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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 003277 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2017 
TAGS: PREL KDEM IZ EI FI SF
SUBJECT: MEYER OPTIMISTIC ON HELSINKI IRAQ PROCESS 
 
REF: HELSINKI 675 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Donald Teitelbaum.  Reasons 1.4( 
b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  The August 31 - September 3 meeting of Sunni 
and Shia Iraqi politicians, hosted by the Crisis Management 
Initiative (CMI) in Helsinki, went "better than expected," 
according to South African conflict resolution consultant and 
former SAG minister Roelf Meyer.  Meyer was impressed that 
the Iraqi parties themselves were able to reach agreement on 
basic principles for future political reconciliation talks, 
with little outside involvement, although he acknowledged 
that the participants may not be able (or willing) to sell 
the process to their political bosses at home.  Meyer singled 
out Irish academic and author Padraig O'Malley as the key 
mover on the initiative, and said that O'Malley planned to 
travel to Baghdad soon to brief the two Iraqi Vice Presidents 
on the Helsinki meeting.  Meyer and his fellow South African 
and Northern Irish "facilitators" are prepared to continue 
their involvement in the Iraq initiative.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) Roelf Meyer, former South African minister and 
conflict resolution consultant, briefed A/PolCouns and PolOff 
September 12 on the recent August 31 - September 3 meeting of 
Iraqi parties held in Helsinki, Finland.  Meyer, who played 
an important role in South Africa's transition to democracy, 
was one of the key players in the Iraq talks, along with 
African National Congress (ANC) activists Mac Maharaj and 
Rashid Ismail, and Northern Ireland politicians Jeffrey 
Donaldson and Martin McGuinness.  (NOTE: Meyer said the South 
African/Irish group briefed the Finnish ForMin on the talks 
before departing Helsinki.  He understood that Donaldson and 
McGuinness had also briefed -- or were planning to brief -- 
U.S. officials, likely in Belfast.  END NOTE.) 
 
------------------ 
Origins of Meeting 
------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Meyer said the idea for the meeting emerged from a 
series of seminars held at Tufts University in Boston, 
beginning in early 2003.  Meyer himself participated in a 
South African mission to Baghdad six weeks before the March 
2003 U.S. intervention, in an attempt to convince Saddam 
Hussein to cooperate with the IAEA, a venture Meyer now 
acknowledges was "too late."  Padraig O'Malley, an Irish 
author and academic who now teaches at the John W. McCormick 
Graduate School of Business at the University of 
Massachusetts, participated in these seminars and has been 
the prime mover behind the Iraqi reconciliation initiative. 
O'Malley traveled to Iraq in advance of the Helsinki meeting 
to gain the support of the two Iraqi Vice Presidents.  Meyer 
said the meeting was funded primarily by a Boston-based 
private U.S. businessman, who is supporting the initiative 
for humanitarian reasons (NFI). 
 
¶4. (C) According to Meyer, once O'Malley had the buy-in from 
the Iraqis, he identified Finland as an appropriate venue for 
two reasons.  First, Finland was willing to be "flexible" on 
allowing entry to the Iraqis.  Second, the Helsinki-based 
Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) agreed to provide a venue 
and logistical support for the talks.  Meyer stressed that 
the meeting was the personal initiative of O'Malley and that 
CMI's role was largely administrative, even though CMI later 
tried to claim credit for the success of the talks. 
 
------------------ 
Surprising Success 
------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) The initial goal of the meeting, Meyer said, was to 
share the South African and Northern Ireland experiences and 
"get the Iraqis talking."  O'Malley invited six political 
entities, representing the major Sunni and Shia parties. 
Meyer characterized the participants as "middle managers," 
although he said that the Minister of State for National 
Dialogue took part in the talks.  He stressed that the 
participants were there at the direction of their respective 
political leaderships (vice participating in a personal 
capacity) and that some consulted with their leadership in 
 
PRETORIA 00003277  002 OF 002 
 
 
Iraq during the meetings. 
 
¶6. (C) Following talks on the South African and Irish 
experiences and lessons learned, the South African/Irish team 
invited the Iraqis to discuss possible conditions for further 
dialogue.  Much to their surprise, the Iraqis -- meeting on 
their own -- developed twelve "recommendations to start 
negotiations to reach national reconciliation," subsequently 
termed the "Helsinki Agreement" (reftel).  In drafting these 
points, Meyer believes the Iraqis drew on the description by 
the Irish politicians of the role the Mitchell Principles 
played in their peace process.  In a lengthy and sometimes 
heated discussion, the parties produced a list of nearly four 
dozen outstanding issues.  They subsequently split into two 
clusters to discuss these issues, one on political and 
another on military/security issues.  Out of these meetings, 
the military/security group agreed on nine "Political 
Objectives," including procedures for dealing with militias. 
The parties agreed to release both the Helsinki Agreement and 
Political Objectives to the public (see www.cmi.fi). 
 
---------- 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶7. (C) Meyer reported that O'Malley plans to return to 
Baghdad to brief the two Vice Presidents on the talks, and 
had already discussed the meeting with one of them by phone 
(NFI).  At the end of the talks, the political entities 
recognized they would have to "broaden the circle" to include 
the militias and other actors if the initiative was to 
succeed.  Meyer acknowledged that he does not know if those 
involved in the Helsinki talks will be able to influence 
their political leadership in Iraq.  Meyer and the other 
South African and Northern Irish leaders are prepared to 
continue their engagement in the initiative. 
 
¶8. (C) Meyer said that in his view the international 
community pushed the Iraqis to negotiate a new constitution 
"before they were ready."  He noted that South Africa took 
six years to negotiate its new constitution, even though 
there was general agreement on its outlines.  Iraq also has 
no history of democracy, Meyer observed, creating additional 
challenges. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) While we cannot comment on the utility of this 
initiative, we believe that Meyer is thoughtful and serious, 
and is genuine in his commitment to promote reconciliation in 
Iraq.  Meyer is an experienced hand, having played similar 
conflict resolution roles in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, 
Bolivia, Spain, and Nepal, not to mention his role in South 
Africa's transition to non-racial democracy.  He is open to 
further discussions with U.S. officials on this initiative, 
and Post is prepared to pass on suggestions or background 
papers to Meyer if deemed useful. 
Bost