VZCZCXRO3274
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #2067/01 3031926
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301926Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0293
INFO RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 5320
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 1058
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 7273

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 002067 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: NEC Hubbard and DOC Gutierrez with Casa Civil 
Rousseff and MDIC Jorge October 10, 2007 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  The meeting between Casa Civil Dilma Rousseff, 
MDIC Secretary Jorge, Secretary of Commerce Gutierrez, NEC Director 
Hubbard, DPA/DNSA Price and Ambassador Sobel focused primarily on 
Doha.  Both sides agreed we must seize the moment to come to closure 
on a Doha agreement.  The delegation discussed the CEO Forum and 
both sides endorsed the value and significance of the Brazilian and 
American private sector coming together to recommend priorities 
jointly to governments.  The group briefly discussed US-Brazil work 
to develop a regional infrastructure initiative.  END SUMMARY 
 
DOHA 
 
¶2. (SBU) The meeting between Casa Civil Dilma Rousseff, MDIC 
Secretary Jorge, Secretary of Commerce Gutierrez, NEC Director 
 
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Hubbard, DPA/DNSA Price and Ambassador Sobel focused primarily on 
Doha.  Secretary Gutierrez said we had an enormous 
once-in-a-generation opportunity to create jobs, lift people out of 
poverty (perhaps 500 million), create prosperity, and bring hope. 
Nothing else could do as much for world prosperity and alleviation 
of poverty.  Many countries looked to Brazil as a leader of the 
developing world; he hoped Brazil would exercise its leadership now 
and, in so doing, leave a powerful positive legacy. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Al Hubbard emphasized the President's commitment to Doha, 
and that he is "absolutely passionate about free and open markets" 
because he has seen how they raise the standard of living.  The 
President recognizes that reaching a Doha agreement is difficult and 
requires leadership by "Europe, Brazil, India, and especially Brazil 
and the United States."  The President meets regularly with USTR 
Schwab, and he pushes her to stretch and find solutions, and we 
needed President Lula to have a similar engagement with his 
negotiator.  The U.S. had stretched to agree to the chairs texts in 
Agriculture and NAMA, and had encouraged APEC to accept them as 
well.  Hubbard noted that we interpreted the October 9 paper 
submitted in Geneva by Brazil and other countries as a step backward 
from where Presidents Bush and Lula were when they met on the 
margins of the UN General Assembly.  We interpreted the paper as 
saying that Brazil didn't support the current text and as indicating 
that agriculture would have to be done before services and NAMA. 
Hubbard encouraged Chief of Staff Rousseff to encourage President 
Lula to (1) be engaged and (2) show leadership. 
(SBU) Dan Price noted the good spirit that existed between our 
presidents at UNGA.  Though President Lula hadn't committed to the 
ranges and flexibilities in the text, the spirit was one of working 
together to bring Doha to a successful conclusion.  The October 9 
paper "took the wind out of the sails" of the negotiations and he 
asked whether Brazil was still interested in the success of Doha. 
When our two presidents meet, he added, they understand each other 
and agree, but when our trade ministers meet, that sense of 
commitment is lacking from the Brazilian side. Our president was 
encouraging USTR Schwab, and so we hoped President Lula would talk 
with Foreign Minister Amorim. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Chief of Staff Rousseff agreed that there was a "crystal 
clear understanding" between our presidents that Doha would have a 
highly favorable impact for the world and that this was an historic, 
groundbreaking opportunity.  Brazil believed a successful Doha 
conclusion would lead to qualitatively different relations between 
nations and create fairer and more just rules of trade.  Brazil is 
committed to Doha, she affirmed, and Lula recognized that 
negotiations would soon move beyond the ministerial level to the 
prime minister and presidential level.  At the same time, Foreign 
Minister Amorim was well instructed by Lula.  He fully understood 
how important it was for the world for Doha to succeed.  Rousseff 
added that President Lula reads President Bush's deep pro-Doha 
interest as a unique opportunity.  She and President Lula agreed 
that now is our window of opportunity and that we have the 
conditions (including the US president's commitment and the personal 
sense of trust between the two presidents) in place to conclude the 
Round successfully.  Brazil recognized that there might not be 
another opportunity in the near term.  Still, for a successful 
conclusion, Brazil insisted that there not be asymmetries.  The 
problem was that no one wants to give in first.  Brazil agreed that 
we must move forward clearly and give signals at the right moment. 
Rousseff pointed to Brazil's upcoming meetings with India and South 
Africa as an opportunity to make progress.  Rousseff promised to 
convey to President Lula what Gutierrez, Hubbard, and Price had 
said.  She acknowledged that we must all seize the moment before us 
to make Doha a success.  NOTE:  Lula re-affirmed this commitment 
later that night at the dinner he hosted for the CEO FORUM.  END 
NOTE 
 
CEO FORUM 
 
¶5. (SBU) Secretary Gutierrez emphasized the importance of this Forum 
for being private-sector led and aimed at helping both governments 
create an environment conducive to trade, investment, and job 
creation.  He emphasized the importance of the joint business 
community coming to governments and attesting:  "This is what we 
 
BRASILIA 00002067  002 OF 002 
 
 
want."  He noted that Spanish companies were more active in Brazil 
than US ones, thus far, and said there was enormous potential for 
greater involvement by US companies.  Al Hubbard said the India CEO 
Forum, in which he was also involved, had been successful.  He 
looked forward to the CEO Forum for the important ideas it would 
offer our governments.  Rousseff agreed that the US-Brazilian trade 
and investment relationship fell far short of its potential, given 
the size of the two countries and our historic closeness.  With the 
CEO Forum, we were opening a new door. 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
¶6. (SBU) With respect to increasing investment in infrastructure, 
Secretary Gutierrez expressed USG interest in helping Brazil, if the 
 
SIPDIS 
GOB believed it could use help, with technical capacity-building and 
by involving OPIC, ExImbank and others.  Ambassador Sobel closed the 
meeting by referencing the Brazilian planning ministry officials' 
meeting at Treasury in early October on infrastructure.  He was 
optimistic that with the ministry's continued interest, we would be 
able to develop US-Brazilian cooperation on infrastructure 
investment in a positive way. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶7. (SBU) The meeting with Rousseff was encouraging in that she 
acknowledged the importance of coming to closure on Doha, seemed 
encouraged that the relationship between our leaderships would 
assist in achieving a final result on the Round, and was supportive 
of the goals of the CEO Forum.  She clearly briefed President Lula 
well going into the dinner and he too underlined these themes. 
 
¶8. (U) DOC and NSC delegations cleared this message.