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INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 137352 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID IR IZ MOPS PREL SY
SUBJECT: IRAQ ALLIES AMBASSADORS' MEETING - SEPTEMBER 18 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  On September 18, Ambassador David 
Satterfield, the Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and 
Coordinator for Iraq, briefed diplomats from 
non-troop-contributing allies.  Amb. Satterfield underscored 
key themes from Amb. Crocker's congressional testimony the 
previous week.  If one assesses conditions in Iraq solely on 
the basis of performance of the national government and the 
18 congressionally mandated benchmarks, then a critical and 
positive phenomenon is missed.  The Government of Iraq's 
minimal success to date in passing national legislation to 
address a broad range of issues is offset by the pragmatic 
and positive accomodations on the ground in the provinces 
which effectively mirror the intent of national legislation. 
The central government, while certainly responsible for its 
own halting performance, is not the fundamental "problem" per 
se - rather, fundamental changes in Iraqi society post-Saddam 
and the absence of consensus on basic questions of Iraqi 
identity underlie the difficulties in moving "benchmark" 
issues to resolution.  The sum of the positive developments 
taking place on the ground from the "bottom up" do not yet 
constitute "reconciliation," but are the incubator or 
precursor of reconciliation and provide a reason for hope and 
a reason to continue our support - support that, if 
withdrawn, will unravel recent accomplishments and result in 
greater violence and terror and attendant expansion of the 
presence and influence of forces such as AQI (Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq) and Iran.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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INTRODUCTION 
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¶2. (SBU) NEA hosted a meeting of ambassadors and 
representatives from non-troop contributing allies on 
September 18 to complement a September 13 meeting of 
ambassadors from 32 troop-contributing nations (plus EU 
Commission) with NSC's General Lute following the testimonies 
by Amb. Crocker and General Petraeus.  Amb. Satterfield 
welcomed this opportunity to discuss the recent assessments 
and where things stand for the way ahead. 
 
¶4. (SBU) On the national level, if success is measured by 
progress on the 18 benchmarks (which were proposed by Iraqis 
and endorsed by Congress), then we are all quite frustrated 
since there has been very little progress: 
--There is no national hydrocarbons law or revenue management 
law yet. 
--While de-Ba thification reform is in consideration, it has 
not yet been enacted. 
--Constitutional revision remains unfinished. 
--We still await a provincial powers law and election law. 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Lack of progress on the benchmarks is not solely a 
result of failure by the government or the prime minister. 
Progress has not been made because there is no consensus 
among Iraq's political leaders on key questions of Iraqi 
identity: 
--What is Iraq? 
--What should the future of Iraq look like? 
--What does it mean to be an Iraqi? 
 
This is a conflict about power, authority, resources, and 
territory.  It has not yet worked its way through to a 
regional consensus on the fundamental issues about the future 
shape of the country.  Therefore progress is slow on issues 
like de-Ba thification and hydrocarbons - difficult matters 
whose debate and resolution, or lack thereof - mirror the 
state of the national leadership debate on the direction Iraq 
should take. 
 
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PROGRESS IN AL-ANBAR 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) As Ambassador Crocker noted, it is important to look 
at "bottom up" progress taking place outside the narrow 
context of the Baghdad leadership debate over the legislative 
benchmarks.  Real advances are being made in restoring 
stability to challenged areas, most notably in Anbar Province 
but also in other parts of Iraq, consisting of pragmatic 
changes on the ground which are improving security and 
allowing bridges to be built not just among local authorities 
and populations, or between local figures and MNF-I, but with 
Baghdad as well.  Local Anbari elements (many of whom had 
 
STATE 00137352  002 OF 004 
 
 
been part of the violent insurgency) decided they had had 
enough and moved against AQI.  At one point last summer, we 
had described Anbar as "lost."  The change has been 
revolutionary:  mayors returned and the provincial council 
which had been in exile in Baghdad for over a year returned. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The first action the returning provincial council 
took was to assess the province's needs, producing a bill for 
$100 million.  The Government of Iraq (GOI) is quite liquid 
in resources but has been "illiquid" in its ability to move 
those resources.  As a consequence of positive steps we had 
undertaken over the past year and more to build budget 
execution capacity, the GOI was able to respond to the needs 
of Anbar Province - including an additional $70 million which 
Prime Minister Maliki approved on his visit to the region. 
An additional $50 million was approved to compensate for AQI 
terrorism.  Thus, the GOI is providing a total of $220 
million of which $170 million has already been allocated on 
the ground. 
 
 
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THE WAY AHEAD 
------------- 
¶8. (SBU) Does all of this constitute "reconciliation?"  We 
would argue that genuine reconciliation is a further goal 
yet.  But practical accomodation on the ground provides the 
precursor - or essential ground - for reconciliation.  This 
also has the ability to lead to reduced sectarian violence, 
reestablishment of order, and reaching out in both directions 
(local to central level and central to local level).  This 
facilitates the reintegration of violent elements into the 
state, the army, and broader national life, making them now 
participants in the life of the state. 
 
¶9. (SBU) There is a real potential for stabilization of Iraq 
in all such bottom-up progress, but we still see a need for 
fundamental national legislation.  While we continue to press 
national political leaders to move forward, we are also 
seeking to be as agile as possible in facilitating further 
accomodations at the local, working level that, in many ways, 
meet the goals of the still-lacking national action.  For 
example, while no de-Ba thification law currently exists, 
former insurgents, many of them Ba thists, in Anbar Province 
are now being paid as part of the national security forces. 
General Petraeus calls this "local immunity."  Another 
example concerns the hydrocarbons law:  even though no 
national law has yet been approved, a Shi a central 
government has allocated money - from hydrocarbon revenues - 
for all the provinces, including $220 million for Anbar, a 
Sunni province, achieving an equitable distribution based on 
respective needs. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Are we confident the aforementioned improvements 
will continue?  No - Ambassador Crocker has been blunt on 
this point.  There are no guarantees, but there is reason for 
hope.  If these changes do not continue, however, the only 
alternative is a reversion to chaos and terror - in which not 
only the people of Iraq will suffer; forces such as AQI and 
Iran will advance their interests at our expense and the 
expense of the region and the international community.  Thus, 
the key  mission of MNF-I is to bring down and keep down the 
levels of sectarian violence and confront AQI.  We believe 
the surge has been successful in this - not just in reducing 
militia activity but also AQI suicide attacks.  The latter 
have fallen 50% over the last four months, 80% since early 
spring.  AQI is still a very threatening force, but it is 
feeling the press of our actions and those of the Iraqi 
security forces.  General Petraeus is confident enough in 
what the surge and Iraqi forces have achieved on the ground 
that he has recommended a drawdown of surge forces starting 
in December - five months ahead of the "hard" drawdown 
commencement date of next April.  Marine surge forces begin 
redeployment this month.  Another assessment by Amb. Crocker 
and General Petraeus is due in March 2008.  All of us hope we 
will see a continuation of current positive trends. 
 
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REGIONAL CONTEXT 
---------------- 
¶11. (SBU) The core conflict in Iraq is an unresolved conflict 
over the nature of the state.  We believe the success of Iraq 
in a practical sense - defined as progress toward greater 
stability and security - will be a bulwark against 
organizations of terror, such as AQI, and strategic state 
sponsors of terror such as Iran and Syria.  Iraq exists in a 
region, not a vacuum, and Iran's approach to Iraq is a 
strategic one, executed in Iraq as well as through radical 
Palestinians, Hizballah,and in Iran's pursuit of nuclear 
weapons.  Iran uses Iraq as a forum to advance specific goals 
in that country and also to protect its influence elsewhere 
 
STATE 00137352  003 OF 004 
 
 
in the region.  If we succeed in stabilizing Iraq, we can 
make the region as a whole more secure.  Just as Iran acts on 
a regional basis, so we are acting in a strategic manner on a 
variety of regional fronts to advance security, stability, 
and greater regional peace.  We are working with Israel and 
Palestinian President Abbas on plans for an international 
event to be held in November to advance resolution of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  We have been working with the 
Persian Gulf states, Egypt, and Jordan (the Gulf Cooperation 
Council plus two) since last September to help build a common 
Gulf security architecture.  We have worked to validate and 
support those allies through a significant arms sales package 
and through the Economic Support Fund and Foreign Military 
Financing.  The international community as a whole is now 
engaged in a confrontation with Iran over its nuclear weapons 
program.  We are moving with our allies on multiple fronts to 
deal with this threat to global peace and security.  We are 
working for a third Chapter 7 UN resolution; we are working 
to mobilize further state-to-state pressure on Tehran, as 
well as bringing additional pressure through financial 
institutions to further impress on Iran the price that must 
be paid for its behavior. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Finally, Iraq needs support.  There are two venues 
coming up for Iraq's neighbors and the broader international 
community to offer such aid and to hear the GOI express its 
own assessment of progress.  On Saturday, September 22, the 
UN Secretary-General hosts a meeting in New York to discuss 
UNSCR 1770 that expanded the mandate of the UN Assistance 
Mission - Iraq (UNAMI) and the status of the International 
Compact with Iraq.  In early November, the Expanded Neighbors 
Ministerial will take place in Istanbul to carry on the 
dialogue begun in Sharm el-Sheikh - a useful and valuable 
forum to discuss what is happening in Iraq and its importance 
to the people of the region. 
 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
------------------ 
¶13. (SBU) Our allies are critical and strategic participants 
and we ask them to continue with us.  We will be working with 
the Iraqi government in the months ahead in several areas: 
--Securing an extension through 2008 of the authorities in 
the existing UNSCR 1723; 
--Discussing through the Strategic Partnership Dialogue the 
long-term relationship between Iraq and the United States and 
the long-term basis for U.S. force presence; 
--We will also be in close contact with all those who have 
troops in Iraq as these critical discussions move forward. 
We look forward to our coming talks and continued 
relationship with Iraq. 
 
----- 
Q & A 
----- 
¶14.  (SBU) Canadian PolCouns Brown asked about the status of 
the communique issued by the five Iraqi political leaders in 
August.  He also wanted to know Amb. Satterfield's thoughts 
on Amb. Crocker's "mixed record" response when asked about 
Syria's actions in the region. 
 
Amb. Satterfield responded that we continue to be engaged 
with Iraqi political leaders and this will not diminish, even 
though there is no national consensus on the future of Iraq. 
Our interest is in seeing greater security and stabilization, 
and this must be pursued both through a bottom-up and 
top-down approach.  Regarding Syria, we have seen no 
discernible change related to the flow of foreign fighters. 
Nothing has come from Syria's hosting of the Border Security 
Working Group.  In addition, the GOI reports that nothing 
resulted from recent meetings held during Prime Minister 
Maliki's visit to Damascus.  Syria is making the strategic 
choice to continue to play a hand in Iraq through jihadists, 
and we have made clear that this behavior must change. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Dutch Ambassador Kroner asked if the benchmark 
approach was an accurate measure in any way. 
 
Amb. Satterfield responded that the benchmarks measure, in 
one formal sense, the ability of the leaders of Iraq to come 
to a consensus.  The hydrocarbons legislation is important. 
We want to see provincial elections, as do most Iraqis.  Our 
argument is that one cannot ignore the benchmarks but 
something else is happening on the ground that is important 
and that must be encouraged. 
 
¶16. (SBU) European Commission Counselor Brender asked for 
elaboration on the long-term security agreement. 
 
Amb. Satterfield replied that the Iraqi leadership called on 
the United States to work with the GOI on this subject.  The 
 
STATE 00137352  004 OF 004 
 
 
United States contemplatees a continued significant presence 
and needs agreed-upon state-to-state arrangements both for 
Iraqi sovereignty reasons and for our own purposes.  However, 
our near-term goal is the extension of current UNSCR 
authorities through the end of 2008.  While it is clear that 
we must move beyond CPA Order 17 and UNSCRs to a long-term 
security arrangement, we are still contemplating different 
models of security arrangements to determine the best way 
forward. 
RICE