VZCZCXRO2120
RR RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMS #0900/01 2621233
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 191233Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8782
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC
RUEAIAO/HQ ICE IAO WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 000900 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOE/NNSA FOR WKILMARTIN, MBEDKE 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR AWYSOCKI, THORTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD EWWT AMGT PTER MU
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO 100% SCANNING REQUIREMENT 
 
REF: A. STATE 119837 
 
     ¶B. 06 MUSCAT 1646 
     ¶C. MUSCAT 387 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Contacts at Port of Salalah expressed 
concern that new scanning requirements for maritime cargo 
under the USG's 9/11 Act will negatively affect trade at the 
port.  They mentioned specifically that scanning 100% of 
U.S.-bound cargo for radioactive material and components of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could lower productivity, 
and - if not mandated worldwide - hurt Salalah's ability to 
compete with other ports in the region.  Contacts also 
claimed that Royal Oman Police (ROP) Customs is not ready to 
effectively manage implementation of the 100% mandate, which 
could place a considerable additional burden on port 
operations.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Poloff met recently with representatives of the 
international shipping line AP Moller/Maersk (APM) and Port 
of Salalah to gauge their reaction to the new U.S. law 
requiring 100% scanning of U.S.-bound cargo in foreign ports 
(ref A). Port of Salalah is Oman's biggest port and one of 
the busiest transshipment hubs in the world (ref B).  Port of 
Salalah already is participating in the Department of 
Homeland Security's (DHS) Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
and the Department of Energy's (DOE) Megaports program.  The 
port also is involved in the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), 
a pilot program designed to assess the feasibility of the 
100% scanning requirement.  While reiterating their 
commitment to these programs and their readiness to comply 
with U.S. security measures, the representatives raised their 
concerns that the 100% scanning requirement presents a number 
of challenges that could eventually disrupt the flow of 
maritime cargo through the port. 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
Lost Productivity 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3. (SBU) The officials commented that the 100% scanning 
requirement - as opposed to risk-based screening of U.S.- 
bound cargo currently conducted under CSI - imposes a 
particularly difficult burden on transshipment ports, where 
scanning could interfere with the fast-paced nature of the 
transshipment business.  They specifically stated that the 
mobile non-intrusive inspection (NII) units that the USG 
plans to install through SFI on the quay at the Port of 
Salalah likely will not be able to accommodate the volume of 
traffic at the port without affecting productivity.  For 
instance, they said, the port assigns seven trucks to each 
crane dockside, unloading and transporting containers from 
the ship to the stacks at a rate of five containers per hour. 
 Under SFI's proposed scanning procedures, each truck will 
convey its container through a NII unit, and when a 
U.S.-bound container triggers an alarm, the truck will head 
to secondary for further scanning and alarm adjudication. 
The procedure will take time, the representative of the port 
opined; when an alarm removes the truck and its driver from 
operation, his productivity drops from 35 to 30 moves per 
hour.  This loss in productivity could cause ships to stay 
longer at port or, in the worst case scenario, for containers 
to miss their onward connection. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In addition, by placing the mobile NII units on the 
quay where space is tight and traffic heavy, the heavy use of 
the machines needed to meet the 100% mandate raises the risk 
of costly damage to both the units and trucks.  The 
representative of the port admitted that his drivers have a 
high accident rate as it is.  If they end up damaging a 
mobile unit, he said, he would have to redirect traffic, 
which would increase the volume of containers running through 
the remaining units and result in time consuming and 
expensive bottlenecks.  Ultimately, he and the 
representatives of the line worried that the available 
scanning technology is not yet advanced enough to meet both 
the needs of U.S. security and transshipment ports.  They 
recommended, therefore, that the U.S. consider alternatives 
to 100% scanning until the appropriate technology is 
developed and tested. 
 
- - - - - - - 
Unfair Burden 
- - - - - - - 
 
¶5. (SBU) The port and shipping representatives further stated 
that the new U.S. law is ambiguous as to whether it requires 
scanning of U.S.-bound cargo at the last port before entry 
 
MUSCAT 00000900  002 OF 003 
 
 
into the U.S. or at all ports of transit and load.  Unless 
the USG mandates full compliance with the scanning 
requirement in all ports, particularly transshipment ports - 
and ensures sufficient financial resources to implement it - 
then those ports that agree to participate will end up losing 
business in a highly competitive industry, they warned.  U.S. 
law may create a free rider problem, in which major 
transshipment hubs like Salalah end up shouldering most of 
the burden for U.S. trade security. 
 
¶6. (SBU) They outlined a scenario in which low-volume 
import/export ports that lack the resources or will to assume 
the upfront investments in scanning equipment may end up 
shifting the responsibility for compliance onto Salalah.  The 
port, therefore, could risk becoming a "scanning hub," which 
would drag down productivity even further.  In another 
scenario, shippers that have had their cargo scanned at a 
port of load may choose to bypass Salalah in favor of a 
regional competitor where ships will not face the prospect of 
delays due to scanning. (Note: The representative of Port of 
Salalah mentioned a rumor that the Port of Jebel Ali in Dubai 
refused U.S. requests to scan transshipment cargo, agreeing 
only to scan import/export traffic.  End note.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) In order to avoid these problems, contacts 
recommended that the U.S. consider mandating scanning of 
U.S.-bound cargo at ports of load only, where it is 
relatively cheap and easy to control what is loaded onto a 
ship.  They predicted that by focusing on ports of load, the 
U.S. could fulfill the 100% scanning requirement at a much 
lower cost to international partners and the USG. 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
Lack of Readiness 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8. (SBU) The representatives also raised their concern that 
the government of Oman simply will not be ready to implement 
the 100% requirement.  Other contacts in and out of 
government likewise contend that Royal Oman Police (ROP) 
Customs, which will bear responsibility for scanning 
U.S.-bound containers and adjudicating alarms, lacks the 
human resource capacity to handle it (ref C).  Customs 
officials have told poloff that the ROP's pace of recruitment 
and training may not be sufficient to keep up with normal 
Customs responsibilities, let alone the increasing demands of 
U.S. security initiatives.  The resource strain could become 
particularly acute at Port of Salalah, contacts tell poloff, 
which is undergoing rapid expansion and expects to more than 
double its annual volume of container traffic over the next 
five years. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Contacts also worry that Customs personnel will not 
be able to accurately or quickly adjudicate alarms, despite 
ongoing training through DOE's Megaports program.  Port 
officials commented that Customs' bureaucratic and top-down 
approach to decision making may strip inspectors of the 
ability to make on the spot decisions and quickly clear 
containers that are not of special concern.  Even responding 
to a minimal rate of naturally recurring alarms - alarms 
triggered by radiation emissions from such innocuous products 
as bathroom tile and cat litter - could put a heavy and 
perhaps unsustainable strain on resources. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Finally, APM and port officials flagged the fact 
that although the port and ROP Customs are scheduled to begin 
increased scanning of U.S.-bound cargo in January 2008 under 
the SFI pilot program, Oman still has not developed the 
capacity to respond if scanning indicates that radioactive 
material of special concern may indeed be present.  They 
argued that the Omani government, USG and the port first 
should focus on developing a response protocol for handling 
and containing potentially dangerous cargo before scanning 
begins.  The lack of such a protocol, they warned, could 
result in confusion when Customs is unable to clear an alarm 
immediately, as well as indefinite disruption of Port 
activities. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Comment:  There is a general consensus that the 
U.S. is rushing to implement enhanced security procedures 
without fully considering the possible negative ramifications 
on international commerce.  Oman in particular is worried 
that the 100% scanning requirement could end up being a 
competitive liability for its biggest port, exactly at a time 
when Oman hopes to expand maritime trade.  Contacts inform us 
that the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which initially 
had not gotten involved in issues related to CSI, Megaports 
 
MUSCAT 00000900  003 OF 003 
 
 
or SFI, is beginning to take notice, and raising red flags 
about the 100% scanning requirement's effect on trade.  Post 
intends to work closely with DHS and DOE to alleviate these 
concerns, explain changes to U.S. law, and establish 
mechanisms for collaboration with Omani government and 
private sector officials to implement the law successfully. 
GRAPPO