VZCZCXRO0134
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHPF #1193/01 2610821
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 180821Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2484

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PHNOM PENH 001193 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, OES/PCI, DRL 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USAID FOR ANE--MMELNYK 
BANGKOK FOR REO--JWALLER, USAID/RDMA--WBOWMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2017 
TAGS: EAGR SENV PHUM PGOV CB
SUBJECT: LAW AND REALITY CLASH IN CAMBODIA'S FORESTS 
 
REF: PHNOM PENH 1189 (DAMMING THE MEKONG: 
     HYDROPOWER'S HIGH PRICE) 
 
Classified By: Economic Officer Jennifer Spande for reasons 1.4(b). 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  While Cambodian law provides for 
environmental and social safeguards in the sale of land and 
in the establishment of Economic Land Concessions (ELCs), 
poor enforcement of these laws means that land sales and 
large concessions threaten both the environment and community 
livelihoods.  NGOs argue that in contrast to the stated 
purpose of promoting economic development, ELCs are nothing 
more than legal loopholes to avoid the official moratorium on 
logging.  Moreover, despite legal provisions designed to 
include community stakeholders in discussions and decisions 
on ELCs, information sharing is so poor that many communities 
are not even informed of the boundaries of new concessions 
established near them.  Meanwhile, villages are also being 
pressured and/or coerced into selling their land.  One 
doleful villager, comparing the societal destruction of 
forest and river disputes to life during the Khmer Rouge 
regime remarked, "Before we had fighting using weapons.  Now 
we have fighting using the environment."  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) Regional Environment Officer (REO) and Econoff 
traveled to Stung Treng and Ratanakiri provinces in 
northeastern Cambodia to investigate forestry and water 
resource issues and their effects on local communities.  This 
cable examines forestry and land issues in this area; reftel 
reports on the environmental and social challenges of 
hydropower dams located upstream in Vietnam and Laos and 
proposed for construction in Cambodia. 
 
Laws Set Strict Environmental, Social Conditions for Land 
Use... 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) According to provincial officials in Ratanakiri and 
Stung Treng, Cambodia's 2001 Land Law, 2002 Forestry Law, and 
government procedures contain many provisions designed to 
protect forests, community land, and the villagers that 
depend on these areas for their livelihoods.  Land belonging 
to indigenous communities cannot be sold.  A logging 
moratorium has been in place since 2002, although companies 
that intend to plant rubber, cashews, cassava, or other crops 
in designated economic land concessions (ELCs) are allowed to 
cut trees so that crops can be planted.  Working groups of 
government officials ranging from village to provincial level 
collaborate on decisions about where to award ELCs and how 
large they should be, and final decisions are made by the 
Minister of Agriculture, Forests, and Fisheries in 
consultation with the Council for the Development of 
Cambodia.  Land used by villages cannot be awarded as an 
economic land concession, and additional land is to be 
reserved for the use of their future generations. 
 
¶4.  (U) Provincial government officials in the northeast told 
us that ELCs are subject to many regulations.  Companies 
operating ELCs must file master plans with the provincial 
government showing what crops they intend to plant after they 
cut down the trees; failure to follow the master plan can 
result in the loss of the concession.  In a nod to 
environmental concerns, only land classified as "thin forest" 
can be designated as an economic land concession.  The 
officials stated that the Ministry of Environment is charged 
with conducting an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
before any concession is granted, and that these EIAs are 
public documents which anyone can obtain on request.  In 
addition, the officials noted, local communities are to be 
consulted in any ELC projects that might impact them. 
 
But Practice is a Far Cry from the Law, Communities Say 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶5.  (C) In contrast to the environmental and social 
safeguards theoretically in place, NGOs and community members 
we visited in the two provinces painted a very different 
picture of the way concessions are awarded and managed in 
practice.  NGO representatives said that "thick forests" and 
"thin forests" are poorly defined terms which could refer to 
canopy density or the type of trees present.  Government 
officials admitted that areas are classified by an 
interministerial committee of non-expert officials based 
largely on satellite images with very limited on-the-ground 
verification.  Several community members we spoke with 
accused officials of manipulating the definitions to allow 
desirable land to be classified as thin forests so that it 
 
PHNOM PENH 00001193  002 OF 004 
 
 
could be given as a concession.  (Comment:  Even the 
assertion that thin forests are somehow less ecologically 
important than thick ones is dubious.  Indeed, it might make 
more sense to preserve a diverse set of forests.  End 
Comment.)  And, the widespread belief among both NGO 
representatives and villagers is that few of the 
concessionaires are interested in actually following their 
master plans and planting crops.  Instead, they say, these 
companies are interested only in logging the trees, have no 
intention of planting rubber or cashews, and do not care if 
they lose the concession after the forests are cleared. 
Thus, while the Chief of the Stung Treng Forest 
Administration, speaking from his hardwood-paneled office, 
told us that two companies in other provinces had recently 
lost their concessions because they failed to follow their 
master plans, this punishment was likely of little 
consequence--the companies had already cleared the land and 
made their profit selling the trees.  In fact, there appears 
to be merit in NGO claims that the ELC system has evolved to 
allow logging companies to sidestep the official moratorium 
on timber-cutting. 
 
¶6.  (C) The NGO Culture and Environment Preservation 
Association (CEPA--strictly protect) gave us a map they said 
was given to them by a staffer's relative who works at the 
Forestry Administration's national headquarters.  This map 
shows approximately 75% of Stung Treng province as being part 
of planned or existing ELCs or forest concessions and another 
15% as being part of Virachey National Park, leaving only 15% 
for villages and village agriculture.  The Governor of Stung 
Treng stated that the eleven concessions in his province 
totaled only 180,768 hectares, or 10% of the provincial land 
area, and that no additional concessions were planned.  If 
the map from CEPA is genuine, then either the Governor was 
unaware of what was happening in his province or he was lying 
to us.  In any case, no official list or map of concessions 
is published, so no one outside of an apparently close circle 
of official insiders know what the true figures are. 
(Comment:  Post also contacted Forest Administration 
headquarters to request a map of concessions in Stung Treng, 
not/not alluding to the map we obtained from CEPA, and we 
were told that no such maps exist.  End Comment.) 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Villagers at two of the three communities we 
visited, as well as villagers from several other communities 
who attended an annual gathering of river communities in 
Ratanakiri province, complained that the borders of ELCs 
adjacent to their lands are unclear, with no official map 
showing where they begin and end.  The village chief in one 
remote ethnic Phnong community told us that he believed that 
a recently awarded concession included his long-established 
village.  But, without information about the concession's 
boundaries, he could not confirm this or appeal for a change. 
 In fact, far from being involved in the ELC decisionmaking 
process, the village chief only learned that a concession had 
been awarded when a group began cutting a road through the 
forest several months ago.  Villagers also say that rather 
than setting aside currently used community land plus extra 
land for the use of future generations, concessions often 
include substantial portions of land currently used by the 
community, leading to greater food and income insecurity. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Information sharing between affected communities 
and government decisionmakers is often problematic. 
Government officials were unclear about how communities were 
supposed to participate in the process.  While the Director 
of the Stung Treng Environmental Department told Emboffs that 
EIAs are public documents, he also noted that no one has ever 
requested to see one.  (Note:  NGO leaders tell us that they 
have requested EIAs.  Sometimes their requests are turned 
down, other times they are given preliminary studies or 
excerpts of EIAs from other concessions.  None of the NGOs we 
spoke with had ever received a complete EIA.  End Note.)  The 
Chief of the Stung Treng Forest Administration downplayed the 
importance of public access to the EIAs, saying that the 
villagers were illiterate and would not be able to read them 
anyway. 
 
Land and Forest Disputes Divide Communities 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Forest conflicts in northeastern Cambodia often 
cause division within and among local communities.  A group 
of Ratanakiri NGO leaders reported that while some 
communities put tremendous effort into fighting to retain 
possession of their land and prevent logging on it, others 
log their land illegally and sell the logs to the wealthy, or 
 
PHNOM PENH 00001193  003 OF 004 
 
 
willingly sell their land to outsiders.  (Note:  NGO leaders 
also highlighted that when there are crackdowns on illegal 
logging, villagers who cut down the logs are arrested, while 
their wealthy patrons go free.  End Note.)  Communities 
reluctant or unwilling to sell their land are often pressured 
into sales, often by their village leaders or neighbors who 
have already agreed to sell.  NGOs reported cases where 
Cambodian officials have forced villagers to sign land sale 
contracts, villagers who tried to enforce their land rights 
via the courts were arrested, or contracts were altered after 
being signed. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Gordon Patterson of the Highlanders Association 
reported that villages trying to retain their land face so 
much pressure to sell that they must invest enormous energy 
in maintaining solidarity; discussing how to approach the 
issue; and in traveling to the provincial capital to talk 
with government officials, NGOs, and others.  For these 
impoverished communities, the cost of this effort is 
substantial:  less time to spend on farming and less money 
for necessities.  Patterson notes that communities who exert 
energy in fighting land issues face a reduction in food 
security the following year, and sometimes simply give in. 
Moreover, those who sell their land generally spend their 
money quickly and end up as landless urban dwellers 
searching, usually unsuccessfully, for factory or day labor 
jobs.  NGO representatives also noted that while government 
officials often promoted land sales as bringing economic 
development to the region, resort and plantation owners often 
discriminate against locals, particularly non-Khmers, in 
hiring, and prefer to bring in workers from other provinces. 
 
Anger, Fear, and Violence 
------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The dozens of villagers we spoke with during our 
six-day trip to the northeast were generally polite, shy, and 
soft-spoken, often speaking with voices so low that the 
interpreters had to ask them to repeat what they said.  When 
the conversation turned to ELCs and land sales, however, they 
became voluble.  Their frustration--and in many cases, 
anger--was obvious.  One ethnic Lao villager in Ratanakiri 
province, his voice quivering, poignantly compared the 
societal destruction of forest and river conflict today to 
Cambodia's Khmer Rouge history:  "Before we had fighting 
using weapons.  Now we have fighting using the environment." 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  At our meeting with the Governor of Ratanakiri 
province, we shared our concern about the high level of 
frustration, resentment, and anger we were hearing.  The REO 
drew parallels between Ratanakiri's land and forest issues 
and those of Vietnam's central highlands just across the 
border.  In that region, violence erupted in 2001 following 
many years of indigenous communities' losing forest land to 
coffee plantations, and the repercussions are still being 
felt today.  The Governor dismissed these concerns with a 
wave of his hand. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Community members and NGO activists reported being 
afraid to protest land policies too vigorously.  Tep 
Bunnarith, Executive Director of the Culture and Environment 
Preservation Association (CEPA), said he learned that the 
central government has asked the provincial Forest 
Administration to keep tabs on CEPA.  The head of the 
Ratanakiri office of Adhoc, a local human rights NGO, 
reported that Adhoc staff and other NGO community members had 
received death threats.  Sadly, just a few weeks after these 
conversations, Seng Sarorn, a CEPA staff member, was shot and 
killed by an unknown assailant while at his home in Stung 
Treng.  Sarorn had been involved in protests against the Sal 
Sophea Peanich company, one of four companies accused in 
March 2007 of taking advantage of unclearly demarcated 
concessions to grab land used by indigenous communities. 
Sarorn had collected thumb prints from community members 
seeking to take legal action against Sal Sophea Peanich just 
two weeks before his death.  The police have arrested two 
suspects, though NGO leaders doubt that these two individuals 
were truly involved. 
 
Forests Critical to Rural Communities 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (U) Rural communities in Cambodia's northeast rely 
heavily on forests for economic survival.  Villagers from 
O'Run and O'Svay villages in Stung Treng told us that only 30 
percent of their community members make enough from farming 
to rely on agriculture as their sole source of income; the 
 
PHNOM PENH 00001193  004 OF 004 
 
 
other 70 percent have to supplement their incomes by 
harvesting non-timber forest products.  These products 
include resin used for waterproofing boats and making 
torches; vines, stems, and leaves used for rattan or wicker 
building materials; and mushrooms, honey, and wildlife such 
as turtles and rabbits used for food.  In addition to using 
these products themselves, villagers sell them in local 
markets, earning USD 300 to 400 per year, a considerable sum 
in rural Cambodia.  The Cambodian Development Research 
Institute estimates that non-timber forest products account 
for 42% of total household income for low-income Cambodian 
families. 
 
¶15. (U) Indigenous communities also attach spiritual 
significance to their forests.  Ethnic Phnong believe the 
souls of their ancestors live in "spirit forests."  Villagers 
worship at designated locations in these sprit forests and 
consider them sacred.  Ethnic Phnong in one community told us 
they feared that if nearby illegal logging came too close to 
their spirit forest, the desecration would cause disease in 
their community. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Continuing forest conflicts in Cambodia threaten 
political and social stability and impede donor and Cambodian 
government efforts to reduce poverty.  The combination of 
insecure access to land and hydropower-related changes in 
fish catch, flood patterns, and water quality (described 
reftel) have a tremendous effect on poor villagers, who often 
have no input into land- or water-use decisions and have 
little recourse after the decisions are made.  As with so 
many other legal issues in Cambodia, the environmental and 
social protections enshrined in the law are fairly strong, 
but lack of enforcement leaves poor rural communities 
vulnerable to land grabs and logging by the wealthy and 
influential.  Villagers feel they have absolutely no 
influence in land-use decisions and have no recourse after 
decisions are made.  Most of the numerous villagers we met 
expressed frustration, fear, and great anger whenever the 
conversation turned to land, forests, and ELCs.  Rather than 
planting cash crops, it appeared to us that the 
concessionaires were planting the seeds of civil and social 
unrest. 
MUSSOMELI