VZCZCXRO9632
RR RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #3267/01 2701134
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271134Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0481
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//JF/UNMA//
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003267 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER EAID ECON PHUM AF
SUBJECT: Security in Nuristan -- The Enemy Within? 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Nuristan Province has seen an increase in 
security incidents since the establishment of a Coalition presence 
last fall.  The situation became particularly acute this summer, 
with 21 separate attacks on Coalition or Afghan targets.  While the 
frequency has declined since July, the PRT expects more attacks 
before the onset of winter.  Significantly, despite claims to the 
contrary by Nuristani elders, a number of the attacks appear to have 
been undertaken by local insurgents. End Summary. 
 
Cross-Border Influence... 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Over the last two months, PRT Nuristan has met with elders 
from throughout the province to discuss the difficult security 
situation.  In every case the elders uniformly asserted that the 
insurgents were foreigners who were entering the province from 
Pakistan.  They acknowledged that while a few locals could be 
involved, they argued that they were unimportant bit-players.  Many 
also said more vigilance on the borders would reduce security 
incidents.  These claims were echoed by Governor Tamim Nuristani, 
who asserted that the insurgency owes most of its strength to 
cross-border leadership.  He complained that foreign insurgents had 
established a "training camp" in eastern Nuristan. 
 
... Or the Kid Next Door? 
 
¶3.  (SBU) However, the facts seem to indicate otherwise.  Insurgent 
radio communications are strictly in Kata and Kam-viri, which are 
neither spoken nor understood by more than a handful of non-native 
Nuristanis.  On September 12 and 13, insurgents fired four mortars 
and an RPG round at the PRT's Forward Operating Base (FOB) in 
Nurgram District in southwestern Nuristan.  (The attacks caused no 
damage.)  After their second foray, the insurgents went back to 
their homes a few kilometers away.  Local security forces say they 
know where they live, but complain that they lack the means to take 
action. 
 
Keys to the Insurgency: Local Governance and Development 
 
¶4.  (SBU) While recent attacks on the PRT were ineffective, 
insurgent activity during July and early August claimed lives 
throughout the province.  Camp Keating, in eastern Nuristan, was the 
target of some 21 attacks during the month of July.  During the 
course of the summer, insurgents also conducted attacks across 
Nuristan.  Coalition operations have caused far more casualties 
among insurgents than the insurgents have inflicted on the 
Coalition. The absence, however, of a constant Afghan National Army 
(ANA) presence in the areas in which insurgent leaders live cedes a 
considerable amount of initiative to the insurgency. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Although the governor points to Pakistan as the source of 
the insurgency, he acknowledges that his own cousin is one of the 
insurgent leaders in the province.  One of the primary operational 
commanders of the insurgents in southwestern Nuristan lives in a 
house a few kilometers up the valley from the PRT.  Clearly, these 
figures are not going to depart for the winter, and border controls 
will not affect them.  The involvement in the insurgency of 
important figures with deep roots in Nuristan gives staying power to 
the insurgency.  One problem is the lack of solid leadership on the 
part of elders at the town level.  Traditionally, Nuristani towns 
decided issues on the basis of corporate decisions, with elders 
playing an important role.  Thirty years of war, however, has 
altered the social fabric of Nuristan, leading to an increase in the 
influence of military and religious leaders relative to town elders. 
 Nevertheless, elders remain important, and they can still play an 
important part in influencing popular positions in their towns. The 
provincial government and the PRT have focused on outreach to elders 
to encourage them to play a constructive role. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Another key to the insurgency is the lack of development. 
The lack of employment has led some Nuristani young men to 
participate in actions against Coalition or government forces on a 
piece-work basis.  Pakistani elements pay for attacks, and some 
local men find it tempting -- in the absence of other sources of 
income -- to take the money, fire off an ineffectual round, and run. 
 
 
 
KABUL 00003267  002 OF 002 
 
 
WOOD