VZCZCXRO0021
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1464/01 2610632
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 180632Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8551
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001464 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN SU ER
SUBJECT: KHARTOUM: EUSR BRYLLE DISCUSSES CPA, DARFUR 
 
--------------------- 
Re-focusing on the CPA 
---------------------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) In a September 17 meeting in Khartoum, EU Special 
Representative for Sudan Thorben Brylle and CDA Fernandez 
agreed that the Darfur crisis should not detract from 
international attention on implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).  Brylle noted that his 
current trip to Sudan had concentrated on North/South issues, 
including visits to potential flashpoints such as Malakal and 
Bentiu.  CDA Fernandez said that the international community 
must "multi-task" in pressing for both an end to the Darfur 
conflict and sustained focus on the CPA. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Characterizing the interaction between North and 
South Sudan as an "unbalanced, symbiotic relationship," 
Brylle said that the National Congress Party (NCP) did not 
want the CPA to collapse but was ignoring the proper 
sequencing through 2011 that is stipulated in the agreement. 
The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) lacked capacity 
and made tactical errors.  Brylle called First Vice President 
Salva Kiir's recent speech mentioning a return to war "a 
little over the hill."  CDA Fernandez noted that while the 
NCP was the shrewdest political actor in Sudan, often 
out-maneuvering the SPLM, the SPLM was relatively more 
sophisticated than any of the other forces in the country, 
such as the Darfur movements.  He said that the U.S. was 
supporting capacity building in South Sudan to strengthen the 
SPLM's hand but was conscious to avoid certain "redlines" 
that might lead to belligerence. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Brylle recalled that the EU had held a recent 
meeting in which it decided to explore a broad-based, 
international conference to regain focus on CPA 
implementation.  He was traveling to Nairobi on September 18 
to discuss the issue with Kenyan Special Envoy for Sudan 
Daniel Arap Moi.  CDA Fernandez said that the U.S. supported 
an IGAD or IGAD partners meeting to review the CPA and 
demonstrate to the NCP that the international community was 
"watching."  Regarding the recent resignation of Assessment 
and Evaluation Commission (AEC) chairman Tom Vraalsen, CDA 
Fernandez said that the NCP had responded with a "classic 
line: the problem was the individual, who they said was 
biased, not the process.  They say they continue to support 
the process."  Brylle called Vraalsen's resignation 
"symptomatic" of a trend in NCP decision-making.  After 
agreeing to the UN/AU hybrid force for Darfur and 
negotiations with Darfur's rebels, it "turned the screw" in 
another area.  Fernandez explained that while a good portion 
of the problems in the AEC emanated from the NCP, the SPLM 
was also responsible for seeming disinterest, often not 
preparing--or even attending--AEC meetings. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Darfur Political Process Stumbling 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) During a meeting with Brylle in Khartoum, National 
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Director General 
Salah Ghosh had described three "umbrellas" of the Darfur 
rebel movements going into the Libya talks: 1) the Justice 
and Equality Movement (JEM), 2) the Zaghawa factions of the 
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), and 3) the Fur factions of the 
SLA.  Ghosh had said that the rebels cannot come "at their 
own will" to and from the negotiations once the talks begin. 
Brylle said that SLA leader Abdulwahid al Nur, a Fur who has 
rejected the Libya talks, "needed a reality check."  He 
suggested that the international community's continued focus 
and interaction with Abdulwahid "contributed to the problem" 
by increasing his profile.  Brylle further stated that the 
NCP was "changing its attitude" on strict adherence to the 
DPA by showing some flexibility for the negotiations but that 
Khartoum remained "fairly confident they can manipulate the 
process."  Brylle and CDA Fernandez agreed that the 
marginalization of Senior Assistant to the President Minni 
Minawi discouraged other movements from joining the peace 
process and that his figurehead status would have to be 
addressed. 
 
¶5. (SBU) CDA Fernandez said that the U.S. was concerned about 
the political process for several reasons: 1) the disunity 
among the rebel factions prior to negotiations, 2) the 
disconnect between the rebel movements and the civilian 
population, 3) Abulwahid's continued intransigence, raising 
the question of who could speak for the Fur, and 4) the 
problematic Libyan venue, which might contribute to Eritrea 
 
KHARTOUM 00001464  002 OF 002 
 
 
becoming a spoiler.  Brylle and CDA Fernandez agreed that the 
Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) could, in 
cooperation with the UN, provide a mechanism for channeling 
civil society concerns into the peace process.  Brylle also 
said that the international community should pressure Eritrea 
to prevent it from disrupting the process, inferring that the 
EU could use its influene with Asmara. 
FERNANDEZ