VZCZCXRO4382
PP RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #4363/01 2821235
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 091235Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2361
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 7613
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6453
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1942
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1112
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 1052
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 7619
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 3660
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 2153
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3070

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 004363 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID MASS KPAO PK
SUBJECT: FATA PLAN IMPLEMENTATION UPDATE: OCTOBER 8, 2007 
 
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 3476 
     ¶B. PESHAWAR 559 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUESTS:  Implementation of the 
Mission's strategy in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) is moving ahead despite challenges.  We received our 
fiscal year 2007 (FY07) funding for the FATA by September 30. 
 With our prodding, the donor community is taking steps to 
improve coordination of assistance to the border areas.  We 
are also engaging the Pakistani government on several levels 
to get buy-in for the U.S. Government's approach to 
supporting Pakistan's FATA plan.  We continue to urge the 
government to appoint a Pakistani "FATA czar" who can cut 
through the bureaucracy. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Post has three urgent action requests: 1) Funding 
for a temporary FATA Coordinator until a permanent position 
can be established.  We have identified a WAE, who would also 
coordinate border projects until a more permanent 
coordination mechanism can be found.  2) Immediate release of 
renewed funding (which lapsed in March 2007) for 
cost-effective, cross-border Pashto language radio programs 
that have been successful.  A robust information campaign is 
going to be key to any counterinsurgency strategy in the 
FATA.  3) To carry this out, we would welcome the assignment 
of a Military Information Support Team to the embassy, which 
we understand is under consideration. (See paras 12, 15 and 
16 for action requests.) END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUESTS. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
USAID Signs FATA Agreement with Pakistan 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) USAID's Mission Director signed the FATA agreement 
with the Government of Pakistan's Economic Affairs Division 
on September 30, 2007.  The Pakistani side had delayed the 
signing to seek U.S. assistance in the form of a cash 
transfer rather than through USAID-implemented projects.  As 
the September 30 deadline neared, Ambassador and USAID 
underscored that this issue was non-negotiable.  Pakistan 
eventually signed the agreement without any changes to our 
project-based structure.  The agreement provides $73 million 
of new money for USAID's new programs in the FATA. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Representatives from USAID's Office of Transition 
Initiatives (OTI) returned to Pakistan the week of September 
23 to begin setting up OTI's program to strengthen community 
and government relations in the FATA.  The program's 
implementers should arrive by mid-November and this effort 
should begin full operations by January 2008. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Preparation is also underway on USAID's Livelihood 
Development Program, whose initial goal is to generate 
employment and develop skills for young men in the Tribal 
Areas.  "Livelihoods" is designed to create better 
alternatives for those who would otherwise be susceptible to 
recruitment by extremists.  USAID sent out its request for 
applications (RFAs) for this $300 million program in 
mid-September.  USAID expects to receive proposals by 
November 2 and implementing partners selected in January 2008. 
 
¶6. (SBU) USAID has received proposals for the Capacity 
Building Program for the FATA Secretariat and FATA 
Development Authority.  The selection committee has met and 
is reviewing proposals.  USAID expects to sign a contract 
with the winning partner by late December, with 
implementation beginning in January 2008. 
 
------------------ 
Donor Coordination 
------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Ambassador met October 3 with Dutch Ambassador 
Willem Andreae to discuss donor coordination for FATA 
development.  Andreae agreed to take the lead coordinating 
role on behalf of the larger donors to the border areas. 
 
ISLAMABAD 00004363  002 OF 004 
 
 
Post has already been meeting with donors.  We do not believe 
the current leadership of UNDP is capable of assuming the 
traditional coordinating role among donors. 
 
¶8. (SBU) USAID Deputy Director met October 3 with development 
assistance counterparts from other donors in Pakistan.  He 
presented USAID's portion of the Mission's FATA strategy and 
learned more about others' assistance plans.  Canada is 
contributing C$12 million to the FATA, primarily through the 
World Food Program.  The UK's Department for International 
Development (DFID) is directing approximately US$1 million to 
support the FATA Secretariat.  But for the most part, other 
donors are looking to the U.S. to lead in the FATA while they 
focus their own efforts along the rest of the Pak-Afghan 
border (i.e., Baluchistan, Northern Areas).  The EU 
Commission, for instance, is reluctant to work in the FATA 
because it believes projects cannot be properly monitored. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Coordination with Government of Pakistan 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Acting DCM and USAID Mission Director briefed the 
Mission's FATA strategy on September 19 to the Economic 
Affairs Division (EAD) of the Finance Ministry.  EAD is 
responsible for coordinating foreign aid to Pakistan and 
signs the government's assistance agreements.  Our briefing 
made clear that EAD, like the rest of the Pakistani 
government, has not fully grasped the full extent of the U.S. 
Government's assistance plan for the Tribal Areas, which 
comprises development, security, political, and 
infrastructure elements.  Peshawar PO and USAID 
representative provided a similar briefing to the FATA 
Secretariat on September 22.  The discussion highlighted the 
 
SIPDIS 
importance of persistent coordination and transparency at the 
field level.  We will continue to give detailed briefs to EAD 
and other federal and provincial entities on each aspect of 
our plan. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Our interactions with the government also revealed 
bureaucratic confusion and disputes over the FATA plan. 
Despite EAD's lead role, the Ministry of States and Frontier 
Regions (SAFRON) wants to be involved in coordinating all 
donor assistance to the Tribal Areas.  Consulate Peshawar has 
faced numerous roadblocks from SAFRON in setting up an 
interim Levy Training Center, which should have been a 
straightforward project.  Ref B highlights the overlapping 
authorities and complexity of the FATA's political 
administration.  We will need to be resilient in managing the 
patchwork of government entities who want a hand in the FATA 
plan's implementation. 
 
------------------------ 
FATA Strategy Leadership 
------------------------ 
 
¶11. (SBU) Now that the presidential election is over, post 
will re-engage with the President and Prime Minister on 
appointing a Pakistani "FATA czar," someone who has the 
stature needed to overcome the government's bureaucratic 
hurdles.  Without such a person, the FATA strategy risks 
stalling on the Pakistani side due to red tape.  Retiring 
Vice Chief of Army Staff Ahsan Hyat would certainly fit the 
bill, but we believe there are alternatives.  Post has 
engaged the government on this issue and will continue to 
raise it at the highest levels after Pakistan's presidential 
election. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Post is urgently seeking Washington approval to 
hire a "FATA coordinator" to oversee our interagency FATA 
strategy (septel).  This is a critical need, so while the 
position is being created, we are working closely with the 
Department to assign an officer to serve as interim FATA 
coordinator and have indentified a WAE to fill this position. 
 This position will not interfere with program implementation 
of individual sections/agencies, but we need a single officer 
 
ISLAMABAD 00004363  003 OF 004 
 
 
to manage this initiative.  He/she can also oversee, at least 
temporarily, some of the border projects. 
 
---------------- 
Public Diplomacy 
---------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Conducting an effective public diplomacy campaign 
is particularly difficult in the FATA, where residents are 
instinctively suspicious of government programs -- more so 
when such programs bear the U.S. government's imprint.  The 
government of Pakistan is fully aware of this challenge, as 
are we.  Post has developed a public diplomacy strategy that 
calls for advising and enhancing the Pakistani government's 
outreach to FATA residents. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Tribal leaders told Ambassador during her recent 
trip to Peshawar that there were not enough information 
programs in their areas and there was no effort to counter 
extremist voices.  Why, one tribal leader asked, did we not 
help amplify statements by leading Muslim clerics that 
suicide bombings were not Islamic? 
 
¶15. (SBU) Since 2004, we have supported Pashto-language radio 
programming that is highly effective in getting moderate 
viewpoints out to the public on both sides of the Pak-Afghan 
border, and we want to continue that support.  The project's 
initial funding came from SCA/RA, with USAID managing the 
program.  Grant funding lapsed in March 2007, although the 
project director continues to produce two programs: "On the 
Borderline" and "Religion and the World."  The Office of the 
Undersecretary for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy (R) 
has notified us that it would fund $140,000 for "Religion in 
the World" by October 29.  (Note: In March 2007, post 
originally requested $450,000 for both programs.  End note.) 
The U.S. Government must preserve and augment funding for 
this type of media outreach -- a small investment that earns 
us a tremendous return.  Post requests the Department 
immediately release $140,000 to ensure continued outreach to 
Pashto-speaking audiences. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Post is aware of consideration of a proposal to 
send a Military Information Support Team (MIST) to the area. 
We would welcome this additional resource to augment our 
information outreach. 
 
------------------------- 
Frontier Corps Assistance 
------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Strengthening the Frontier Corps, Pakistan's first 
line of defense on the Afghan border, is an important piece 
of the U.S. assistance plan.  The Frontier Corps has a 
historical and locally accepted presence on the border, 
whereas the Pakistani Army has traditionally stayed out of 
the FATA.  The Office of the Defense Representative to 
Pakistan (ODRP) has obligated $29.4 million of its $39.4 
million of FY07 Department of Defense Counternarcotics 
funding.  This will fund an expansion of the Frontier Corps, 
a new Frontier Corps training center, Border Surveillance 
Centers (BSCs), special operations training for air crews, 
communications gear, and FLIR night observation devices.  The 
contractor is now refining design plans for the training 
center and the BSCs in consultation with ODRP and CJTF-82. 
In the meantime, RAO medics may be able to provide some 
emergency training to Frontier Corps medics, as Frontier 
Corps units are reluctant to fight because there is limited 
care and increased combat. 
 
¶18. (SBU) DEA is beginning to engage with the Frontier Corps. 
 DEA conducted a 3-day drug enforcement training course with 
the Frontier Corps (Northwest Frontier Province) in 
mid-September.  A training session on clandestine drug labs 
is planned for November.  During DEA Administrator Karen 
Tandy's late-September visit to Islamabad, she discussed with 
Interior Minister Sherpao further DEA cooperation with the 
 
ISLAMABAD 00004363  004 OF 004 
 
 
Frontier Corps. 
 
¶19. (SBU) In recent meetings, senior Pakistani officials have 
incorrectly claimed that the U.S., for all its talk of 
helping the Frontier Corps, has not yet provided material 
support.  In fact, the embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section 
(NAS) has provided the Frontier Corps more than $31 million 
worth of lifesaving equipment, communications gear, and other 
essential items over the past five years, with another $8 
million in the pipeline.  Ambassador wrote to Foreign 
Secretary Riaz Khan on September 24 with these details to set 
 
SIPDIS 
the record straight.  Khan replied quickly that he would 
disseminate this information within the Pakistani government. 
 NAS also is providing another $2 million in commodity 
support for the Frontier Constabulary, which interdicts in 
the Tribal Areas' interior suspected terrorists and 
traffickers who make it past the Frontier Corps.  Both 
organizations are suffering high casualty rates (septel). 
 
----------------- 
Visit by GAO Team 
----------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) A four-person GAO team visited September 23-28 to 
review U.S. assistance to Pakistan/Afghan border areas. 
Their schedule included a full slate of Embassy briefings, 
meetings with Pakistani officials, and discussions with other 
donors to the FATA.  The team also traveled to Peshawar for 
briefings at the Consulate, a helicopter tour of the border 
(including an aerial view of the new Frontier Corps training 
facility and a border security road constructed by NAS), and 
meetings with government officials there.  We will continue 
to respond to their requests via the Department's GAO liaison. 
 
PATTERSON