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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ASHGABAT 001102 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
USOSCE FOR AMBASSADOR FINLEY 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ECON KDEM TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN:  SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF 
AMBASSADOR JULIE FINLEY, OCTOBER 20-23 
 
 
¶1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Embassy Ashgabat warmly welcomes you to 
Turkmenistan.  You are coming to Turkmenistan in the early 
months of an expanding dialogue between Turkmenistan and the 
international community in general, and the OSCE and the 
United States in particular.  In the ten months since the 
death of former President Niyazov, the new president has 
taken deliberate steps to move the country back toward the 
mainstream from the eccentricities and outrages of the 
Niyazov era.  In contrast to his predecessor's often-hostile 
attitude toward the OSCE, President Berdimuhamedov seems 
willing to cooperate with the organization, especially in the 
human and security dimensions, and is allowing the OSCE's 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 
and the OSCE field mission in Ashgabat, the OSCE Center, to 
assist with one of Turkmenistan's most urgent needs: 
increasing the country's human capacity.  Given 
Turkmenistan's neutrality, the OSCE's multinational nature 
makes it easier for the Government of Turkmenistan to turn to 
the OSCE than to Western countries, for assistance on some 
particularly sensitive issues, including election reform. 
The United States supports this engagement, which in turn 
bolsters U.S. efforts since Niyazov's death to turn the page 
in the bilateral relationship and to advance widespread, 
albeit gradual, change.  We are confident your visit will 
help promote the OSCE's very constructive role here, as well 
as U.S. foreign policy across all three dimensions. 
 
THE OSCE IN TURKMENISTAN:  A ROLLERCOASTER RELATIONSHIP 
 
¶3.  (SBU) While the OSCE has had a field mission in Ashgabat 
since January 1999, relations with the OSCE for most of the 
last eight years have been rocky at best.  In response to the 
wave of arrests -- including that of Turkmenistan's 
Ambassador to the OSCE, Batyr Berdiyev -- following the 2002 
attack on former President Niyazov's motorcade, the OSCE 
invoked the Moscow Mechanism and assigned a French rapporteur 
to investigate Niyazov's handling of the event.  Turkmenistan 
denied the rapporteur a visa.  In 2004, relations continued 
to worsen when the government indicated that it would not 
renew the visa of the Romanian diplomat who headed the OSCE 
Center.  Although the current Head of Mission, Ambassador 
Ibrahim Djikic, succeeded in calming much of the rancor and 
restoring at least a limited working relationship, the OSCE 
Center again became the focus of controversy in June 2006 
after the Government of Turkmenistan publicly accused the 
Center's Human Dimension Officer, Benjamin Moreau, of seeking 
to undermine President Niyazov's government. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Turkmenistan's relationship with the OSCE took an 
abrupt turn for the better almost immediately after Niyazov's 
death.  Then-interim President Berdimuhamedov invited ODIHR 
to advise the government on the presidential election.  While 
ODIHR advisors concluded that the poll fell far short of 
international standards, ODIHR was encouraged enough by 
Berdimuhamedov's expressed willingness to broaden cooperation 
that ODIHR's Director, Ambassador Christian Strohal, visited 
in May, and he, the president and Deputy Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers/Foreign Minister Rashit Meredov mapped 
out a program of cooperation.  The OSCE Center's patient, 
constructive approach has paid off.  Cooperation has 
blossomed, with the OSCE Center now able to carry out 
programs -- including in the human dimension -- that would 
have been unthinkable just a year ago. 
 
TURKMENISTAN POST-NIYAZOV 
 
¶5.  (SBU) A hydrocarbon-rich state that shares borders with 
Afghanistan and Iran, Turkmenistan is in the midst of an 
historic political transition.  The unexpected death of 
President Niyazov on December 21, 2006, ended the 
authoritarian, one-man dictatorship that by the end of his 
 
ASHGABAT 00001102  002 OF 005 
 
 
life had made Turkmenistan's government among the most 
repressive in the world.  The peaceful transfer of power 
following Niyazov's death confounded many who had predicted 
instability because the former president had no succession 
plan.  President Berdimuhamedov quickly assumed power 
following Niyazov's death with the assistance of the "power 
ministries" -- including the Ministries of National Security 
and Defense, and the Presidential Guard.  His position was 
subsequently confirmed through a public election in which the 
population eagerly participated, even though it did not meet 
international standards. 
 
NIYAZOV'S LEGACY 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Berdimuhamedov inherited a country that former 
President Niyazov had come close to running into the ground. 
Niyazov siphoned off much of Turkmenistan's hydrocarbon 
proceeds into non-transparent slush funds used, in part, to 
finance his massive construction program in Ashgabat at the 
expense of the country's education and health-care systems. 
Politically, his increasing paranoia -- particularly after 
the 2002 armed attack on his motorcade -- led to high-speed 
revolving-door personnel changes at the provincial and 
national level, and an obsessive inclination to micro-manage 
the details of government.  Criticizing or questioning 
Niyazov's decisions was treated as disloyalty, and could be 
grounds for removal from jobs, if not worse.  Niyazov's 
increasing paranoia and xenophobia, expressed as "positive 
neutrality," led to Turkmenistan's political and economic 
isolation from the rest of the world.  His policies calling 
for mandatory increases in cotton and wheat production led to 
destructive agricultural and water-use policies that left 
some of Turkmenistan's arable land salinated and played-out. 
 
EDUCATION -- "DIMMER PEOPLE EASIER TO RULE" 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Niyazov's attacks on the educational system grew 
increasingly destructive in his later years.  The Soviet-era 
educational system was broadly turned into a system designed 
to isolate students from the outside world and to mold them 
into loyal Turkmen-speaking presidential thralls.  President 
Niyazov famously defended this policy when, in 2004, he told 
a fellow Central Asian president, "Dimmer people are easier 
to rule."  Niyazov's destruction of his country's education 
system included cutting the Soviet standard of ten years of 
compulsory education to nine, firing large numbers of 
teachers, and introducing his own works as core curriculum at 
the expense of the traditional building blocks of a basic 
education.  He slashed higher education to two years of study 
and discouraged foreign study by refusing to recognize 
foreign academic degrees.  Taken together, these steps 
created a "lost generation" of under-educated youth 
ill-equipped to help Turkmenistan take its place on the world 
stage. 
 
RULE OF LAW -- A LOW BAR 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Niyazov seriously harmed Turkmenistan's political 
system.  His capricious authoritarianism left a legacy of 
corrupt officials lacking initiative, accountability, and -- 
in many cases -- the expertise needed to do their jobs. 
Young officials who came of age after Niyazov's destructive 
changes to the education system are particularly deficient in 
skills and broader world vision needed to facilitate 
Turkmenistan's entry into the international community.  Many 
laws lack transparency and provision for oversight and 
recourse.  The population's lack of understanding of the 
meaning of rule of law has left the bar low in terms of 
citizens' expectations of their government. 
 
BERDIMUHAMEDOV BEGINS TO REBUILD THE SYSTEM 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Berdimuhamedov still speaks of maintaining his 
 
ASHGABAT 00001102  003 OF 005 
 
 
predecessor's policies and the government pays respectful 
li-service to Niyazov, but the new president has started 
reversing many of the most destructive, especially in the 
areas of education, health, and social welfare.  He has 
restored -- and in many cases -- increased old-age pensions 
that Niyazov had largely eliminated.  The president is 
embarking on a course of hospital-building, with the main 
focus on improving medical facilities in Turkmenistan's five 
provinces.  To this end, he has already authorized 
construction of five provincial mother-and-children 
(maternity) hospitals.  He has also publicly committed to 
improve rural infrastructure and to ensure that every village 
has communications, electricity, and running water. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) In education, Berdimuhamedov is reversing many of 
the policies Niyazov ordered him to implement while he served 
as Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers for Education. 
  Since his inauguration, Berdimuhamedov has ordered a return 
to the compulsory standard of ten years' education, a return 
of universities to five years of classroom study, and a new 
emphasis on exchange programs and the hard sciences.  On July 
13, he called for recognition of foreign academic degrees, a 
major step which would allow exchange students to receive 
credit for their overseas study.  The goal is to repair 
Turkmenistan's broken education system as quickly as possible 
and to give the country the educated workforce that it needs 
to compete commercially.  These efforts, however, are 
hampered by old-thinking bureaucrats, especially in the 
Ministry of Education, who sometimes block or otherwise 
impede foreign assistance programs.  This may perhaps be a 
legacy of the culture of xenophobia Niyazov had encouraged. 
 
ELIMINATING THE CULT OF PERSONALITY 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Berdimuhamedov has incrementally started 
dismantling Niyazov's cult of personality.  Huge posters of 
the deceased president are beginning to be removed from 
public buildings, and references to Niyazov's "literary" 
works, especially the "Ruhnama," are less frequent and might 
fade away over time.  The new president has banned the huge 
stadium gatherings in his honor and the previous requirement 
for students and government workers to line the streets, 
often for hours, along presidential motorcade routes.  That 
said, in many places, Niyazov's picture has been replaced by 
Berdimuhamedov's, and the new president's quotes are now 
replacing Ruhnama quotations on newspaper mastheads.  But 
these fairly common Central Asian practices are still far 
from "personality cult." 
 
FIRST STAGES OF POLITICAL REFORM 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Berdimuhamedov has begun replacing the ministers 
he inherited from Niyazov.  His focus seems to be on finding 
better-qualified individuals.  On August 24, he established a 
"Human Rights Commission" to help bring the practices and 
policies of Turkmenistan's government agencies into line with 
international human rights standards and conventions.  He has 
established a state commission to review complaints of 
citizens against law enforcement agencies, which has become a 
mechanism for pardoning at least some of those imprisoned 
(including for complicity in the 2002 attack on the 
presidential motorcade) under Niyazov.  Since August, 
Berdimuhamedov has pardoned at least 26 prisoners of concern, 
most notably including the former Grand Mufti of 
Turkmenistan, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, and has promised that 
he will pardon more.  Berdimuhamedov has also agreed to allow 
UNDP to provide human rights training to police. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) In addition, he has slowly begun to walk back some 
of the most restrictive controls on movement, first removing 
police checkpoints on the roads between cities, then -- on 
July 13 -- eliminating the requirement for Turkmenistan's 
citizens to obtain permits to travel to border zones 
 
ASHGABAT 00001102  004 OF 005 
 
 
(however, the permit system remains in force for foreigners). 
 Although the president has been slower to strengthen the 
rule of law, and correct Turkmenistan's previous human rights 
and religious freedom record, he has told U.S. officials he 
wants to "turn the page" on the bilateral relationship and is 
willing to work on areas that hindered improved relations 
under Niyazov.  Since an August visit by a delegation from 
the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 
(USCIRF), at least two religious groups that have been trying 
to register (in some cases for up to six years) in accordance 
with Turkmenistan's 2004 Law on Religion have been permitted 
to do so.  He has also approved an unprecedented number of 
visits by U.S. delegations since he took office, including 
those directed toward promoting reform. 
 
ECONOMY AND FINANCE 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Turkmenistan's economy is closely controlled by 
the state, and, although the government for many years 
regularly proclaimed its wish to attract foreign investment, 
it made little effort up to now to change the state-control 
mechanisms, restrictive currency-exchange system and dual 
currency exchange rates that created a difficult foreign 
investment climate.  However, in recent months, we have seen 
greater willingness among upper-level personnel at 
Turkmenistan's main economic and financial institutions -- 
including both the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the 
Central Bank -- to acknowledge that reforms are necessary. 
Part of this new attitude is linked to the president's 
growing frustration, expressed publicly during several 
cabinet-level meetings in August, with Turkmenistan's 
complex, opaque web of on- and off-budget funds, which have 
made a thorough accounting of state income and 
disbursements/expenses virtually impossible.  And, in fact, 
President Berdimuhamedov's frustration with the lack of 
accountability in the budget was one of the key factors that 
led, in late July, to the creation of a Supreme Auditing 
Chamber.  That said, growing interest in investing in 
Turkmenistan among western businessmen in hopes that the new 
government eventually will make the changes necessary to 
improve the investment climate is also providing an incentive 
for change. 
 
FOREIGN POLICY:  A NEW FOCUS ON ENGAGEMENT 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Notwithstanding his statements that he plans to 
continue the "neutrality" policies of his predecessor, 
Berdimuhamedov -- probably at the advice of Deputy Chairman 
of the Cabinet of Ministers and Foreign Minister Rashit 
Meredov -- has put an unprecedented emphasis on foreign 
affairs.  Berdimuhamedov has met or spoken by telephone with 
all the leaders in the region -- including with President 
Aliyev of Azerbaijan, with whom Niyazov had maintained a 
running feud.  He has exchanged visits with Russia's 
President Putin, and held a high-profile gas summit with 
Putin and Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev in Turkmenistan's 
Caspian seaside city of Turkmenbashy (Krasnovodsk).  China 
has a strong and growing commercial presence in Turkmenistan, 
and continues to court Berdimuhamedov through a series of 
high-level commercial and political visits.  In mid-July, 
Berdimuhamedov made a state visit to China, focused mainly on 
natural gas and pipeline deals.  While Turkey has given 
Berdimuhamedov top-level treatment, including an invitation 
to Ankara, its relationship with Turkmenistan continues to be 
colored more by the image of its lucrative trade and 
construction contracts, amounting to hundreds of millions of 
dollars, than by generous development assistance or fraternal 
support. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Berdimuhamedov had a very successful trip in 
September to New York for the UN General Assembly, where he 
met with Secretary of State Rice.  He has also held positive 
meetings with high-level U.S. State Department officials and 
 
ASHGABAT 00001102  005 OF 005 
 
 
leaders of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) and United Nations to discuss areas of 
potential assistance.  He met with UN High Commissioner on 
Human Rights Louise Arbour in May, the Head of the OSCE's 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), 
Christian Strohal, and agreed to a future visit by the UN's 
Special Rapporteur on Religious Freedom. 
 
ENERGY RESOURCES 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Turkmenistan has world-class natural gas reserves, 
but Russia's monopoly of its energy exports has left 
Turkmenistan receiving less than the world price and overly 
beholden to Russia for export.  Pipeline diversification, 
including both a pipeline to China proposed for 2009 and the 
possibility of resurrecting plans for Trans-Caspian and 
Trans-Afghanistan pipelines that would avoid the Russian 
routes, and construction of high-power electricity lines to 
transport excess energy to Turkmenistan's neighbors, 
including Afghanistan, would not only enhance Turkmenistan's 
economic and political sovereignty, but also help fuel new 
levels of prosperity throughout the region.  Berdimuhamedov 
has told U.S. interlocutors he recognizes the need for more 
options and has taken the first steps to this end, but he 
also moved toward increasing the volume of gas exports to 
Russia -- agreeing in principle to build a new littoral 
pipeline -- during the May tripartite summit in Turkmenbashy. 
 He will require encouragement and assistance from the 
international community if he is to maintain a course of 
diversification in the face of almost certain efforts by 
Moscow to keep Turkmenistan from weaning itself away from 
Russia. 
 
U.S. POLICY 
 
¶18.  (SBU) U.S. policy in Turkmenistan is three-fold: 
 
-- Encourage democratic reform and increased respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including support for 
improvements in the education and health systems; 
 
-- Encourage economic reform and growth of a market economy 
and private-sector agriculture, as well as diversification of 
Turkmenistan's energy export options; and 
 
-- Promote security cooperation. 
 
In raising human rights concerns, the United States: 
 
-- Encourages further relaxation of Niyazov-era abuses and 
restrictions on freedom of movement; 
 
-- Promotes greater religious freedom, including registration 
of unrecognized groups like the Roman Catholic Church, and 
making legal provision for conscientious objectors; and 
 
-- Advocates the growth of civil society by urging the 
government to register Turkmenistani non-governmental 
organizations. 
HOAGLAND