Amy Marie Newcomb  01/22/2008 04:25:00 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  ECO-POLShare

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UNCLAS    SENSITIVE     NICOSIA 00777

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000777 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY
SUBJECT: TWO OF THE PRESIDENTIAL HOPEFULS OUTLINE THEIR CYPRUS 
PROBLEM POLICY 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  In televised press conferences on September 11 
and 14, President Tassos Papadopoulos and Democratic Rally 
(DISY)-backed presidential candidate Ioannis Kasoulides outlined 
their Cyprus problem policy - the top issue of every national 
election campaign.  Papadopoulos confirmed that his rejection of the 
2004 Annan Plan will be the cornerstone of his campaign. Though he 
recognized that the "July 8 process" of 2006 is yet to take off, he 
insisted that it was the only way forward and squarely blamed the 
Turkish side for the lack of progress.  In stark contrast, 
Kasoulides focused almost exclusively on the future and on what 
Cypriots should do to tackle the problem.  He proposed upgrading and 
fast-tracking the UN-sponsored July 8 process in order to start 
comprehensive talks as soon as possible.  Highlighting the need for 
unanimity among Greek Cypriot parties, he suggested that the 
National Council undertakes the task of formulating a commonly 
acceptable solution framework which would serve as the Greek Cypriot 
proposal at the intercommunal negotiations.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Papadopoulos Promises No Change to his Cyprus Policy 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶2.  A week after his meeting with Turkish Cypriot Mehmet Ali Talat, 
which failed to get the UN-brokered July 8 Agreement off the ground, 
President Papadopoulos told viewers during a televised press 
conference on September 11 that he intended to continue the same 
policy on the Cyprus issue.   He stressed that he will insist on the 
implementation of the July 8 Agreement encouraged by the 
determination of the UN Security Council and other important 
countries to make this process work. He also revealed that he was 
"aware of initiatives already undertaken in this direction."  He 
admitted that his September 5 meeting with the Turkish Cypriot 
leader did not yield a positive result but blamed this squarely on 
the Turkish Cypriot side's lack of political will to implement the 
July 8 Agreement.  He quashed criticisms that his insistence on the 
"stalled" July 8 process prolonged the deadlock and essentially 
consolidated the de facto partition of the island, saying that the 
international community does not favor partition but on the contrary 
strongly supports the July 8 process.  He emphasized that the July 8 
process was important because it was designed to bring about a new 
basis for a comprehensive Cyprus solution and thus cast away the 
Annan Plan. It is for this reason, he said, that Turkey and the 
Turkish side are doing all they can to get rid of the July 8 
agreement. He lashed back at the opposition asking whether it would 
be wise to abandon a process that is strongly supported by at least 
four of the USNC Permanent Members.  He went on to charge that the 
fifth member, thought its representatives in Cyprus, argues that 
since the process has failed, it should be abandoned and replaced 
with a new one.  A day later, the state-run Cyprus Broadcasting 
Corporation (CyBC), "disclosed" that it is Britain that was less 
than stalwart in its support of the July 8 process.  Since this 
press episode, the British have made clear that HMG indeed does 
support July 8, but believes that the process is sufficiently 
flexible that both sides should be able to find a mutually-agreed 
way forward. 
 
¶3.  In an apparent attempt to draw from the 76 percent cent "no" 
vote pool, Papadopoulos repeatedly stressed the correctness of the 
decision to reject the Annan Plan.  He asserted that "the worst has 
been avoided with the rejection of the Annan Plan" in April 2006 and 
"reminded" the electorate that acceptance would have resulted in the 
dissolution of the Cyprus Republic. He painted a rosy picture of the 
current state of the Cyprus issue claiming that he succeeded in 
overcoming prejudices against the Greek Cypriot side created 
internationally as a result of the rejection of the UNSYG's plan, 
and at the same time averted the Turkish plans of securing 
international recognition of the "pseudostate." 
 
¶4.  Responding to criticisms that the status of Turkish Cypriot 
leader Talat was improving as evidenced by his meetings with senior 
officials internationally, Papadopoulos angrily responded that Talat 
"never" received an official invitation nor had he any official 
meetings in a ministry or government office.  He retorted that most 
of Talat's meetings take place in restaurants.  The following days, 
opposition papers carried photographs of the Turkish Cypriot 
leader's meetings with Secretary of State Rice, President Musharraf 
of Pakistan, and EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn. 
 
¶5.  In a statement that caused a sensation as it is out of his 
character to admit a mistake, Papadopoulos said that he regretted 
accepting the UNSYG's arbitration on the Annan Plan in February 
¶2004.  He was quick to shift blame, though, saying that the UNSYG 
did not honor the three conditions that Papadopoulos had put forward 
and the UN official had accepted in writing. He commented with a 
sigh "I guess the UN is not what it used to be."  Papadopoulos also 
charged that past concessions made by President Vassiliou and 
President Clerides to the Turkish demand that a solution be approved 
in a referendum left him with no choice but to put the plan to a 
referendum.  Explaining the reason he disagrees with the holding of 
a referendum, he said this was an issue of fundamental importance 
because a referendum is a system of establishing a new state. 
Without a referendum, a solution would constitute an evolution of 
the existing state, he said. 
 
¶6.  Asked to clarify his position on a bizonal, bicommunal 
federation, Papadopoulos said that he is committed to this form of a 
solution but added that there is a disagreement on the 
interpretation of the term bizonal.  He said this term does not 
exist legally and went on to say that the Greek Cypriot side does 
not accept that the term bizonal means the creation of two 
ethnically-pure areas.  His remarks disturbed Papadopoulos' former 
coalition partner AKEL, which warned that Papadopoulos risked 
damaging the Greek Cypriot side's credibility by casting doubt over 
its commitment to a bizonal, bicommunal federation. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Kasoulides Advocates Pro-active Cyprus Policy 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  DISY-backed, independent presidential candidate Kasoulides 
analyzed in a press conference on September 14 his proposal for 
breaking the current deadlock and opening the way for a 
comprehensive Cyprus settlement.  Emphasizing the need for practical 
ways to promote unanimity among the Greek Cypriot parties, he 
proposed an intra-Greek Cypriot process to formulate a widely 
acceptable solution framework which he dubbed "National Agreement on 
a Solution Framework".  At the same time, he stressed the importance 
of injecting new life in the July 8 Agreement by simplifying, 
upgrading and speeding up its implementation, in order to allow the 
start of comprehensive talks. 
 
¶8. Elaborating on his proposal for an intra-Greek Cypriot agreement, 
Kasoulides said that if elected he would appoint for this purpose a 
team of prestigious constitutional and international law experts and 
economists who would work under his political supervision and within 
a fixed timetable.  He envisaged an agreement based on the 
following: 1) the 1977 Makarios-Denktash, 1979 Kyprianou-Denktash, 
and July 8, 2006 Papadopoulos-Talat agreement; 2) the positive 
elements of the various UN proposals of the past; 3) UNSC decisions; 
and 4) experiences gathered from federal systems in other parts of 
Europe and the rest of the world.  The product of their work would 
then be discussed at the National Council to be turned into a 
"national agreement" and eventually presented as the Greek Cypriot 
position at the intercommunal negotiations. 
 
¶9.  To make his Cyprus solution proposal a success story, Kasoulides 
said it should be supported by the four pillars, which are the basic 
planks of his platform: unity of the people which could be achieved 
by turning the "yes" and "no" of the past to "together"; restoration 
of Cyprus' credibility abroad and establishment of the Cyprus 
problem as a problem of occupation of EU territory; "correct" 
utilization of Turkey's relations with the European Union and its 
desires for accession by engaging the EU in the effort for a Cyprus 
solution; and the immediate pursuit of a Cyprus-origin solution plan 
that would result from substantive negotiations with the Turkish 
Cypriot side on the basis of the "National Agreement on a Solution 
Framework." 
 
¶10.  Kasoulides stated that he intended to involve Greece in the 
efforts for a solution and would also seek powerful international 
and European guarantees for the implementation of a Cyprus solution 
without any deviations.  He stressed that the agreement should 
provide for mechanisms that would guarantee the return to the 
current status should Turkey fail to meets its obligations emanating 
from the solution. 
 
¶11.  Predictably, Kasoulides's proposal was quickly dismissed by his 
opponents.  GOC spokesman Vassilis Palmas described it as "vague to 
the point that it sounds like an oracle" and pointed out that a 
Cyprus solution remains elusive due to Turkey's refusal to 
cooperate.  AKEL reacted even more strongly branding his proposal as 
dangerous and potentially catastrophic.  AKEL spokesman Nicos 
Katsourides said the process proposed by Kasoulides could have grave 
consequences since it constituted a deviation from the UN framework 
and marginalized the role of the UN but also of Russia and China 
which played a crucial role in the UNSYC in favor of the ROC. 
 
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Comment 
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¶12.   As expected, in this first presentation of their Cyprus 
problem positions, Papadopoulos and Kasoulides tried to pull the 
electorate in exact opposite directions: the former to pin them down 
to the past and the latter to force them to peek into their future. 
The state of the Cyprus issue in the months leading up to the 
February 2008 elections will be an important factor in vindicating 
each candidate's positions and determining people's choice.  The 
lack of progress towards a solution, coupled with developments in 
northern Cyprus and in the EU perceived by Greek Cypriots as actions 
consolidating the partition of the island, favor to some extent 
Papadopoulos' two main opponents.