VZCZCXRO7226
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #1445/01 2961834
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231834Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1655
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001445 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PBTS SR KV
SUBJECT:  SERBIA'S FOURTEEN POINTS 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (U) Serbia's delegation to the October 22 Troika talks held in 
Vienna submitted 14 principles on resolving Kosovo status.  These 
points were an amended version of the Troika's fourteen points and 
did not differ substantively from Belgrade's previously announced 
"broad autonomy" plan for Kosovo.  Serbian officials told post that 
the proposal reflected a "sincere compromise" and showed Serbia's 
committment both to the negotiations process and to Kosovo's 
European future.  An unofficial translation of Serbia's 14 points is 
provided in para 5.  End Summary. 
 
Differences 
----------- 
 
¶2. (U) Serbia's 14 point proposal differed significantly with the 
Troika's original proposal on several key points.  Belgrade's 
proposal specifically called for UNSC Resolution 1244 to be the 
basis for any settlement between the parties.  In its points, 
Belgrade also assured that Serbia would not overstep its 
"competencies under a future agreement."  Belgrade's text also 
removed the Troika's reference to Euro-Atlantic integration (in 
favor of European integration only) and made no reference to Kosovo 
Serbs as a minority, reflecting Belgrade's position that Kosovo 
Albanians are a minority within Serbia. 
 
Similarities 
------------ 
 
¶3. (U) Most of Belgrade's proposal maintained much of the character 
of the Troika's original 14 points.  The Serbian text kept the 
Troika's concilatory tone and respect for the negotiating process. 
In contrast to its previous proposals, the Serbian text refrained 
from defining Belgrade's presence in Kosovo including reserved 
powers over Kosovo's military, foreign policy and customs.  Instead, 
the Belgrade proposal agreed to abide by the "competencies of a 
future agreement" with Pristina. 
 
MFA:  Serbia Offering a "Sincere Compromise" 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Ministry of Foreign Affairs U.S. desk officer Srdjan 
Miljkovic (protect) told poloff on October 23, that the GOS aimed to 
show a "sincere compromise" through this document and a "committment 
to not blocking Kosovo's path to Europe."  Miljkovic added that 
Belgrade was committed to the spirit of the negotiations but that 
Pristina was "not compromising at all."  He hoped that this text 
could be the basis of a new UNSC resolution which would not 
determine status but allow for a transition to EU control in Kosovo. 
 MFA Political Director Boris Stefanovic gave Charge a similar 
message on October 22, saying Serbia's intention was to show 
engagement in the negotiating process.  "Please urge your side to 
appreciate our attempt to engage," he said.  In response to Charge's 
comment that Serbia's points still lacked a bridge between autonomy 
and independence, Stefanovic revived the idea of a "Common Sovereign 
Roof."  Asked about accepting two sovereign roofs, Stefanovic 
replied, "Ok, if that means a Serbian and an EU roof." 
 
Belgrade's 14 Points 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) Unofficial translation of Serbian delegation's fourteen 
points from Serbian press: 
 
¶1. The subject of these talks is to determine the future status of 
Kosovo based on the principles defined in UN Security Council 
resolution 1244.  Every change of the subject of negotiations 
previously requires a change of the existing and binding UN Security 
Council resolution 1244. 
 
¶2.  All three sides [Serbia, the temporary Kosovo 
institutions and international mediators] are obliged to refrain 
from any kind of unilateral steps. 
 
¶3.  Kosovo will be fully integrated into regional structures, 
especially those which include economic cooperation. 
 
¶4.  There will be no return to the situation prior to 1999 and the 
future order in Kosovo should be resolved on the basis of UN 
Security Council resolution 1244. 
 
¶5.  Serbia will not govern Kosovo within the competencies which will 
fall to the province under a future agreement. 
 
¶6.  Serbian institutions will not be present in the province in 
affairs which are not within Belgrade's competencies under the 
future agreement. 
 
¶7.  In their legislature and the policies conducted in accord with 
it, Serbia and Kosovo will progressively implement the principles, 
norms and standards in accordance with the process of Stabilization 
 
BELGRADE 00001445  002 OF 002 
 
 
and Association with the European Union.  With full participation in 
that process, they will advance towards accession and finally 
membership in the EU. 
 
¶8.  Starting from an agreed solution between Belgrade and 
representatives of the temporary institutions of self-government 
which will be confirmed by the UN Security Council, Kosovo will 
implement comprehensive measures to promote the well being of the 
Serbs in Kosovo and that of other non-Albanian communities, 
especially through the decentralization of the local authorities and 
constitutional guarantees. 
 
¶9.  Taking into consideration their exclusive competencies, Belgrade 
and Pristina will cooperate on issues of common interest including: 
the return of displaced persons, the fate of the missing, physical 
protection of cultural heritage, economic issues...; power 
generation, trade, infrastructure, traffic and communications; the 
banking sector and fiscal policy; harmonization with EU standards; 
protection of the environment; the fight against organized crime. 
 
¶10.  In these and other possible fields of cooperation 
Belgrade and Kosovo will form joint bodies to conduct affairs of 
common interest. 
 
¶11.  Except to the extent of its international obligations as a 
subject of international law, Belgrade will not interfere in 
Pristina's relations with international financial institutions. 
 
¶12.  Kosovo will have full jurisdiction over its finances 
(taxation, public income etc). 
 
¶13.  The process of stabilization and association (Tracking 
Mechanism) for Kosovo will continue in cooperation with Belgrade. 
 
¶14.  The international community will, after status is 
defined, continue its civilian and military presence in Kosovo under 
a UN mandate, that is under a decision by the UN Security Council. 
 
End unofficial translation. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a ministry affiliated 
with the President's Democratic Party, is intent on showing Serbia's 
full engagement in the Troika talks.  In particular, Belgrade wanted 
to illustrate its support for the negotiating process -- something 
Serbian leaders have said the U.S. position has lacked.  Serbian 
leaders have been frustrated that its proposals have been dismissed 
since the days of the Ahtisaari talks, and this proposal was an 
offering they hoped would receive a more serious look.  However, the 
document is without any real substantive shifts on Belgrade's part 
and a critical gap between Pristina and Belgrade over Kosovo status 
remains.  End Comment. 
 
BRUSH