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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1470, FORCE COMMANDER CHAIRS HIS FIRST CFC MEETINGS, MAKES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1470 2007-09-18 11:56 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO0411
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1470 2611156
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181156Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8558
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001470 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPKO AU UN US SU
 
SUBJECT:  FORCE COMMANDER CHAIRS HIS FIRST CFC MEETINGS, MAKES 
POSITIVE REFORMS, BUT FRUSTRATED BY HASKANITA 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Force Commander General Martin Luther Agwai took over 
Cease-fire Commission (CFC) meetings and is making positive changes 
(including some that we recommended).  However, the inability to 
investigate the Haskanita violence highlights how weak the CFC will 
remain, despite internal reforms.  End summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
US, UN OBERVERS OFFER RECOMMENDATIONS 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) During two separate meetings with Force Commander Agwai, 
S/CRS Poloff presented several proposals for improving the 
functioning of the CFC, based on input from the US and UN CFC 
observers.  While Agwai wants to improve the CFC, he does not have 
the time to attend long, pointless meetings.  Poloff proposed that 
the CFC chambers meet one day a week to discuss substantive issues 
and that he chair those meetings.  On the following day, there would 
be meetings for logistical or administrative matters, chaired by the 
new Deputy Force Commander. 
 
3. (SBU) Another key recommendation is to create a log of active 
cases and insure follow-up.  The CFC Secretariat does not currently 
maintain such a log.  S/CRS Poloff will also draft standard 
operating procedures for conducting investigations. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
GEN AGWAI CHAIRS HIS FIRST CFC MEETINGS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) After returning to El Fasher several weeks ago, Agwai 
chaired the meetings of both chambers on September 12 for the first 
time.  He allowed the representatives to complain about the 
reduction in the monthly subsistence allowance (MSA) and the lack of 
logistical/administrative support but then made clear that he 
expected them to discuss substantive issues from in the future.  He 
also told them to put complaints about MSA and support in a letter, 
and his staff would either address it or forward it to the Joint 
Commission. 
 
-------------------------- 
FRUSTRATION OVER HASKANITA 
-------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Serious fighting occurred in Haskanita on September 10, as 
the SAF attacked the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the 
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Unity, as a reprisal for the Wad Banda 
attack in Kordofan.  On September 11, Agwai issued an official 
statement expressing concern.  He later advised he had wanted the 
CFC to review the statement but decided it was more important to get 
it out promptly rather than delaying it for the CFC meeting.  The 
Second Chamber meeting on September 12 was delayed an hour while 
Agwai met with JEM representative Gen. Mohammed Bashir and 
SLA/Non-Signatories Forces (NSF) representative Col. Abdou Ismail. 
At the CFC meeting, Bashir said the JEM threat to shoot down AMIS 
flights to Haskanita was a misunderstanding and had been rescinded. 
Agwai expressed his desire to investigate the incident as soon as 
possible and was clearly frustrated that he had not yet been able to 
do so. (Note: On September 12, Agwai told a visiting western 
diplomat that he felt both the Sudanese Government and JEM had 
obstructed his attempts to get a team to Haskanita to investigate. 
End note.) 
 
6. (SBU) Note: At the September 13 security briefing for 
humanitarian organizations, the UN Department of Safety and Security 
(UNDSS) reported that they were gathering information about 
Haskanita.  They put the casualties at 49 civilians and 200 
combatants, although they could not yet confirm those numbers. 
Concerning the JEM claim that two Sudanese Armed Forces helicopters 
had been shot down, UNDSS said that one damaged helicopter had 
returned to the airfield in Nyala.  UNDSS had no word on the second 
helicopter.  UNDSS also briefed that five SAF and nine militia 
soldiers had been killed in a clash between the SAF and an Arab 
militia.  Although this clash occurred near Haskanita, they felt it 
was not related to the main fighting.  End note. 
 
FERNANDEZ