VZCZCXRO4943
PP RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #4469/01 2550538
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 120538Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3748
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004469 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER OREP ENRG MNUC
SUBJECT:  Nunn-Lugar Roundtable:  Russians Praise CTR, Call for More 
Cooperation 
 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary:  At an event co-hosted by the Carnegie Moscow 
Center and the Center for Policy Studies to commemorate the 
fifteenth anniversary of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction, 
the Russian guest speakers broadly praised the Program, 
acknowledging its popularity and success.  Some argued, however, 
that the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe is a potentially 
destabilizing remnant of the Cold War.  They viewed the U.S. plan 
for missile defense in Europe as a poor example for developing 
nations and harmful to the U.S.-Russian cooperation on Iran and 
North Korea.  They also argued that a shared warning system and 
nuclear cooperation within the CIS would enhance the U.S.-Russian 
partnership.  Several suggested a renewal of U.S.-Russia dialogues 
to improve communication and avoid misperceptions.  End Summary. 
 
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The Need To Keep Nuclear Weapons At Home 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) On August 28 Senators Lugar and Nunn participated in a 
wide-ranging discussion on national security during their August 
26-31 trip to Russia to commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of the 
Nunn-Lugar Program (Transcript and Lugar speech at 
www.carnegie.ru/en).  Colonel General Yevgeny Maslin, the former 
Chief of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of 
Defense, responsible for Nuclear Arsenals and a member of the Center 
for Policy Studies's Expert Council, proposed "settling the question 
on deployment of nuclear weapons outside the territories of the 
countries possessing these weapons."  Maslin pointed out that "the 
U.S. now is the world's only country possessing nuclear weapons 
outside its territory," and described these weapons as "bait" for 
Islamist extremists.  Dispersing a nuclear arsenal around the world 
only increases the risk of such weapons falling into the hands of 
terrorists. 
 
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Nunn-Lugar For a Safer Tomorrow 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) Maslin said the Nunn-Lugar program "works and is very 
successful," and acknowledged it has safely and efficiently reduced 
Russia's stockpile of nuclear weapons.  He also said that 
"concentrating all Soviet nuclear stockpiles in Russia and 
withdrawing them from the former Soviet republics," especially 
Ukraine, drastically reduced the danger of nuclear proliferation. 
Maslin stressed, however, that the threat of radioactive substances 
being stolen is always present, "and our task is to further reduce 
this threat."  He noted the absence of previous fora for bilateral 
discussions and suggested establishing a constant dialogue between 
Russia and the U.S. on nonproliferation issues to prevent the 
emergence of new nuclear states. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Missile Defense Questioned, Cooperation Urged 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (U) Dr. Alexei Arbatov, the Nonproliferation Program Co-Chair at 
the Carnegie Moscow Center, said that the U.S. plan for missile 
defense in Europe is a bad example for developing nations in light 
of the commitment to disarmament under Article Six of the 
Nonproliferation Treaty.  He also said it was harmful to 
U.S.-Russian cooperation on Iran and North Korea.  Arbatov noted 
that the United States and Russia agree that Iran could pose a 
threat to security, but proposed that no interceptors should be 
placed in Poland until Iran develops mid-range missiles capable of 
reaching Europe. 
 
¶5.  (U) Arbatov argued that the U.S. and Russia should cooperate on 
a shared missile warning system, and that the two countries cannot 
wait until the change in administrations to take action.  He said 
that linking radar stations in Gabala, Azerbaijan and Armavir 
(southern Russia) to the U.S. radar in the Czech Republic would be 
ideal.  Arbatov emphasized, "I cannot imagine how governments and 
countries that have joint warning systems and joint missile defense 
systems will be a threat to each other." 
 
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Needed:  A Fresh START 
---------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) Sergey Rogov, the Director of the Institute for USA and 
Canada Studies in Russia argued for the ratification of a post-START 
agreement.  He said, "it seems we are on the verge of collapse of 
the rules-based regime.  If the START treaty is not extended the INF 
Treaty could also crumble."  This could also endanger the Nunn-Lugar 
Program, he said. 
 
¶7.  (U) Major-General Vladimir Dvorkin of both Carnegie and the PIR 
Center proposed creating a nongovernmental group consisting of 
experts who would be able to provide some new or innovative ideas 
 
MOSCOW 00004469  002 OF 002 
 
 
for a post-START process.  One major task for this group would be 
deciding which verification measures to retain and which to leave 
out.  Arbatov agreed, arguing that if the START treaty is not 
renewed, then certain elements of it could be combined with the 
Moscow Treaty to produce an agreement. 
 
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The Need For 123 
---------------- 
 
¶8.  (U) Rosatom Deputy Director Nicolai Spasskiy co-chaired one of 
the panels, and spoke of Russia's renewed efforts in the nuclear 
energy field.  After elaborating on Russia's nuclear reorganization 
and plans to expand nuclear power production, he spoke of 
cooperation with the U.S. within the framework of the Global Nuclear 
Energy Partnership and noted areas of potential cooperation with 
Russia's International Enrichment Center at Angarsk.  He predicted 
the discussions on the 123 Agreement would be concluded soon, and 
took the opportunity to suggest that failure to agree would be 
harmful to future U.S.-Russia nuclear cooperation.