VZCZCXRO4376
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #1482/01 3041710
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311710Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1694
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1389
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001482 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PBTS KPAO SR MW KV
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN SERBIA: AVOIDING CARGO CULT 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  The United States' objective in Southern Serbia is to integrate 
the Albanian-majority Presevo Valley with the rest of the country. 
While the region is currently stable, its relationship with Belgrade 
is dysfunctional and local Albanian leaders have failed to commit to 
a future with Serbia.  Local contacts told the DCM during an October 
25-26 visit to the region that U.S. involvement was critical to keep 
Belgrade and Albanian leaders working together to achieve what both 
sides claimed they want -- a prosperous, stable future in the EU. 
Post will work to prevent a "cargo cult mentality" and will ensure 
that local citizens understand that international assistance did not 
simply fall out of the sky after violence broke out; rather it is 
tied to their future within Serbia.  End Summary. 
 
 
Serbs, Albanians Talk About the Future 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  Southern Serbia is still a success story for the GOS.  In 2001, 
Belgrade successfully diffused an armed insurgency in Southern 
Serbia's Presevo Valley through mediation and agreed to integrate 
local Albanians into government institutions.  Today, the affected 
municipalities have held three local elections, avoided ethnic 
violence, and have elected an ethnic-Albanian Member of Parliament. 
The GOS's Coordinating Body for Southern Serbia (CB) still functions 
and is in contact with Albanian leaders.  Local leaders (both Serb 
and Albanian) and GOS officials all confirmed to the DCM that they 
desired stability, security and a future in the EU.  Rather than the 
palpable hate and rhetoric that plagued this region in the past, the 
local mayors, police officials and GOS representatives discussed 
issues in terms of future.  The U.S. remains a significant and 
respected player, with heavy press coverage documenting every stop 
during the visit. 
 
 
Southern Serbia or Eastern Kosovo? 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  Albanian leaders in Southern Serbia would not commit to a future 
in Serbia and used Kosovo as an excuse for ambiguity.  At worst, 
this leaves secession on the table and, at best, is a major irritant 
to the GOS.  In separate October 26 meetings with the DCM, Presevo 
Mayor Ragmi Mustafa and Bujanovac Mayor Nagip Arifi both blamed 
unfulfilled promises by Belgrade as a basis for their ambiguity over 
the future status of the Presevo Valley.  Riza Halimi, Member of 
Parliament and leader of the largest Albanian party in Serbia, 
blamed hard-line Albanians for dividing the community and being 
unable to make a joint statement on being part of Serbia.  His 
coalition partner, Skender Destani, said Albanians would adhere to 
"whatever state the Presevo Valley was determined to be in."  While 
the Presevo Valley Albanians have legitimate complaints about the 
CB, they also use unfulfilled promises for political leverage with 
the international community.  Arifi, Mustafa and other leaders used 
meetings with the DCM to cite incomplete CB projects such as a 
maternity ward in Presevo and teacher's college in Bujanovac, as 
proof that Belgrade had forgotten about Southern Serbia.  They also 
continued to complain about the heavy-handed presence of the Serbian 
Gendarmarie forces and their occupation of various formerly 
community-oriented structures. 
 
¶4.  The Albanian leaders' vacillation irks Belgrade, and both sides 
distrust each other.  In an October 24 interview with Nedeljni 
Telegraf, a CB vice-president accused Presevo Valley Albanians of 
"hypocrisy" and "going to Belgrade for money and to Pristina for 
advice."  Director of the CB, Nenad Djurdjevic, told the DCM on 
October 25 that the Presevo Valley continued to receive 
disproportionate attention and resources from Belgrade but that the 
Albanians "could not even make a common statement" to live in 
Serbia. 
 
¶5.  Meanwhile, the Serbs in the region have abandoned the weak and 
unorganized "Coalition for Bujanovac" for the visible and 
inflammatory Serbian Radical Party (their "Stop the Seselj Trial" 
posters have turned Bujanovac into an anti-minority gauntlet). 
"Coalition of Bujanovac" leader Stojanca Arsic told the DCM on 
October 26 that he would not talk with the Radicals but did not 
offer a competing vision.  When asked, he defined Radical adherents 
as hayseeds from the hills and appeared unwilling or unable to 
penetrate their circles.  In short, Arsic and other moderates have 
conceded Bujanovac to the Radicals and yet the Radicals remain 
completely marginalized from any significant political process. 
Mayor Arifi described Radical participation in municipality meetings 
as meaningless.  "They oppose whatever we want to do and walk out." 
 
¶6.  As in the rest of Serbia, the Orthodox Church is very 
influential.  Unfortunately, the Vranje Eparchy will not be a 
constructive factor while led by the bigoted Bishop Pahomije.  On 
October 26, Pahomije spouted messages of fear and hate, and claimed 
 
BELGRADE 00001482  002 OF 003 
 
 
that Serbia would be cleansed of Serbs by "Turks, Albanians and 
Muslim Gypsies," who had "come over the hills" after World War II 
and tried to convert the region to Islam.  Pahomije said that the 
Serbs had "held the line" against Islam on behalf of "Christian 
Europe."  Pahomije said Iran was busy building a green corridor 
through the Balkans up to Vienna and was enlisting the Albanians in 
this cause.  "We can help teach you how to fight Islam," Pahomije 
offered, "otherwise your Black Friday will come."  (Pahomije is a 
controversial figure due to widely-publicized pedophilia allegations 
of which he was cleared in 2006 following heavy Church involvement 
with the case.  His mental acuity is questionable; he proposed to 
the DCM a U.S. Democracy Commission grant for medical research on a 
breed of cattle living on church lands whose genetic material he 
thinks could cure AIDS.)  Nevertheless, post will engage with local 
church leaders to keep open important lines of communication with 
the Serb community and to explore avenues for faith-based 
initiatives. 
 
 
Security 
-------- 
 
¶7.  The security situation remains an irritant in Belgrade's 
relationship with local Albanian leaders.  Shaip Kamberi, director 
of the Bujanovac Council for Human Rights, complained to the DCM on 
October 25, of the militarization and Interior Ministry's 
Gendarmerie presence in the Presevo Valley.  In an email to the DCM 
on October 29, he appealed for "international assistance," in the 
case of the beating of an ethnic Albanian, which was typical of 
local groups' focus on individual cases versus developing a vision 
for the future. 
 
¶8.  The GOS, however, contends that the security presence is 
justified and reasonable. In stark contradiction to Bishop 
Pahomije's complaints and "photographic evidence" of Albanian 
desecration of Orthodox religious objects (churches and cemeteries), 
Vranje Police Chief Stole Filipovic told the DCM on October 26 that 
the security situation in the region was "under control" with the 
police using the "least amount of required presence."  He claimed 
that out of the hundreds of Orthodox and Muslim religious objects in 
his jurisdiction (all of Southern Serbia) none had been damaged, 
though there had been some petty theft.  He said that Albanians were 
adequately represented in the police force, but fudged the numbers, 
using the Albanians' national percentage (around 1%) rather than the 
district or municipal percentages, which were considerably higher. 
In the short-term, it was unrealistic to expect the GOS to draw down 
forces with Kosovo unresolved, he said.  The GOS could, however, be 
much more transparent in its operations and consult more closely 
with local Albanian authorities. 
 
 
Serbia's (Lacking) Economic Plan 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  Belgrade's economic plan for Southern Serbia is not clear. 
Djurdjevic told the DCM on October 25 that the CB will continue for 
another year.  The CB's Economic Team for Southern Serbia, still led 
by Nenad Popovic, has disappeared and various contacts noted their 
concern that the Ministry of Economy and Regional Development might 
take over GOS investment.  Local USAID implementers expressed 
concern that such reorganization would deprive Southern Serbia of 
its special status and upset local leaders.  In any case, the CB 
needs to take concrete steps forward on the ground and do a better 
job of publicizing what they have already done.  Djurdjevic has done 
what he can -- opened a few more positions for Albanians in the 
local CB offices, for example -- but lacks the clout to affect real 
change either within the CB or from the local Albanians; it must 
come from his boss, Minister of Labor and Social Policy Rasim 
Ljajic, who has unfortunately shown dwindling interest in Southern 
Serbia.  For example, Ljajic had been scheduled to participate in an 
October 29 Forum on Ethnic Relations conference in Southern Serbia 
but sent deputies at the last minute. 
 
 
U.S. Assistance: Beyond Bricks and Mortar 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  The Albanian leaders' unwillingness to commit to Serbia shows a 
major goal of U.S. assistance to the region has not been achieved. 
The key to success for the region's economic integration with Serbia 
will be moving to practical approaches beyond infrastructure. 
Vranje Mayor Miroljub Stojcic, who has a record of such success in 
regional development, told the DCM on October 25 that Southern 
Serbia could grow to be an economic hub due to its strategic 
position and transnational business potential.  Stojcic told the DCM 
that he saw a stable, prosperous Presevo Valley as an economic boon 
for Vranje.  This is already happening; Albanian guest-workers have 
returned flush from Western Europe and opened small businesses, 
including restaurants and motels, to capitalize on lucrative 
opportunities.  A major highway, "Corridor 10", runs from Belgrade 
 
BELGRADE 00001482  003 OF 003 
 
 
to Skopje through Southern Serbia and the Presevo Valley lies 
between Bulgaria, Macedonia and Kosovo. 
 
¶11.  In order for Southern Serbia's integration to have permanence, 
assistance must move beyond bricks and mortar to cultural and civics 
training.  OSCE local representative Martin Brooks told the DCM on 
October 26 that no donors were addressing party building, grant 
writing, and other "soft" development and the EU assistance program 
might withdraw from the region altogether.  With this kind of 
assistance, Kamberi could move beyond short-sighted recriminations, 
Arsic could actually serve his Serb constituents and a group of 
concerned citizens could open their own teacher's college or 
maternity ward without waiting for the CB.  This would counter the 
"cargo cult" mentality among the citizens of the Presevo Valley, 
many of whom do not equate foreign assistance with the region's 
integration with Serbia and think that donors will always be there, 
following a time of troubles. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12.  Southern Serbia is fragile and warrants concern as Kosovo 
status resolution approaches.  The United States and GOS want the 
same thing -- a stable, prosperous Presevo Valley fully integrated 
into Serbia -- and post will use its influence to keep both Belgrade 
and local leaders engaged.  In Belgrade, we will press Ljajic to 
deliver key CB projects and make security transparent.  In Southern 
Serbia, we will press Albanian leaders to commit to a brighter 
future as a part of Serbia and not count on U.S. assistance if they 
choose otherwise.  End Comment. 
 
 
BRUSH