VZCZCXRO5274
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #3054/01 2551147
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 121147Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0194
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003054 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID KDEM PGOV PINR AF
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KARZAI'S NEW GOVERNANCE CZAR OUTLINES 
VISION FOR REFORM 
 
REF: A. KABUL 2684 
     ¶B. KABUL 1712 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) President Karzai established the new Office of Local 
Administration on August 30 and appointed as its director 
general Ghulam Jelani Popal, a respected former deputy 
minister of finance.  Popal outlined his vision for making 
the Afghan government "a reality in the lives of the people," 
partly by putting "maliks" -- traditional quasi-official 
liaisons between tribes and the government -- on the 
government payroll.  He is considering replacing several 
governors.  He will also urge the central government to give 
more support to governors and provincial councils, 
particularly by seeking their input on security requirements, 
making other ministries more responsive, and channeling funds 
for sub-national priorities.  The JCMB "Informal Group" of 
Ambassadors has invited Popal to outline the support he needs 
to help him overcome political opposition to his reform 
agenda.  The Embassy and USAID are also considering how to 
ensure that the new office, which inherits MOI staff, does 
not also inherit its deficiencies. END SUMMARY. 
 
LEADERSHIP FOR SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE REFORM 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) President Karzai issued a decree on August 30 
establishing the Office of Local Administration, a focal 
point for governance policy under the Presidency and a new 
home for the Ministry of Interior's dysfunctional Civil 
Administration Division (ref A).  He appointed as its 
director general Ghulam Jelani Popal, a Pashtun close to the 
Karzai family and the deputy chairman of Minister of Finance 
Ahady's Afghan Millat Party.  As a respected former Deputy 
Minister of Finance under Ashraf Gani, Popal centralized the 
collection of customs revenue, diminishing the influence of 
regional warlords over an important source of government 
revenue.  He speaks fluent English and reportedly lived in 
the U.S. from 1998-2001.  He worked on local development as 
head of the Afghanistan Development Association (ADA) NGO, 
and is thought to have credibility with tribes, especially in 
the South. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Popal's deputy for policy is Barna Karimi, formerly 
deputy to Karzai's previous Chief of Staff Jawad Ludin, who 
has has a reputation for competence.  The new deputy for 
administration is the out-going MOI deputy minister for civil 
administration Abdul Malek Sediqi, a former communist 
technocrat whose moribund division's inactivity led to its 
move to the Palace.  Popal's appointment was preceded by a 
week of Palace intrigue in which Sediqi, reportedly backed by 
Parliament Speaker Qanooni, challenged Karzai's pick for the 
top governance job.  Popal suggested to Poloff that Sediqi's 
appointment was a political necessity and that Sediqi may not 
last long in the office, saying that he can nevertheless help 
the new office learn routine, administrative procedures for 
"at least three or four months" while Popal and Karimi press 
forward with reform. 
 
AN AFGHAN VISION FOR LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Popal outlined his vision for sub-national 
governance reform in an introductory meeting with Poloff on 
September 8, saying, "Legitimacy comes not just from the 
ballot box, but from delivering security and services." 
Afghans have high expectations of the international community 
and their government that are not being met, according to 
Popal, while the Taliban, from whom Afghans expect little, 
are in fact helping address local problems in many villages 
(often by taking sides in tribal disputes).  Popal 
acknowledged the good work that has built the government at 
the center, but said "the government is not a reality in the 
lives of the people."  He thinks governance policy needs a 
consistent approach backed by political will, saying that 
 
KABUL 00003054  002 OF 003 
 
 
"Karzai is committed." 
 
¶5. (SBU) For Popal, the key to strengthening government 
authority is creating a system through which formal 
government structures can systematically interface with 
tribal leaders at the local level.  Historically, he 
explained, district administrators interfaced with the tribes 
through "maliks", quasi-official tribal representatives 
selected by local communities to solve collective problems, 
sometimes by convening shuras, and charging fees for 
facilitating access to government services.  Popal said this 
system worked smoothly, but was undermined by three decades 
of war.  (NOTE:  The traditional malik system was replaced by 
elected village representatives under the 1964 Constitution 
and then by community based councils under the Daud regime 
(1973-78), which tended to function as propaganda outlets for 
the regime rather than as conduits from villages up to the 
central government.  END NOTE.)  Popal intends to revive a 
similar system of officially recognized tribal liaisons by 
identifying those community leaders informally playing this 
role and providing them with a modest government stipend.  He 
estimated that the system would require 10,000 maliks, or 30 
for each of Afghanistan's 400 districts.  (NOTE: Popal did 
not indicate how he would fund this system, but he alluded to 
reforming the bloated staff of the MOI's former civil 
administration division.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) Popal said that Afghanistan cannot yet afford -- 
politically or financially -- formal elections at the 
district and community level, as foreseen in the 
Constitution.  For the 2009/10 election cycle, village shuras 
will play the role of district councils, and maliks from each 
district will collectively form a district shura.  Popal 
plans to "streamline" the number of shuras currently claiming 
to represent communities, many of which have formed since the 
war to represent powerful individuals and lack legitimacy. 
Popal said the government should only consider extending 
formal democracy below the provinces once the state becomes 
stronger.  However, he supports elections in 2009/10 for 
municipal councils and mayors, which -- unlike district and 
village councils -- have independent revenue-raising 
authority and a clear mandate to deliver municipal services. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Popal acknowledged that his vision differs somewhat 
from that of the Community Development Councils (CDCs) 
established by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development.  He said the existence of CDCs is based on the 
promise of development funds, but that they are otherwise 
artificial, not well-rooted, and unsustainable.  The 
existence of 17,000 CDCs nevertheless "makes our lives 
easier" because many local leaders who could play the role of 
maliks are already participating in CDCs.  Popal is in the 
process of negotiating with MRRD the appropriate future role 
for CDCs.  (NOTE:  The World Bank told Poloff that CDCs may 
remain within MRRD and retain their original development role 
rather than evolve into formal village councils.  END NOTE.) 
 
REVITALIZING SUPPORT FOR GOVERNORS AND PCS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) Popal will oversee Afghanistan's 34 provincial 
governors, and says that President Karzai has agreed to stop 
receiving governors and to refer them instead to Popal's 
office, except for "two or three of the biggest warlords." 
Popal said effective provincial governance not only depends 
on appointing the right governors, but also on supporting 
them with resources and security.  He intends to fill 
vacancies in Faryab and Jowzjan, and to replace several 
governors, mentioning Kunar Governor Deedar and Ghazni 
governor Patan.  (NOTE:  The Asia Foundation (TAF), which has 
been advising Popal on the structure of his new Office, told 
Poloff that Popal had insisted as a condition of accepting 
the job that Karzai replace several governors, possibly 
including Uruzgan Governor Monib, Wardak Governor Naimi, 
Farah Governor Balouch, and Zabul Governor Arman.  END NOTE.) 
 
 
 
KABUL 00003054  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) Popal confirmed that administrative authority over 
provincial councils will move from Faruk Wardak's Office of 
Administrative Affairs to his new office (ref B).  He 
observed that PCs were established to play their 
Constitutional role in appointing members of the upper house 
of Parliament (the Meshrano Jirga), but they have otherwise 
been under-utilized and should be given real authority. 
 
DONOR SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN-LED GOVERNANCE REFORM 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶10. (SBU) The JCMB "Informal Group" of Ambassadors discussed 
on September 4 how to support the new Office, agreeing to 
invite Popal to outline his plans and needs.  SRSG Koenigs 
said, "There is a crisis of political legitimacy and a lack 
of belief in institutions from the President down to the 
provinces," and that Afghanistan needs a more "robust and 
connected" system of governance.  He concluded on behalf of 
the group that the new office is a positive reform that 
raises high expectations and deserves support.  Popal told 
Poloff that he plans to ask for public support from the 
international community to overcome political opposition to 
his reform agenda.  He will also request technical assistance 
and financial support.  Popal and Karimi were pleased to 
receive a copy of an inventory of governance programs 
developed by the Embassy, and requested further working-level 
consultations to refine their agenda. 
 
¶11. (SBU) One issue requiring urgent attention is how to 
ensure that the new office, which inherits MOI staff, does 
not also inherit its deficiencies.  If reform is to stick, 
the new office will need effective leadership within as well 
as at the top.  The Asia foundation estimates that the new 
office will need seven core senior officials and 52 new staff 
in key positions as a first step in implementing serious 
reform.  The Embassy and USAID have encouraged the Afghan 
Government to show that the new office is a priority by 
funding its transitional staffing needs as we explore how 
best to support the new office's reform agenda. 
DELL