VZCZCXYZ0005
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #2349/01 2901057
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 171057Z OCT 07
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7168
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7370
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 8651

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 002349 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage October 17 on Taiwan's UN referendum and on the ruling and 
opposition parties' reactions to Chinese President Hu Jintao's 
proposal at the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China Monday for a peace agreement with Taiwan.  In terms of 
editorials and commentaries, a column in the pro-independence 
"Liberty Times" harshly criticized Hu's proposal and described it as 
a letter calling for the surrender of Taiwan.  An editorial in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" criticized 
Washington's positive reaction to Hu's proposal.  The article said 
"by pushing Taiwanese toward a settlement with a Chinese government 
that has no interest in the welfare of Taiwanese, the US pacifies 
the same dictatorship that is colonizing Tibet."  An editorial in 
the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times," however, discussed 
Beijing's strategic thinking behind such a proposal.  The article 
said "Beijing is trying to create an image in the international 
community:  Namely, it is Taipei, not Beijing, which is creating 
trouble across the Taiwan Strait."  End summary. 
 
A) "Hu Jintao's Nonsense Letter Calling for [Taiwan's] Surrender" 
 
The "Free Talks" column in the pro-independence "Liberty Times" 
[circulation: 720,000] noted (10/17): 
 
"... First, Hu Jintao proposed the peace agreement [with Taiwan] in 
his capacity as Secretary-General of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) and in the party-to-party manner.  Since Taiwan is a 
democratic country, on what basis can a Chinese political party 
propose a peace agreement to another country?  Such a proposal is 
effectively akin to treating Taiwan as part of China and box Taiwan 
in its one-China 'principle.' 
 
"Second, China's one-China [principle] refers to the People's 
Republic of China.  If one follows Hu's train of thoughts, [the 
statement regarding] both sides of the Taiwan Strait discussing a 
formal end to the state of hostility would mean to Sinify and 
internalize the Taiwan issue.  In that case, the peace agreement is 
in fact China's letter calling for Taiwan's surrender. 
 
"Third, Taiwan and China are one country on each side [of the Taiwan 
Strait], and the KMT-CPC war was between the KMT and the CPC, which 
has nothing to do with Taiwan.  The current hostility across the 
Taiwan Strait was caused by China's attempt to annex Taiwan.  If 
China really wants to put an end to cross-Strait hostility, it can 
end it unilaterally by removing the thousand missiles [targeting 
Taiwan] and abolishing the Anti-Secession Law.  Such ways would be 
real moves to extend an olive branch [to Taiwan]. ..." 
 
B) "Seduced by a 'Moderate' Hu Jintao" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (10/17): 
 
"When Chinese President Hu Jintao suggested at this week's Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) Congress that China and Taiwan could begin 
talks -- on condition that Taiwan accept the 'one-China' principle 
-- one might have assumed that literate China-watchers would cluck 
their tongues, think 'more of the same' and turn to more pressing 
internal political matters.  Not so with the US' National Security 
Council (NSC), whose membership is delighted with Hu's 'moderate 
tone.' Spokesman Gordon Johndroe gave sober cross-Strait analysts 
cause for mirth when he suggested that Hu's rehash of old strategy 
amounted to new and constructive language. ... 
 
"The fact is that the NSC's language assumes deep down that Taiwan 
is Chinese territory and that unification is inevitable, blocked 
only by technical political disagreements and the wicked designs of 
President Chen Shui-bian. The NSC's words make no allowance 
whatsoever for the extent of dissent in Taiwan on the 'one-China' 
policy or even the existence of such dissent; indeed, the NSC seems 
unaware that Taiwan's democracy movement was intertwined with the 
realization that independence from China is essential to protect 
democracy.  All of this lends weight to sources that suggest US 
President George W. Bush is now playing a major role in cross-Strait 
policy. If this is true, Taiwanese have good reason to be concerned, 
and not just because he has been treating his Chinese counterpart 
with kid gloves ever since Bush's anomalous promise to defend 
Taiwan, 'whatever it takes,' in 2001. ... 
 
"Too many US officials interpret 'one China' as a principle for 
unity and stability, yet they concede that on the far side of China 
things are far from unitary or stable.  If the US values the 
integrity of Tibetan people and their religious leader, the Dalai 
Lama -- and are prepared to irritate the Chinese in showing it -- 
why is it that at every juncture so many US government agencies 
adopt a stance that emboldens Beijing regarding Taiwan?  By pushing 
Taiwanese toward a settlement with a Chinese government that has no 
interest in the welfare of Taiwanese, the US pacifies the same 
dictatorship that is colonizing Tibet, punishing the devout and 
 
 
making a global hero out of the Dalai Lama. It would be interesting 
to hear the NSC explain the reasoning behind this contradictory 
strategy." 
 
C) "Beijing's Strategic Thinking behind Its Call for a Peace 
Agreement across the Taiwan Strait" 
 
The centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" [circulation: 400,000] 
editorialized (10/17): 
 
"... Beijing's strategic thinking was very clear when it proposed a 
peace agreement [with Taiwan].  One the one hand, it will no longer 
dance to the tune of the internal agenda discussed at the 
campaigning in Taiwan.  Instead, Beijing decided to 'cope with 
shifting situation by sticking to a fundamental principle' by 
unveiling a bigger framework.  Such a framework is not meant to 
emphasize the enactment of the 'Anti-Secession Law' but to call 
positively for the signing of a peace agreement.  For Beijing, the 
'one-China' premise is already there, so the 'Anti-Secession Law' 
can easily hide behind the scene, and the call for 'signing a peace 
agreement' under such circumstances can fully demonstrate that its 
fundamental position with regard to cross-Strait relations is to 
seek reconciliation and to [resume] dialogue...  To a certain 
extent, such a declaration by Beijing did not appeal to Taiwan alone 
but to the international community, because Beijing knows that the 
whole world is watching how Beijing will react to Taiwan's push on 
the 'UN referendum.'  When it turned out that, while Taiwan is 
intensifying its campaign for the 'UN referendum,' Beijing not only 
did not make any harsh remarks but has made a gesture of seeking 
'peace' and proposed a structure for dialogue, the image that 
Beijing has created in the international community is naturally a 
positive one.  Washington's immediate approval to Beijing was an 
evident proof.  In other words, Beijing is trying to create an image 
in the international community:  Namely, it is Taiwan, not Beijing, 
which is creating trouble across the Taiwan Strait, and it is 
Beijing, not Taiwan, which is pursuing reconciliation and dialogue 
across the Taiwan Strait. ..." 
 
WANG