VZCZCXRO3697
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
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DE RUEHKH #1427/01 2540900
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 110900Z SEP 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8469
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001427 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: AU, UN, PARTNERS PLAN ACTION ON SECURITY 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) called a 
long-awaited working group meeting in Khartoum on September 4 
to invigorate discussion of the ailing security provisions of 
the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).  With the arrival of Joint 
Special Representative Rudolphe Adada and Force Commander 
Martin Luther Agwai, representatives from the AU, the UN, the 
U.S. and the UK discussed a plan of action for addressing the 
break-down in the DPA's security mechanisms, including the 
Cease-fire Commission (CFC) and the Joint Commission (JC), 
and the rise in banditry and attacks against AMIS and 
humanitarian organizations in Darfur. 
 
------------------------ 
Breakdown in the CFC, JC 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) The CFC and the Joint Commission had ceased to 
function, according to JC Secretary Abubakr Rufai.  The 
majority of SLM representatives were absent from the CFC in 
protest of a reduction in the monthly subsistence allowance 
(MSA), meaning cease-fire investigations could not occur. 
The Sudanese Government, which the AU claimed was "quietly 
behind" the protest, had delayed progress on a plan for 
Janjaweed disarmament.  The CFC could thus focus on only one 
component of its mandate: verification of areas of control. 
While the AU had completed its verification report in recent 
weeks, it was awaiting revisions from the DPA signatories. 
Meanwhile, lack of political leadership over the DPA 
signatory commanders--i.e. the Sudan Liberation Movement 
(SLM)/Minawi--had led to a rise of anarchy in the field, 
according to AU Head of DPA Implementation Sam Ibok. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Freeze DPA or Fix Political Issues? 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ibok  suggested that with the arrival of Joint 
Special Representative Rudolphe Adada and Force Commander 
Martin Luther Agwai, the UN and AU needed to make a "clean 
break" from the security provisions associated with the DPA 
as part of the new UN/AU peace process.  He said that the 
UN/AU Joint Mediation Support Team was studying the options 
for a cessation of hostilities that could be effectively 
monitored.  While Ibok recommended a complete "freeze" of 
implementation of the security provisions, other 
participants--including some from the AU--cautioned that such 
an action would give the impression that the international 
community had abandoned the DPA.  Poloff asserted that the 
problem with the security mechanisms was political, not 
structural.  The focus should be on reversing the breakdown 
in command and control within the SLM/Minawi and providing 
incentives to the DPA signatories and the non-signatories to 
participate in effective security arrangements. 
 
-------------------- 
Non-Military Support 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Abdul Mohammed, the head of the Darfur Darfur 
Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC), advised that a series of 
confidence building measures among the SLM/Minawi commanders, 
AMIS, and the humanitarian organizations should be put in 
place.  While the international community should make clear 
that the decision to reduce the MSA--which was not designed 
as a source of income for the movement's commanders--was 
non-negotiable, Mohammed cautioned that the SLM should "not 
be pushed into thinking there is no reason to be a part of 
the (security and political) process anymore."  Referring to 
the recent completion of the AU report on areas of control, 
UN Director of Political Affairs Abidoun Bashua asked if the 
UN/AU could launch a program to provide non-military 
logistical support to meet the basic needs of the commanders 
and their families, which would decrease the motivation for 
looting and banditry.  The UK representative emphasized the 
importance of addressing security issues with the commanders 
at the local level and not just in Khartoum or the Darfur 
state capitals.  Poloff noted that the SLM had approached the 
U.S. and the AU regarding a proposed conference with the SLM 
political leadership and the field to address the threats 
against humanitarian operations, the MSA issue, the 
dysfunction in the CFC, and non-military support.  Ibok was 
supportive of the proposal and agreed to work with Poloff to 
help the SLM focus its strategy. 
 
------------- 
Action Points 
 
KHARTOUM 00001427  002 OF 002 
 
 
------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The participants adopted three action points at the 
conclusion of the meeting: 1) AMIS will prepare a briefing 
paper on the status of funding and payment of the MSA to 
date, 2) AMIS and the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), in 
consultation with the U.S. and the UK, will prepare 
suggestions for an interim arrangement for a cessation of 
hostilities and an effective monitoring capacity, and 3) AMIS 
will prepare a proposal to provide non-military logistical 
support to the DPA signatory movements.  The working group 
agreed to meet on September 16 to review progress on the 
proposals, which would then be raised to the chief of mission 
level. 
FERNANDEZ