VZCZCXRO5555
RR RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #1695/01 2831231
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101231Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9847
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 7344
RHMFIUU/HQ BICE WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 001695 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, ISN/CPI, ISN/ECC 
ENERGY FOR NA - 24 ED FOX 
ICE FOR FOLDEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL KSTC AE
SUBJECT: SUCCESSFUL US - UAE LEGAL/REGULATORY WORKSHOP 
 
REF: A. STATE 98673 
     ¶B. ABU DHABI 1015 
 
 ¶1. (U) This is an action request.  Please see para. 15. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary: On September 24-25, the U.S. held a legal 
and regulatory workshop for the UAEG legal team responsible 
for the UAE's export control law.  The UAE's team members 
clarified ambiguous aspects of the law and stated that the 
UAE was currently working on implementing regulations.  The 
U.S. was pleased to hear that the law was drafted to give the 
government broad authority and flexibility, so that the UAE 
government can adapt their export control system to evolving 
challenges, i.e., new threats and changes to control lists, 
through regulations. The UAE legal team had clearly been 
thinking about the challenges of implementing the new law and 
pushed hard for examples of how the U.S. regulates exports, 
licenses exports and enforces its law.  Many of the UAE 
questions were fairly basic, including questions on how to 
structure a licensing system.  The U.S. side praised the UAE 
for being the first country in the region to establish a 
comprehensive export control law The UAE team was delighted 
to hear that the U.S. found their law to provide a sufficient 
legal basis upon which to build an effective export control 
system.   The challenge would be ensuring that the 
implementing regulations were sufficiently transparent and 
detailed and reflected the licensing policy established by 
the Guidelines of the four multilateral export control 
regimes (the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, 
the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar 
Arrangement).  The U.S. team also urged the UAE to modify its 
control list to reflect the EU control list, which represents 
the international standard.  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (SBU) On September 24-25, an interagency team with 
representatives from State, Commerce, DHS/ICE, Department of 
Energy, and DOD/DTSA conducted a legal and regulatory 
workshop for UAE officials from the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, Interior, Economy, and Justice, as well as 
representatives from Dubai police, the Federal Customs 
Authority, and the Federal State Security Organization. 
Several of the UAEG attendees had been involved in the 
interagency committee drafting the UAE,s new export control 
law, as well as the drafting of the implementing regulations. 
 The UAE delegation opened their presentation by 
acknowledging the importance of an export control law and 
stressing that this was a new field for the country.  The UAE 
team leader Riyad Belhol stressed that the UAE was not a 
manufacturing, but a trading nation and expressed his concern 
that this would increase the challenges for implementing 
effective export controls.  He noted that the UAE legal team 
needed to conduct outreach activities with the UAE's various 
implementing agencies, with industry, and with prosecutors 
and judges.  Renee Pan, the U.S. Delegation head, emphasized 
that we appreciated the significant step that the UAE took in 
passing a comprehensive export control law, the first country 
in the region to do so.  She stressed the importance of an 
effective export control system in guaranteeing legitimate 
trade.  Belhol, noting the difficulties the UAE would face in 
evaluating the risk associated with a transaction and the 
challenges of implementing an export control system in a 
country that trades but does not manufacture, asked whether 
the USG could provide the UAEG with advanced notification of 
U.S. licensed exports to the UAE in three categories (goods 
licensed for export to the UAE; goods licensed for another 
country, but transiting the UAE; goods licensed for another 
country that would be re-exported from the UAE). The U.S. 
delegation recognized their concerns and offered to take back 
to Washington the idea of an information sharing agreement 
with the UAE. 
 
UAE Export Control Law 
---------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Issa Baddour, a legal advisor at the Ministry of 
Economy (and one of the drafters of the law) explained the 
process underpinning the law. He said that the process had 
started about three years previously, when the UAE 
established a national committee consisting of about 20 
institutions, both public and private. The Committee reviewed 
the comments, proposals, and suggestions of the institutions, 
and tried to balance trade and security concerns.  UNSCR 1540 
(2004) on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
required countries to develop export control laws and various 
U.S. sponsored workshops helped with the deliberations. 
 
ABU DHABI 00001695  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Baddour then explained in detail the provisions of 
the law. He explained that the law broke down into two parts. 
 Part one dealt with general export-import issues.  The goal 
was to harmonize efforts and regulations among the emirates 
under a federal umbrella.  The Ministry of Economy had the 
lead on this portion of the law and would chair an 
interagency committee dealing with general exports and 
imports.  Part two of the law dealt with export, reexport, 
transit and transshipment of "strategic goods" and was 
modeled on Singapore's export control law.  According to 
Baddour, the UAE views its economic status as similar to 
Singapore's, with both countries enjoying a position as a 
regional trading hub.  Although the UAE published Singapore's 
control list, the law allows the government flexibility to 
amend the list in regulations without amending the entire 
law. He stressed that the UAE had brought both the private 
sector and the various emirates into the legislative 
decision-making process and that the law had the blessings of 
both. 
 
¶6. (SBU) According to this law, UAE's MFA will have the lead 
in dealing with strategic goods and will chair a strategic 
goods committee (committee).  Baddour noted that, since most 
re-exports are via the UAE's many free zones, the UAEG 
ensured that the law covered the free zones.  Representatives 
of the UAE's free zones will also be on the committee.  The 
law also provides for establishing an executive agency under 
the MFA.  This will serves as the secretariat to the 
strategic goods committee, receive and examine licensing 
applications, and make recommendations to the committee.  He 
noted that the UAE had done  something similar in its 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) implementation, where the 
executive body makes recommendations to the committee and the 
committee makes the final determinations. 
 
¶7. (SBU)  The U.S. team expressed concerns that the size and 
varied representation of the committee, which includes 
industry representatives, might make it difficult for a 
licensing decision to be reached, especially if decisions 
required consensus.  The UAE side noted that the law allows 
for the committee to establish sub committees for specific 
tasks, such as license review. Baddour suggested that working 
groups for issues such as reviewing licenses would be set up 
under bylaws issued by the MFA.   envisioned that certain 
subcommittees could have the lead on certain licensing issues 
and would discuss the recommendations of the Executive Agency 
and would refer cases directly to the head of the committee 
for a decision. The MFA head of the committee would have the 
final say on whether a license is issued.  (Note:  The MFA 
has not yet designated a committee head.  End Note.)  The 
regulations would specify conditions for licensing.  Licenses 
could be denied due to violations of law or according to 
conditions covered in the regulations.  There would be a two 
tier appeal process, first to the head of the committee, then 
to the courts. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The U.S. side noted that the law presented a good 
framework for an export control system and one that gave the 
UAEG significant flexibility to be able to adapt to changing 
circumstances.  It would be key for the regulations to go 
into sufficient detail for companies to be able to understand 
their license obligations and the licensing decision making 
process.  Pan explained that the USG did have some concern 
about the UAE's control list, which was based on Singapore,s 
old control list.  Lisa Meyers from the Department of 
Commerce explained that Singapore will adopt an updated list 
in January 2008 that adds over 1,000 new items, thereby 
bringing under control items from the Missile Technology 
Control Regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement and additional 
Australia Group chemicals and equipment.  The new Singapore 
list is in conformity with the European Union control list, 
which is the international standard.  U.S. delegates passed 
over a copy of the EU list and urged the UAEG to revise its 
current list to match the EU list, explaining that conformity 
with international standards would improve clarity for 
businesses.  The UAE team committed to bringing the list back 
to appropriate members of the committee for consideration. 
 
 
 
U.S. Export Control Regulations and Enforcement 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶9. (SBU) At the request of the UAE delegation, the U.S. team 
 
ABU DHABI 00001695  003 OF 004 
 
 
discussed developing a licensing regime, presented an 
overview of the U.S. legal and regulatory system, and case 
studies of enforcement actions. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Ms. Meyers gave a brief overview on the licensing 
process, focusing on the technical and policy review that the 
licensing authority conducts.  The delegation discussed the 
roles of various agencies in the U.S. system, as well as our 
process to resolve disputes.  Ms. Meyers emphasized the 
importance of the regulations having license review 
guidelines consistent with those established by the four 
multilateral export control regimes, and the importance of 
having clearly stipulated license review and denial standards 
which are well understood by industry.  The UAE delegation 
was interested in the type of information the U.S. requires 
to be submitted with the applications, how applications are 
submitted and processed electronically. The UAE side appeared 
shocked about the number of licenses issued each year and 
wanted information on how many of the Department of 
Commerce's licensing officers were technical experts. They 
expressed concern that the UAEG would not have the technical 
expertise to adequately review license applications.  USDel 
reminded them that they could reach out to other government 
agencies, universities and other organizations (such as the 
Abu Dhabi National Oil Company) which could have the 
requisite expertise and committed to helping the UAE develop 
the requisite knowledge of the regime control lists necessary 
to process licenses. The UAE and U.S. had an extensive 
discussions about how to evaluate the risk associated with a 
transaction.  The UAE delegation was very interested in any 
information the U.S. could provide about entities known to be 
involved in WMD programs (such as the Department of 
Commerce,s Entity List), as well as information on licenses 
the U.S. issued for export to the UAE or reexport or 
transshipment through the UAE. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Glenn Kaminsky briefed the UAE delegation on U.S. 
export control authority. The UAE's legal team was also 
interested in the enforcement briefing, expressing concern 
about how UAE officials could make effective cases for 
prosecution.  DHS/ICE and BIS representatives walked the UAE 
through two case studies of successful export control 
investigation and prosecutions. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The U.S. delegation discussed the training plan 
that was provided to the UAE in July (ref A) which proposed 
workshops on licensing, industry outreach, and enforcement. 
The U.S. team also promised to consider the UAEG request for 
training of judges and prosecutors in the application of the 
new export control law. The U.S. noted that it was open to 
the UAE,s further recommendations on what types of 
assistance would be most useful. 
 
¶13. (SBU) List of Attendees 
----------------- 
UAE 
 
--Lt. Col Dr. Riyadh Mohamed Kalfan Belhol, Legal Advisor 
Dubai Police 
 
--Lt. Col Hasan Ali Mirza, State Security, Legal Advisor 
 
--Staff Lt Col. Mohamed Khalifa Al-Kitbie, Ministry of 
Interior, Coordinator for Anti Trafficking in WMD 
 
--Major Mansour Abdullah Mohamed, Dubai Police 
 
--Major Omar Al Rahoumi, Dubai Police, Legal Department 
 
--Captain Mohamed Saif Al-Miqbali, Dubai Police 
 
--Saeed Muhaier Al-Kitbi, MFA Legal Department 
 
--Juma Mohamed Al-Kait, Director WTO and FTA Affairs Ministry 
of Economy 
 
--Issa Baddour, Legal Advisor Ministry of Economy 
 
--Yahya Al-Dabagh, Advisor Ministry of Economy 
 
--Ahmed Baqr, legal Advisor Federal Customs Authority 
 
--Mohamed Amadi, Advisor Ministry of Justice 
 
U.S. 
 
ABU DHABI 00001695  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
--Renee Pan, Department of State 
 
--Lisa Meyers, Department of Commerce 
 
--Tom Madigan, Department of Commerce 
 
-- Glenn Kaminsky, Department of Commerce 
 
-- Shane Folden, Department of Homeland Security/ICE 
 
-- Edward Fox, Department of Energy 
 
-- Chuck Shotwell, Department of Defense 
 
-- Ransom Avilla, ICE Attach 
 
-- Oliver John, Econchief 
 
-- Nasir Khan, Export Control Attach 
 
¶14. (SBU) Comment:  This was a very positive workshop.  It 
was clear that the UAE legal team had thought about issues 
related to the law and was able to explain the thinking 
behind the law and clarify how some of the law,s more 
ambiguous provisions would be clarified in implementing 
regulations. This was purposeful because the UAE wanted the 
law to give the federal government broad authority and allow 
the government the flexibility to adapt the export control 
system to evolving challenges.   Based on the elementary 
nature of many of their questions, however, it was clear that 
they are still grappling with the complexities of 
implementing this new export control system.  Post believes 
that we would have the opportunity to help the UAE implement 
its new law and would recommend holding a follow-on licensing 
workshop as soon as possible after the regulations are 
drafted.  Post will follow-up with MFA to try and obtain a 
copy of either the draft or final regulations.  In addition, 
post will follow-up on ref b training plan. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Action Request:  Post recommends that we seek to 
capitalize on the momentum by scheduling both a visit by 
Acting Undersecretary of State John Rood and the next 
Counterproliferation Task Force meeting in late January/early 
February 2008.  Post also recommends that we propose a 
licensing workshop for December as soon as the regulations 
are issued.  Post recommends that the Interagency consider a 
mechanism to share information on U.S. licensed exports to 
(and via) the UAE with the UAEG.  Post also requests that 
Department consider a proposal to train prosecutors and 
judges on export controls and non-proliferation.  This will 
help them understand the importance of these types of cases 
and improve the chances of successful prosecutions.  Post 
requests that Department provide us with copies of Commerce 
licensing forms, and copies of USG and other governments' 
published entities lists. 
 
¶16. (U) This cable was cleared by the delegation. 
SISON