VZCZCXRO0737
RR RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV
DE RUEHTC #1808/01 2711000
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281000Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0546
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0424
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2183

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001808 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EU NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU TREATY: DUTCH DODGE A BULLET 
 
 
¶1. (SBU)  SUMMARY:  The Dutch Labor Party's (PvdA) September 
25 decision to drop its demand for a referendum on the EU 
Reform Treaty avoids a messy -- and potentially disastrous -- 
repeat of the Dutch 2005 popular rejection of the previous 
Constitutional Treaty. Parliament is now expected to ratify 
the treaty.  At the same time, the PvdA's reversal comes at a 
cost both to the PvdA leadership -- now widely accused of 
"cowardice" for abandoning a major election promise -- and to 
its Coalition Partner, the Christian Democrats (CDA) -- which 
will now be expected to show more flexibility on another 
major issue, such as the national "dismissal laws" or the 
Dutch deployment to Afghanistan. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) The Dutch appear to have avoided a political crisis 
over a possible referendum over the proposed EU "reform" 
treaty. On September 25, the Parliamentary Group of the Dutch 
Labor Party (PvdA) announced that it would not support a 
referendum on the treaty, effectively reversing its campaign 
pledge to submit the treaty to a public vote.  The PvdA 
decision followed a September 21 Cabinet decision that a 
referendum was "not desirable" and "not necessary" in light 
of a Council of State study concluding that the "new" treaty 
did not "have a constitutional nature."  Supporters of the 
treaty -- even many of those who believed a referendum was 
necessary -- worried that the Dutch public, if given the 
chance, would have repeated their 2005 rejection of the draft 
EU Constitutional Treaty, embarrassing the Balkenende 
government and strengthening anti-EU sentiments on the left 
and right. 
 
¶3. (U) As a member of the governing coalition government, the 
PvdA ministers (including the Minister for European Affairs, 
Frans Timmermans) officially supported the September 21 
Cabinet decision.  Although the Cabinet members are expected 
to make every effort to convince their Parliamentary faction 
to support government decisions, the PvdA ministers faced the 
real prospect that their MPs would undercut their position by 
pushing a pro-referendum motion in Parliament.  Jacques 
Tichelaar, PvdA floor leader, had repeatedly indicated his 
support for a referendum in keeping with the party's election 
manifesto.  Former development minister Jan Pronk -- who 
narrowly lost a bid to become Party Chairman on September 24 
-- had also publicly called for party members to challenge 
the coalition government's stance.  In the end, however, 
under Tichelaar's guidance, the parliamentary faction agreed 
to adopt the government's anti-referendum position without 
putting the issue to a vote. 
 
¶4. (U) Following the decision, Tichelaar asserted that most 
rank-and-file PvdA members were much more concerned about 
domestic issues -- such as an upcoming debate on loosening 
hiring and firing regulations -- than EU matters.  In several 
press interviews following the September 25 decision, 
Tichelaar rejected accusations that he had "turned 180 
degrees" on the referendum issues, arguing that his previous 
positions were more nuanced.  Political commentators 
suggested that Tichelaar's mention of the dismissal laws in 
the same breath as the EU treaty probably means the PvdA 
expects to cut a deal in Cabinet linking the two issues. 
 
5, (U) Opponents of the treaty on the left and right 
immediately attacked Tichelaar and the PvdA leadership in 
general for reversing the party's pre-election stance in 
favor of a referendum.  According to Socialist Party (SP) 
spokesman Harry van Bommel, the PvdA's decision was a 
"pistol" the SP and others would use to weaken the already 
beleaguered party.  Maverick nationalist politician Geert 
Wilders (PVV) openly accused the PvdA leaders of "cowardice" 
for not trusting the Dutch electorate to make up its own mind 
on the issue.  The pro-referendum camp in Parliament -- SP, 
Green-Left, D-66, and PVV -- have made clear it intends to 
push forward with their motion for a referendum, but without 
PvdA support, it will have no majority in either Chamber of 
Parliament. 
 
¶6. (SBU) COMMENT: The parliamentary faction's decision will 
be discussed at an upcoming PvdA conference on October 6. 
There is a slight chance that PvdA rank and file members will 
take the opportunity of the conference to reopen the debate 
and call for a new decision.  Such an action, however, would 
essentially constitute a vote of "no confidence" in the PvdA 
leadership -- possibly leading to a collapse of the current 
government -- and would be seen as virtually suicidal for a 
party already widely viewed as weak and internally divided. 
 
¶7. (SBU) COMMENT, CONTINUED: The purported link between the 
coalition decisions on the EU treaty and the dismissal laws 
could also indirectly have an impact on the current debate 
over the Netherlands' troop deployment to Afghanistan.  Since 
joining the Balkenende IV cabinet, three main issues have 
 
THE HAGUE 00001808  002 OF 002 
 
 
divided the PvdA from its senior Coalition Partner, the 
Christian Democrats (CDA):  the EU treaty referendum, 
revising national labor laws regarding hiring and firing (the 
"dismissal laws"), and renewing the Dutch deployment to 
Afghanistan.  Absent a victory in at least one prominent 
area, the current PvdA leadership, and Finance 
Minister/Deputy Prime Minister Wouter Bos in particular, will 
face ever growing resentment from party members.  Having 
"lost" on the EU referendum, if the PvdA doesn't "win" on the 
dismissal laws, it may toughen its stance against a renewed 
Afghanistan deployment or seek other areas in which to prove 
the party's relevance in Cabinet.   END COMMENT. 
Gallagher