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OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
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DE RUEHKH #1461/01 2601216
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171216Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8545
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0225
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001461 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN AU CD LY SU
SUBJECT: UN/AU UPDATE ON DARFUR PEACE PROCESS IN LEAD-UP TO 
NEW YORK 
 
KHARTOUM 00001461  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) One week before the September 21 meeting on Darfur 
in New York, the UN/AU provided an update on the peace 
process for representatives in Khartoum.  With the exception 
of a proposed meeting of Darfur rebel leaders in N'djamena 
from September 16-17, the UN/AU provided few details on its 
plan for preparing the parties for negotiations at the end of 
October.  However, the UN/AU presented a broad agenda for the 
talks encompassing power-sharing, wealth-sharing and security 
and asked the "non-regional" governments of the Tripoli 
Format to select four representatives to participate in the 
negotiations.  While several key rebel leaders, including 
Abdulwahid al Nur, Khalil Ibrahim, and Ahmed Abdulshafie may 
not attend the talks, the potential of reaching an inclusive 
agreement--in the brief timeframe laid out by the UN/AU and 
heartily supported by the Sudanese Government--is 
questionable.  The U.S. should present clear positions on the 
following issues during the September 21 UN/AU-sponsored 
meeting in New York: a single UN/AU negotiator, issue-based 
"shuttle diplomacy" prior to the start of negotiations, 
UN/AU-facilitated dialogue among the factions of the SLM, 
realistic outcomes for the Libya talks, and an agile contact 
group with leverage on all of the parties.  End summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
Preparation (or Lack Thereof) 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The UN/AU held a briefing for the Khartoum 
representatives of the "Tripoli Format" governments on 
September 14 to provide an update on the Darfur peace process 
in the lead-up to the September 21 meeting on Darfur in New 
York.  Sam Ibok, co-chair of the Joint Mediation Support Team 
(JMST), said that the UN/AU planned to convene a September 16 
preparatory meeting for the Darfur rebels in N'djamena with 
the "leading personalities" from the late-July Arusha 
conference.  Without providing specifics, Ibok said that the 
meeting would focus on bringing the rebel movements together, 
with minimal UN/AU intervention.  Sudan Liberation Movement 
(SLM) faction leader Abdulwahid al Nur had declared he would 
not attend.  Others, such as Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim were also ambivalent. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Beginning around October 17, Ibok said that the 
UN/AU planned to hold a series of workshops for the rebel 
movements in Libya to prepare a "rebel platform" for the 
negotiations.  The Chairman of the Darfur Darfur Dialogue and 
Consultation (DDDC), Abdul Mohammed, recalled that the most 
progress during the Abuja talks had occurred just after 
successful workshops with the rebel movements. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Poloff asked whether, given the continued disunity 
within the rebel movements, the UN/AU was able to conduct 
"shuttle diplomacy" between the parties, as envisioned in the 
UN/AU roadmap.  Ibok responded that the "shuttle continues;" 
UN/AU representatives spoke to rebel leaders daily to 
determine the most productive "models" for representation at 
the talks and were seeking meetings with the Sudanese 
Government to discuss the current fighting and to review the 
draft agenda for the Libya talks. 
 
-------------------- 
Not So Hidden Agenda 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ibok previewed a broad draft "agenda" for the talks. 
 Though UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim 
had approved the agenda, Ibok emphasized that it was still 
preliminary and had not been shared with the parties.  While 
the agenda was divided into four categories (wealth-sharing, 
power-sharing, security, and implementation modalities), Ibok 
stressed that the UN/AU had not decided on a sequence for 
discussing each category and that Eliasson and Salim were 
considering whether the components could be negotiated 
concurrently.  However, he outlined the specific issues that 
the UN/AU planned to discuss and asked for feed-back from the 
Tripoli Format governments before or during the September 21 
UN/AU-sponsored meeting in New York.  The agenda will include 
discussion of the following: 
 
-- Wealth-sharing: compensation; reconstruction and 
 
KHARTOUM 00001461  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
development, including a discussion on the resumption of the 
Darfur Joint Assessment Mission (DJAM) and a donor 
conference; and humanitarian issues, including the return of 
IDPs and refugees, humanitarian assistance, and land 
issues/howakir. 
 
-- Security: a new cessation of hostilities, which the UN/AU 
hoped would precede the October 27 talks; a comprehensive 
cease-fire agreement; a definition for the UN-African Union 
Mission in Sudan's (UNAMID) support of the political process; 
the disarmament of the Janjaweed, and formal security 
arrangements relating to demobilization and re-integration of 
all of the armed groups. 
 
-- Power-sharing: one region for Darfur rather than three 
states and a review of the current power-sharing arrangements 
at both the federal and regional level. 
 
-- Implementation modalities: international guarantees and 
the formal status of the new agreement, i.e. as an "annex" to 
the DPA, a stand-alone agreement, or another mechanism. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The French Ambassador, Christine Robichon, asserted 
that it would be difficult to have constructive negotiations 
without a cessation of hostilities to use as a basis for a 
sustainable cease-fire mechanism.  Ibok agreed, saying "if 
what is happening on the ground now (i.e. the ongoing 
Government-rebel violence in South Darfur) continues, we 
cannot have negotiations."  Ibok characterized a cessation of 
hostilities as a "light political statement" to test the 
sincerity of the parties' commitment to the peace process. 
The existing mechanisms of the African Union Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS), plus the UN Heavy Support Package, would monitor 
adherence to the agreement, he posited. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Quick Talks, But Who Will Attend? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Ibok said that Eliasson and Salim--under pressure 
from the international community--wanted to conclude the 
negotiations by the end of the year but called this 
expectation an "optimistic projection."  Several outstanding 
issues on participation remained the principal obstacle to 
the process, according to Ibok.  In addition to recalcitrant 
Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Abdulwahid al Nur, 
other key rebel leaders, including the Justice and Equality 
Movement's (JEM) Khalil Ibrahim and SLM faction leader Ahmed 
Abdulshafie have indicated they will not attend the Libya 
talks. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Egyptian Ambassador cautioned that criteria for 
participation in the peace process should not be limited to 
armed groups.  "They can't be negotiating through the barrel 
of a gun...there cannot just be a place (at the negotiating 
table) for those whose only constituency is weapons," he 
said.  Ibok responded that the UN/AU were developing a 
strategy to include civil society groups in the process, 
which would be essential for its success. 
 
----------------------- 
Hospitality As Leverage 
----------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Ibok stressed that addressing the intransigence of 
Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Abdulwahid al Nur 
"should not be left only to the UN/AU" and that it was 
incumbent on other governments, particularly in Europe, to 
ensure his participation in the peace process.  "If there is 
no Abdulwahid, we can pack our bags," he said.  The UN/AU was 
not requesting that Abdulwahid be expelled from Europe, 
according to Ibok, only that European governments "use the 
leverage of hospitality to bring together all of the parties." 
 
¶10. (SBU) Robichon called Ibok's comments--a clear allusion 
to Paris--"severe."  "My authorities are working very hard 
with Abdulwahid," she said, adding that France had persuaded 
Abdulwahid to receive a UN/AU team in early summer.  Ibok 
apologized for "giving the impression that he was talking 
about France," noting that Abdulwahid was not the only rebel 
leader who had taken refuge abroad and was obstructing the 
peace process.  "He's just the biggest fish," explained Ibok, 
who then reiterated that "there must be conditions attached 
to hospitality."  Robichon said that France had not granted 
 
KHARTOUM 00001461  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
"political refugee" status to Abdulwahid, meaning that his 
visa expired every three months.  "We are using all of our 
leverage within the rule of law," she said.  In a separate 
meeting on September 17, Robichon told the Charge that France 
was coordinating its Abdulwahid strategy with UN Envoy 
Eliasson. 
 
----------------------------- 
SPLM: No Luck with Abdulwahid 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) During the briefing, Ibok received word that a 
delegation of the Sudan People's liberation Movement (SPLM), 
led by Government of Southern Sudan Vice President Riek 
Machar, had been unsuccessful after three days of meetings in 
Paris to convince Abdulwahid to attend an SPLM-sponsored 
meeting for the SLM in Southern Sudan.  Noting that the UN/AU 
still considered the SPLM's role in the Darfur peace process 
"important," Ibok said that any effort to re-unify the SLM 
that did not include Abdulwahid was "useless." 
 
------------------------- 
Contact Group Controversy 
------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) UN/AU plans for international participation at the 
Libya talks provoked a strong response from many of the 
European nations.  According to Ibok, the UN/AU would include 
the four "regional" members of the Tripoli Format (Chad, 
Libya, Eritrea, and Egypt) and four non-regional members. 
The UN/AU made it the responsibility of the non-regional 
members of the Tripoli Format to select their representatives 
in preparation for the September 21 meeting in New York.  He 
suggested, however, that one slot each could represent North 
America, Europe, Asia, and the Arab world.  During the Abuja 
talks, negotiations had occurred between the parties and the 
international community, rather than among the parties.  In 
the new process, both the regional and non-regional 
representatives would thus operate within a defined framework 
under the leadership of the UN and AU envoys, said Ibok. 
 
¶13. (SBU) The UK called the four-country limit "unrealistic," 
emphasizing that the UN/AU would need the "maximum leverage 
and positive influence" of a broad range of Western 
participants to bring the parties to compromise.  Dutch 
representatives expressed similar concerns, while calling for 
the appointment of a chief negotiator.  Poloff iterated USG 
support for a single chief negotiator to shepherd the 
process.  (Note: European representatives in Khartoum concede 
that the U.S., China, and the EU must be represented on the 
"contact group."  A UN official told Poloff following the 
meeting that Eliasson had begrudgingly accepted four 
non-regional members, instead of two, and would never consent 
to increasing the number.  End note.) 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) UN and AU officials, including Ibok, admit that 
there is no concrete strategy to prepare the parties for 
negotiations prior to October 27, with two exceptions: 1) the 
vaguely defined--and possibly little attended--meeting in 
N'djamena, and 2) the workshops in Libya to build a rebel 
platform, an impossible task given the ongoing disunity 
within the Darfur movements.  The UN/AU have interpreted 
"shuttle diplomacy" to mean any UN/AU discussions with the 
Darfur rebel groups and the Sudanese Government, rather than 
an effort to focus on narrowing the parties' positions on key 
issues before the start of talks.  This misinterpretation is 
most evident by the menagerie of issues included in the UN/AU 
draft agenda and the absence of a decision on whether the 
outcome of the Libya talks will be an addendum to the DPA or 
a new agreement.  To address some of the shortcomings in the 
UN/AU process, the U.S. should present clear positions on the 
following issues during the September 21 UN/AU-sponsored 
meeting in New York: a single UN/AU negotiator, issue-based 
"shuttle diplomacy" prior to the start of negotiations, 
UN/AU-facilitated dialogue among the factions of the SLM, 
realistic outcomes for the Libya talks, and an agile contact 
group with leverage on all of the parties.  End comment. 
 
¶15. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
FERNANDEZ