VZCZCXRO5979
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3396/01 2831742
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 101742Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3815
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003396 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: MAYSANIS CONTINUE TO ENGAGE WITH PRT 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) This is a PRT Maysan report. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary and Comment:  We have seen a dramatic 
turnaround in the willingness of Maysan officials to engage 
with the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), beginning in 
late May.   On September 13, we hosted a substantive meeting 
with the PRDC Chairman and two other provincial officials at 
Tallil AB.  On September 19, the First Deputy Governor 
dropped in for a short-notice visit to Tallil, conveying 
Governor al-Maliki's strongest indication yet of his interest 
in working closely with the PRT and the UN, with an earnest 
effort to reassure us of his control of security in the 
province.  They have emphatically pledged to provide full 
security and protection for any (including US or UK) 
investors, companies, or other entities working on projects 
in the province and have shared a written security strategy 
signed by the Governor.  When pressed, they also welcomed a 
visit by the PRT to the province.   The delegation also 
provided wish-list papers on their education strategy and 
ideas on expanding private sector finance. 
 
¶3. (SBU) We believe that Maysan provincial officials now 
recognize the PRT as a resource that can assist them both in 
projects and in building capacity that will help them deliver 
services to the Maysan electorate.  We assess that they are 
closely watching news speculation of a US drawdown and want 
to extract as much benefit from PRT engagement before this 
happens.  We also believe that the Maysanis - as the only 
Sadrist-controlled province - are committed to demonstrating 
their governing acumen and ability to create jobs and deliver 
services to the people, particularly as there are no 
Coalition forces in-province to blame.  Our strategy is to 
engage broadly with the Maysan Government in support of the 
current basket of reconstruction projects, as well as planned 
efforts to expand public administration capacity and gestures 
to demonstrate the province's importance to the Coalition. 
End Summary and Comment. 
 
READY TO ENGAGE 
--------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) During a September 13 meeting, the PRDC Chairman 
opened with complimentary words about the difference they 
felt in their relationship with us from that of previous 
donor groups with which they have dealt.  They specifically 
appreciated the fact that we communicated with them mostly in 
Arabic.  (Comment: The PRT has only recently concluded the 
hiring process for two LES interpreters, and this was our 
first meeting with their assistance.  End Comment.)  The 
meeting was a fairly pedestrian but productive review of 
ongoing USG projects and gave us an opportunity to discuss 
proposed FY07 PRDC projects.  We used this opportunity to 
inquire about interest in other areas of possible engagement, 
including private sector handicraft sales (locally woven 
carpets), wheelchair donations, journalist training, 
alternative energy technology for off-grid areas, and 
vocational training.  The Regional USAID officer added 
valuable input on potential support opportunities. 
 
¶5. (SBU) On September 18 and 19 we met with United Nations 
Office for Project Services (UNOPS) Project Manager Ewelina 
Pusz, who was exploring suitable opportunities for the UN in 
Southern Iraq.  On the second day of her meetings with us, we 
received an emailed notification that Governor al-Maliki had 
dispatched a small delegation to meet with the PRT at Tallil 
AB within two hours.  Shortly afterward, we received First 
Deputy Governor al-Rafaie and two close aides of the 
Governor. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Al-Rafaie opened by passing the Governor's warm 
greetings for both the UN and the PRT.  He observed that they 
have had many productive planning meetings with the UN, but 
that there has been slow follow-through.  He claimed that 
there had been USD 7.9 Million allocated three years ago, but 
that they had not received it.  (Comment: While he did not 
describe the ostensible purpose for such funding, he assented 
when Pusz suggested that it may have represented early 
British development planning.  We note that in both this and 
the last meeting with al-Rafaie, he opened with a vague, 
generalized complaint.  We had no sense that this was serious 
or that he expected resolution of this funding matter.  End 
Comment.)  Seeking to reinforce their seriousness, he added, 
"After you go, we must depend upon ourselves". 
 
SECURITY COMMITMENT 
------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) After these generalized opening remarks, al-Rafaie 
got to the heart of his message: conveying a sense of 
commitment to protecting projects in the province.  Noting 
that Maysan's security situation is much better than that in 
most other provinces in the country (thanks partly to a 
 
BAGHDAD 00003396  002 OF 002 
 
 
uniformly Shia population), he said that Maysani officials 
were committed to providing protection to any project or 
entity involved in reconstruction work being done to the 
benefit of the Maysani people.  He volunteered that while 
they could not claim that they could control everything "100 
percent" and that there could be others opposing, that they 
could, without hesitation, give a 100 percent guarantee of 
provincial government commitment to security for project 
work, supplies, and people.  He noted, however, that they had 
a successful track record and that they had provided security 
for a Brazilian firm in the installation of a 400 kilovolt 
(kV) substation, and that they had likewise protected a 
Kuwaiti firm involved in a water treatment plant, as well as 
a Turkish firm in another project.  When we asked if this 
offer of protection specifically included American and 
British entities, al-Rafaie replied, "Yes.  All of them."  He 
passed us a document signed by Governor al-Maliki, indicating 
their commitment to: 
--Ensure the safety of the people and materials of the 
project site until completion 
--Provide permanent site protection by Iraqi police with 
checkpoints 
--Allow contractors to retain their own on-site guards and 
issue weapons permits for the guards' use 
--Provide secure storage for project materials and equipment 
--Provide protection for the transport of materials from 
ports and airports to the governorate 
 
OTHER MAYSAN PRIORITIES 
----------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Turning to education, al-Rafaie said, "developing 
the Maysani mind is more important than building (physical) 
bridges."  He offered a letter describing the province's 
strategy for developing education.  Noting that considerable 
funding had been allocated for education at the primary and 
secondary levels since 2005, the document asked for 
assistance in support of enhancing the operations of the 
recently established Maysan University.  It specifically 
asked for UN and/or PRT assistance with one of the following: 
--Funding/ building colleges within the university 
(engineering, administration, law, and education) 
--Research centers (in agriculture and on the marshes) 
--University facilities (such as a library or student center) 
--Staff housing and child care 
--A teacher training institute 
--University technical support (including a twinning 
relationship with an American university, new reference 
materials, equipment, and planning assistance). 
 
¶9. (SBU) Al-Rafaie told us that they had already taken 
considerable steps forward on the university.  According to a 
document he gave us, they have already secured funding from 
the central budget for the first stage of the engineering 
(civil and mechanical) college's departments.  They have also 
identified and performed a land survey of the best site. 
Engineering consultants from Baghdad University have prepared 
designs for optimal site usage.  They have received a 
commitment from the Ministry of Education to fund the design 
of the university's main gate and fence.  (Comment: Pusz 
suggested that UNICEF may be able to support the teacher 
training institute.  End Comment.) 
 
¶10. (SBU) Al-Rafaie turned to banking and observed that a key 
factor in the development of the Gulf Countries was their 
focus on the development of financial institutions.  He said 
that the Iraqi economy needed to be connected to worldwide 
investment and that the Maysan Government is focusing on 
widening the role of banks in the province.  Mr. Zaid Khalaf 
Hoshi, a delegation member and advisor to the Governor then 
observed that the banking system in the country is backward, 
indicating that the banks suffer from limited capital and few 
branches; that they lack industrial banks and have only one 
agricultural bank; that loans are limited by size, numerous 
guarantees, and high (up to 20 percent) interest rates; and 
that they have no ability to issue letters of credit (LOCs). 
It was clear from their comments that they are acutely aware 
that the paucity of financial intermediaries would continue 
to constrain the growth and maturity of the presently 
moribund private sector in Maysan.  While there was no 
explicit appended banking wish-list, their document on 
banking policy in Maysan reported that they would need to: 
--Capitalize banks 
--Increase the numbers of branches of government banks and 
encouraging private banks to do the same 
--Increase the number of loans issued 
--Have banks adopt loan policies with softer conditions and 
lower interest rates 
 
 
CROCKER