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Viewing cable 07TUNIS1273, MEPI LESSONS LEARNED 3: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TUNIS1273 2007-09-19 09:45 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tunis
VZCZCXRO3841
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHTU #1273/01 2620945
ZNR UUUUU ZZH ZDK
P 190945Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3881
INFO RUEHMEP/THE MIDDLE EAST PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1362
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1833
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TUNIS 001273 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KMPI KDEM XF PREL PGOV EAID
SUBJECT: MEPI LESSONS LEARNED 3: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
 
REF: A. TUNIS 1259 
     B. TUNIS 1263 
 
TUNIS 00001273  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified.  Handle Accordingly. 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Since MEPI's launch in 2002, we have 
learned a great deal about public-diplomacy efforts towards 
reformers in the Arab world.  Building trust and name 
recognition has required on-the-ground engagement by posts 
and the MEPI Regional Office.  The primary challenges have 
been identifying our target audience, developing appropriate 
tools to get the word out, and getting the "reform" message 
right.  To date, we have made great strides in reaching 
MEPI's natural constituency - reformers - and maintaining a 
relationship with them, most recently through enhanced alumni 
activities.  We have not, however, taken a consistent PD 
approach on MEPI aimed at the general public in the region. 
There are pros and cons to doing so, as well as resource 
implications.  Given MEPI's considerable PD potential, we 
should take a country-by-country approach to exploiting this 
untapped source.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) This is the third in a series of cables by the MEPI 
Regional Office in Tunis, based on three years of supporting 
MEPI activities from Morocco to Lebanon.  The others are: 
--  Overview (ref a) 
--  Addressing the challenges (ref b) 
--  Small Grants: The Secret Weapon (septel) 
 
------------ 
The Audience 
------------ 
 
3. (SBU) While Public Diplomacy is not MEPI's priority 
mission, we have been successful in outreach efforts to our 
natural constituency: current and future reformers.  Within 
civil society across the region, MEPI has developed high and 
generally positive name recognition.  Achieving this success 
has meant adapting our approach and learning as we go.  Early 
on we saw that overcoming skepticism about our goals would 
require persistent engagement and building up trust.  This 
was one of the primary motivations for opening MEPI Regional 
Offices (ROs) in Abu Dhabi and Tunis, to establish an 
on-the-ground presence dealing full-time with reform issues 
and programs. 
 
4. (SBU) The first challenge was to identify local partners 
whose reform activities we could support.  This required 
considerable outreach efforts by posts and the RO, as many 
existing contacts turned out to be seeking funds for projects 
that did not fit MEPI's objectives, such as one-off 
conferences or provision of social services.  Posts cast 
their net wider, the RO used visits to meet new civil society 
contacts and even held seminars in three countries to explain 
MEPI's objectives and how to apply for a grant.  Over time, 
as posts became more familiar with NGOs and the NGOs with 
MEPI, we have been much more effective at identifying 
hundreds of individuals and groups to participate in, or 
implement, MEPI programs. 
 
---------- 
The Medium 
---------- 
 
5. (SBU) The second challenge was getting the word out about 
MEPI opportunities and accomplishments. In 2006, the RO 
launched a website with information geared to the countries 
in the region and 100% mirrored in Arabic and French - 
essentially 3 parallel websites, a first for the Department. 
The site (www.mepimedregion.mepi.state.gov) not only provides 
material on MEPI programs, but is also constantly updated 
with funding opportunities, human impact stories, and 
articles on democratic reform.  To ensure that the website 
was used, the RO began to reach out electronically to its 
target audience and draw them into the website.  The RO now 
sends a monthly "electronic journal" to some 1,500 contacts. 
Its articles and other information are linked to the website, 
which results in three times as many hits in the days after 
the e-journal's release than during the rest of the month. 
 
6. (SBU)  It took us two years of trial and error to reach 
this point.  When the RO opened three years ago, there was 
very little material on MEPI and almost none of it was in 
Arabic or French.  In 2005, we began by developing fact 
sheets and information packets in those two languages plus 
 
TUNIS 00001273  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
English to explain MEPI's broad objectives.  Posts 
appreciated having something to share with potential MEPI 
partners and host governments, yet told us this general 
information was of limited use; what was really needed to 
spread the message was country-specific material.  That led 
us to the website, which is the most effective tool developed 
so far, justifying the considerable effort required to 
maintain it.  The RO plans to continue making the website 
more attractive and interactive. 
 
----------- 
The Message 
----------- 
 
7. (SBU) The third, and perhaps the hardest, challenge is 
getting our message right.  While there is clearly a growing 
understanding of, and hunger for, democratic practices across 
the region, they are usually not expressed in broad, sweeping 
terms, but rather in more concrete ways of addressing daily 
problems.  In other words, "freedom, democracy or rule of 
law," are harder concepts to grasp for most people than 
"government corruption, equal access to jobs or fair 
treatment by judges," even if the latter are just examples of 
the former.  Arab opponents of reform frequently deride the 
term "democracy" as a Western model being imposed on Arab 
society.  They also usually paint USG democracy-promotion 
efforts as part of a grand conspiracy linked to other 
policies unpopular in the region.  However specious, these 
arguments have resonance with a large segment of the 
population, even among liberal reformers. 
 
8. (SBU) We have found no magic lexicon to address this 
challenge.  Hot-button words vary by country, as do examples 
of democratic practices that have resonance.  In general, 
people respond well to specific examples of activities that 
have an impact on the daily lives of individuals they can 
relate to.  The key is to find terms that reinforce the ideas 
that democratic development is taking place, that it is not 
being imposed from the outside but is home-grown, and that 
expanding democracy ultimately leads to concepts that are 
genuinely shared by our different cultures, such as justice 
and security. 
 
---------------------------- 
Reformers or General Public? 
---------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) When we made initial visits across the region after 
opening the MEPI Regional Office three years ago, most 
activists and reformers met us with skepticism - when they 
met us at all.  The reasons for their reticence varied: 
doubts about USG sincerity on reform; objections to certain 
policies; fear of being tarnished, or endangered, by 
association.  Our persistent engagement, with a consistent 
message and concrete program support, turned that around. 
It's not that the reformers now agree with all US policies, 
but they have concluded that we share a common interest in 
promoting democratic change.  The bottom line is that a lot 
of groups who avoided us in the past are now coming to us 
with ideas for reform projects for which they are seeking 
MEPI support. 
 
10. (SBU) We need to consolidate existing relationships with 
reformers and to continue outreach, especially outside of 
capitals.  Maintaining contact with participants and grantees 
after their MEPI programs have ended is crucial to our 
efforts.  The creation of MEPI Alumni Associations in several 
pilot countries should go a long way in ensuring both that 
posts maintain contact with the growing list of participants 
and that the alumni involved in different aspects of reform 
in their country are exposed to each other. 
 
11. (SBU) Given the success in outreach to the "reform" 
community, the question remains whether MEPI PD efforts 
should more consistently target the general public.  The 
numerous MEPI activities across the region offer great 
potential to demonstrate concrete USG support for positive 
change.  But there are potential hazards as well. 
Publicizing MEPI support of activities in politically 
sensitive areas, such as the media or political parties, can 
potentially undermine their impact.  We have seen examples in 
several countries of spurious media coverage of MEPI-funded 
activities that made accusations about the 
independence/loyalty of the local implementer and/or 
"meddling" by the USG in internal affairs.  Therefore, great 
care must be taken in selecting which activities to 
publicize.  We should adopt a country-by-country approach 
toward PD efforts related to MEPI, perhaps as part of the 
democracy-strategy process.  This would allow all interested 
 
TUNIS 00001273  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
parties to discuss the pros and cons, as well as the resource 
implications, and decide which activities to promote.  There 
should be no illusions.  Publicizing MEPI events will not 
quickly win over the person in the street, but it will let 
him or her see another facet of USG policy in the region, one 
which has a positive impact on real people. 
GODEC