni's patience is wearing thin. 
He welcomed U.S. statements that the Juba Peace Process could not go 
on endlessly.  He believes that the LRA needs to be under pressure 
with a deadline and physically encircled for its leaders Joseph Kony 
and Vincent Otti to consider seriously Uganda's offer of a 
soft-landing.  To this end, Uganda has been reaching out 
continuously to Congolese President Joseph Kabila.  His efforts 
finally paid off at the Uganda-Congo summit in Arusha in September 
when Kabila promised to take action against the LRA in January 2008 
if there were no progress at the negotiating table.  Museveni 
welcomed the pledge, but is skeptical that Kabila can or will follow 
through.  Museveni views the U.S. as having leverage over Kabila and 
wants us to help hold Kabila to his promise. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) If Congolese forces cannot take on the LRA militarily, 
Museveni wants, at a minimum, for the LRA to fulfill its commitment 
to assemble at Rikwangba.  This would require the DRC Government to 
tell the LRA it is no longer welcome at Garamba and that the LRA 
should move its forces to Rikwangba assembly area.  Museveni 
believes that this will help build confidence among the 
internally-displaced persons in Uganda that the LRA wants peace, but 
also would put the group closer to Uganda, where its activities can 
be monitored and individual members would be able to break away. 
This would also put pressure on the LRA leadership to make peace. 
Museveni is anxious to settle ongoing border problems in the Lake 
Albert region and use joint oil exploration as a means to further 
economic cooperation with DRC and decrease tensions.  (Note: Embassy 
believes the LRA is highly unlikely to assemble at Rikwangba, absent 
a peace deal, even if the DRC were to tell the LRA to move.  End 
Note.) 
 
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"SUDAN, SUDAN, SUDAN, SUDAN": ALWAYS A PRIORITY 
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¶4.  (SBU)  Museveni has told A/S Frazer and other visiting 
delegations that "behind everything is Sudan, Sudan, Sudan, Sudan." 
Museveni knows that he needs the cooperation of both the Khartoum 
and Southern Sudanese Governments to resolve the LRA problem.  He 
also views the Khartoum Government as spreading what he calls "Arab 
fundamentalism" in the region (within Sudan, northern Uganda, and 
Somalia).  Because Khartoum provided significant support in the past 
to the LRA, Museveni remains deeply suspicious that Sudan is keeping 
the LRA "in reserve" to be used to disrupt progress on the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).  Museveni is focused on the 
upcoming census and Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) 
elections in southern Sudan (2009), the referendum (2011), and 
Uganda's next elections (2011). 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Museveni wants pressure on Khartoum to close off the 
LRA's options, and wants President Omar al-Bashir to take a public 
stand that Khartoum will not tolerate further delays in the 
negotiation and send private messages that the LRA can no longer 
count on support from Sudan.  From the Government of Southern Sudan, 
which is mediating the Juba Peace Talks, Museveni wants a full-time 
commitment from Vice President Riek Machar and an accelerated 
timetable to conclude the negotiations by the end of January 2008. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) An inextricably linked problem for Museveni is what he 
views as poor prospects for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 
 
KAMPALA 00001595  002 OF 003 
 
 
reached in January 2005.  Museveni continues Uganda's support for 
the SPLM and is highly concerned that the CPA implementation is 
behind schedule, because its failure has serious repercussions for 
Uganda's security.  Museveni is particularly concerned that the 
Southern Sudanese themselves will oppose moving forward with the 
referendum if other aspects of the CPA remain unimplemented, and if 
they perceive it to be rigged by Khartoum.  Uganda fears a return to 
war in southern Sudan, which would once again bring Kampala in, to 
the detriment of Museveni's other agenda items, such as regional 
integration and industrializing Uganda. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Darfur also worries Museveni because he believes that the 
continuing civil war there will undermine the CPA as well as spread 
Arab fundamentalism to Chad and Central African Republic.  Museveni 
visited Chad earlier his year and hosted CAR President Bozizie in 
late August.  Museveni is pushing other African countries to commit 
enough troops to Darfur to stabilize the security situation.  Uganda 
has over 100 police officers in Darfur, but military officials say 
that Uganda is stretched thin with its commitment to Somalia, 
LRA-Affected northern Uganda, and Karamoja. 
 
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SOMALIA: AN IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM AGENDA ITEM 
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¶8.  (SBU)  Museveni remains concerned that only Uganda has troops in 
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) almost a year after he 
began moving ahead with the Ugandan deployment to AMISOM.  He 
considers Ethiopia's withdrawal necessary for Somalia's political 
transition to move forward.  Uganda is frustrated that Nigeria and 
Ghana are dragging their feet on committing troops.  Museveni and 
Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa believe the issue is money and argue 
that if Ghana and Nigeria were promised U.N. rates for their 
peacekeepers, both countries would commit troops. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Museveni's plan for Somalia is re-establishing security, 
rebuilding the national institutions, and establishing a timetable 
for a political transition.  He has dispatched a special envoy to 
work with TFG President Yusuf on holding discussions with those 
parties left out of reconciliation efforts.  Uganda appreciates U.S. 
support for the deployment of its troops to Somalia and prefers U.S. 
engagement remain behind-the-scenes.  Nonetheless, U.S. statements 
encouraging dialogue among the Somalis could help focus the parties 
on the country's future political transition. 
 
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FOURTH TERM: NECESSARY TO COMPLETE ALL AGENDA ITEMS 
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¶10.  (SBU)  President Museveni all but acknowledged to Senator 
Russell Feingold on August 28 that he (Museveni) would be seeking 
another presidential term.  Museveni told Senator Feingold that the 
democratic process in Uganda was ongoing and not bound by electoral 
schedules.  For Museveni, change of an individual at the top does 
not equal democracy.  In his view, the development of Ugandan 
democracy is moving in the right direction and there is no need to 
change that by changing leadership.  Museveni's Political Advisor 
Moses Byaruhanga told P/E Chief on October 6 that, in 2005, the 
U.S., through its Embassy officials and the National Security 
Council, told Museveni it would not oppose his bid for a third term 
if done legally.  Museveni expects the same U.S. position regarding 
his fourth term.  Museveni is content "to agree to disagree" with 
the U.S. on the issue of term limits. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Byaruhanga said that Museveni was examining ways to 
"tighten up" the electoral process and would begin by addressing 
some of the inadequacies of the electoral commission.  Several 
members of Museveni's ruling party and the leader of the opposition 
tell us that the President has begun to "soften the ground" for a 
series of constitutional amendments aimed at the 2011 elections. 
The most important would be removing the requirement of receiving 
over 50 percent of the vote to avoid a run-off election.  The 
rationale is that the number of votes Museveni received declined in 
successive elections and the President would find a run-off 
politically embarrassing.  Ruling party Secretary General Amama 
Mbabazi announced that party members would not be allowed to run as 
independents in the future, a move designed to rein in perceived 
party renegades in advance of the elections. 
 
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COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING: ALL HANDS ON DECK 
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¶12.  (SBU) Uganda is not ready for CHOGM, set for November 23-25. 
As a result, almost all Government activity is centered on CHOGM 
preparations, including roadwork, beautification, and hotel 
 
KAMPALA 00001595  003 OF 003 
 
 
construction.  Intense wrangling for CHOGM contracts resulted in 
substantial delays and cost overruns in projects and the Government 
is furiously working to complete them on time.  For Museveni, the 
hosting of 53 fellow heads of state will provide an opportunity to 
showcase Uganda's progress under the National Resistance Movement 
government and his progressive ideas about regional integration, 
climate change, poverty alleviation, fighting HIV/AIDS, and 
industrialization of developing countries. 
 
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AFRICAN LEADERSHIP: WHO IS IN CHARGE? 
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¶13.  (SBU)  African leadership issues also preoccupy Museveni.  He 
looks around at his fellow African heads of state and sees no 
equals, no one of his intellect, vision, drive, and few of his 
longevity.  He is disappointed that former Nigerian President 
Obasanjo's third term effort was thwarted, because his successor, 
Shehu Yar'Adua, is not strong enough to demonstrate leadership on 
African issues.  Ghanaian President John Kuffor, whose instincts on 
African issues were similar to Museveni's, has been "a 
disappointment" for Uganda.  Museveni told A/S Frazer that Ghana 
lost its nerve once it took on the African Union Presidency.  The 
uncertainty over the African National Congress elections in South 
Africa could leave Museveni without powerful African allies to 
confront Sudan and Libya on the continent.  Within East Africa, 
Museveni remains at the forefront of the charge for economic 
integration, which he believes would remove key barriers to Ugandan 
development.  Museveni also has picked up on the theme of climate 
change and believes that developed countries need to curb their 
emissions while helping developing countries with renewable energy 
sources and poverty alleviation. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶14.  (SBU)  International and regional issues are high on President 
Museveni's agenda  Museveni also believes that his own domestic 
experience in building democracy can be replicated in other 
countries, such as Somalia, and that the U.S. can play a supportive 
role on his key agenda items: Congo, Sudan, and Somalia. 
CHRITTON