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Viewing cable 07KOLKATA305, BURMESE MIGRANTS IN NORTHEAST INDIA FACE DISCRIMINATION:

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KOLKATA305 2007-09-27 16:04 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Kolkata
VZCZCXRO9983
OO RUEHBI RUEHCHI RUEHCI RUEHCN
DE RUEHCI #0305/01 2701604
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 271604Z SEP 07
FM AMCONSUL KOLKATA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1714
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1617
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 0720
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 0723
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 0323
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0468
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0108
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 0174
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0028
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0026
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0467
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0381
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK NY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0021
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/USAID WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 2099
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KOLKATA 000305 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PHUM PREL BM IN
SUBJECT: BURMESE MIGRANTS IN NORTHEAST INDIA FACE DISCRIMINATION: 
CONCERNED BY DEVELOPMENTS IN BURMA 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  India's Northeast region is home to 
thousands of Burmese refugees and migrants who have fled 
political oppression and economic backwardness in Burma.  Ethnic 
Chins are the largest group, estimated at 50,000 to 100,000, and 
are primarily in the India's Northeastern state of Mizoram. 
They are often harassed by powerful local Mizo groups who see 
them as a social and economic threat.  India as a non-signatory 
to the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees as 
well as its related 1967 protocol, and lacking a national 
refugee law has not granted the Chins refugee or temporary 
resident status.  The GOI also does not allow the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) access to Mizoram to 
assess the possible refugee status of the Chins in the state. 
In addition, the GOI's increasingly cooperative relationship 
with the Burmese government over the past 12 years has further 
increased feelings of insecurity among the Chin population.  The 
GOI should be encouraged to seek a constructive solution to the 
Chins' status in the Northeast in order to promote human rights 
and democracy.  Also as a practical matter, the GOI will need to 
plan a response to another possible influx of Burmese refugees 
as it experienced in 1988, if the Burmese Junta violently 
suppresses the ongoing pro-democracy demonstrations.  End 
Summary. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
 
2.  (U) Burmese migrants in India consist mostly of ethnic Chins 
who reside in Northeast India.  Most live in Mizoram, with a 
smaller population in neighboring Manipur and Nagaland. 
Following a large influx of refugees in 1988 as a result of the 
brutal suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Burma, 
thousands of Chins fled their homes and entered the neighboring 
Indian states.  The people of Chin state in northwest Burma, who 
are predominantly Christians, are among the ethnic groups 
targeted by the primarily Buddhist Burmese regime.  According to 
Chin contacts, the Chins face religious persecution, forced 
labor and political suppression in Chin state.  Political 
oppression as well as economic necessity has prompted a continue 
flow of Chins to India.  Neither the GOI nor UNHCR in New Delhi 
(to whom the Northeast is inaccessible) have officially 
acknowledged the plight of these Burmese refugees in the border 
areas.  As a result, the Chin population suffers discrimination 
and an indeterminate status in India. 
 
----------------------- 
Migrants' Vulnerability 
----------------------- 
 
3.  (U) The continuing lack of an formal legal status for 
Burmese in India makes it difficult to estimate the actual 
number living in the Northeast.  Except for a small number who 
have been able to approach UNHCR in New Delhi, the majority of 
the Burmese in India are afraid to identify themselves as 
refugees.  During the initial influx of Chins in 1988, the GOI 
set up camps for them, but these were closed in 1995 as India 
began a policy of greater engagement with the Burmese regime. 
This shift left the Chins without reliable humanitarian support, 
and they have since survived on low-paying, marginal jobs. 
 
4.  (SBU) Close cultural and linguistic similarities with the 
Mizos allow the Chins to integrate somewhat into local society. 
However, they remain frequent targets of the ethnic Mizo 
population, who see them as an economic threat and easy 
scapegoat.  During a recent visit in August by ConGen to the 
Mizoram, Chin leaders recounted experiences of discrimination 
and abuse by the Mizo population.  Chins fill menial jobs, or 
work as weavers, laborers or porters.  Many Chin often try to 
keep a low profile to avoid being identified as "foreigners" or 
as illegal immigrants.  The Chins' marginal status makes them 
 
KOLKATA 00000305  002 OF 003 
 
 
vulnerable to exploitation and they are occasionally targeted by 
local communities and political parties.  In 2000, Mizoram 
authorities forcibly repatriated hundreds of Chin refugees to 
Burma.  At least 87 of them were reported to have been arrested 
and sent to forced labor camps in Burma.  In March 2002, the 
powerful Young Mizo Association (YMA) ordered the eviction of 
Chins in the Lunglei district.  In July 2003, in response to a 
rape in which a Burmese national was alleged to be responsible, 
the YMA - with the support of the state government -- evicted 
about 5,000 Chins from Mizoram. 
 
5.  (U) The migrants can be broadly divided into two categories: 
 those fleeing to India in the immediate aftermath of the 
Junta's 1988 crackdown and those who have crossed steadily into 
India since the early 1990s.  The first category includes 
students and youth who participated in the 1988 uprising and 
subsequently fled to escape the Junta's brutal repression.  The 
rest constitute those who came in search of a livelihood and/or 
to escape human rights violations in the form of arbitrary 
arrest, torture, forced labor and religious persecution. 
Ongoing insurgency and counter-insurgency violence has also 
contributed to the Chin fleeing Burma.  India is not a signatory 
to the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees or its 
related 1967 protocol.  India also does not have a national 
refugee law.   While the GOI reacted to refugee outflow 
triggered by the 1988 uprising by setting up refugee camps for 
perceived political refugees as noted, it later withdrew all 
assistance. 
 
------------------ 
Through Chin Eyes 
----------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Field Coordinator of the Chin Human Rights 
Organization (CHRO) in Mizoram Terah Thantluang (please protect) 
told post that about 60,000 Chins reside in India.  These 
include 50,000 Chins in Mizoram and 10,000 in Manipur.  Although 
Chin leaders say the persecution of Chins in India has been less 
acute since the 2003 deportation drive in Mizoram, they also say 
that Chins are "not free" in India because of the GOI's close 
relationship with the Burmese government.  Chins living along 
India's border remain in fear of threats by both locals and the 
Indian army. 
 
7.  (SBU) Van Lian Thang (please protect), leader of the Chin 
National Council (CNC) - an umbrella organization of Chin 
socio-political groups -- estimated there were 80,000-90,000 
Chins in India.  He said that the Chin migrants live in 
difficult economic circumstances and lack legal security.  With 
the GOI's Look East Policy and friendly relations with Burma, 
the Chin movement is unable to make progress in gaining GOI 
recognition of their plight.  Although the YMA has refrained 
from outright acts of abuse, Thang indicated that the Chins felt 
threatened by this ethnic Mizo group.  He added that the 
situation had improved recently under the state Mizo National 
Front (MNF) government, which is now more sympathetic to the 
Chins and their difficulties, but provides no official support. 
(Comment:  Despite the current situation being relatively 
improved, the CNC continues to conduct its larger meetings in 
jungle areas to avoid drawing attention of the state authorities 
and locals Mizo groups.  End Comment.) 
 
------------------------- 
Things Changing in Burma? 
------------------------- 
 
8.  (U) On September 27 Chin leaders told Post that they have 
not seen any marked increase of Burmese crossing into India 
since the recent pro-democracy demonstrations in Burma began. 
The Chins in Burma presently remain remote from the center of 
the demonstrations and agitation.  Thang noted that the Chins 
were watching events closely but lacking resources and a means 
 
KOLKATA 00000305  003 OF 003 
 
 
to support the protestors, he lamented, "Unfortunately we cannot 
physically or financially support the movement [in Burma], but 
we hope some country will come forward to help us." 
 
------------- 
Role of UNHCR 
------------- 
 
9.  (U) UNHCR contacts told post that asylum seekers have to 
approach the organization in New Delhi as the GOI does not 
permit UNHCR access to Northeast states and it has no links with 
NGOs in the Northeast region.  UNHCR emphasized that if a 
migrant from a foreign country resides in India for economic 
reasons, their application is likely to be rejected.  So far, 
UNHCR has granted refugee status to 1,800 Burmese in India, and 
UNHCR admitted they don't have an accurate count of the total 
number of Burmese migrants in the country as they get varying 
estimates (50,000 to 100,000) from asylum seekers. 
 
10.  (SBU) Comment:  The Chins remain in legal limbo in India as 
the GOI avoids adequately addressing their presence.  While 
presently not forcing the Chins to return to Burma, the GOI 
still offers no mechanism for them to maintain a legal status 
until the political situation in Burma changes.  UNHCR is unable 
to effectively assess whether the Chin are political refugees or 
economic migrants as the GOI refuses the organization access to 
the region and few Chins have the means to make the long trip 
from the Northeast to New Delhi to apply for refugee status. 
Given recent the pro-democracy demonstrations in Burma and the 
likelihood of a violent response by the Burmese Junta, India 
could possibly see a repeat of 1988 with another large influx of 
refugees.  The GOI should be encouraged to consider such an 
eventuality and prepare a possible response to an increase in 
Burmese refugees.  The GOI should also be encouraged to allow 
UNHCR greater access to the Chins to identify legitimate 
refugees and to craft a sustainable approach in dealing with the 
sizeable Chin community.  A constructive response to the Chin 
situation would demonstrate the GOI's commitment to basic human 
rights and contribute to broader efforts to promote democracy in 
Burma. 
JARDINE