VZCZCXYZ0005
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0725/01 2680929
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 250929Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3776
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0060

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000725 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2017 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR EAID PGOV AF FI
SUBJECT: PDAS VOLKER'S SEPT. 13 - 14 VISIT TO FINLAND 
 
Classified By: POLCHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: PDAS Volker visited Helsinki Sept. 13-14 
for wide-ranging discussions with FM Kanerva, with MFA 
and MOD officials, and with senior advisors to the 
President and Prime Minister.  Bilateral discussions 
focused on Finland's intention to increase its 
contributions in Afghanistan (septel) and in Kosovo; 
OSCE issues (election monitoring, CFE, Kazakhstan, 
Finland's priorities as chairman, and Russia's 
behavior); Russia; and NATO and the NRF.  PDAS Volker 
also held three very successful Public Diplomacy events 
(see reports in PD channels).  End Summary. 
 
Kosovo 
------ 
¶2. (C) Volker raised US views on the current situation in 
Kosovo and possible next steps in separate meetings with 
Foreign Minister Ilkka Kanerva, State Secretary to the 
Prime Minister Riisto Volanen, and Kosovo Office 
Director Juha Ottman.  Ottman noted that Finland is very 
pessimistic about what will occur after the Troika- 
sponsored negotiating period closes on Dec. 10.  There 
is a "growing realism" within the EU that Russia will 
block a UNSC resolution on final status and the Union 
needs to prepare itself for what comes next.  Ottman 
suggested that a "movement toward critical mass" may be 
emerging within the EU in favor of recognizing Kosovo 
should Pristina declare unilateral independence.  This 
would involve the difficult task of convincing the MS 
that oppose recognition to "constructively abstain," but 
it increasingly appears to be the only way forward. 
Ottman added that the US would have to play a key role 
in using its influence to ensure that no violence breaks 
out among the Kosovars.  He also noted that some EU MS 
have suggested again postponing the deadline from Dec. 
10 to sometime in Spring -- perhaps after the Russian 
election.  However, "for Finland, Dec. 10 is the key 
date." 
 
¶3. (C) Volker emphasized to Ottman -- and later to FM 
Kanerva -- that "Dec. 10 is the deadline" and that this 
is not negotiable.  More time will not make a 
difference, and in the absence of a UNSCR, the fall-back 
must be UNSCR 1244 and the Ahtisaari recommendations. 
He agreed with the Finns' assessment that the future of 
KFOR and the ESDP mission will be jeopardized without a 
clear path toward final status, adding that the decision 
to give the Serbs (and Russians) more time has already 
hurt the process.  Recognition of a Kosovar independence 
declaration might be the only way to ensure stability, 
and it is clearly something the US and EU must come 
together on, he concluded. 
 
¶4. (C) Volker also emphasized to Kanerva that if 
violence were to break out, KFOR's mandate needs no 
changes; if KFOR acts decisively to protect life and 
property, its current mandate is sufficient.  Kanerva 
agreed.  The FM was also pleased to report that the GOF 
will re-assume a framework nation role within KFOR at 
the beginning of 2008 and increase its troop 
contribution from 400 to more than 450. 
 
Finland, NATO, and the NRF 
-------------------------- 
¶5. (SBU) Volker's visit occurred in the midst of 
widespread political debate in Finland over whether to 
join the NATO Response Force (NRF), and Kanerva, 
Volanen, MFA Political Director Pilvi-Sisko Vierros- 
Villeneuve, MOD Policy Planning Director Pauli Jarvenpaa 
and former Finnish Ambassador to NATO Antti Sierla all 
raised the issue with him.  Kanerva noted that Finland 
has a six-month EU Battlegroup commitment beginning in 
January, which may include a deployment to Chad. 
However, the FM fully supports joining the NRF as well. 
He said he hopes to join Sweden in making a formal 
commitment this spring, and then work toward actual 
troop participation by 2010.  Vierros-Villeneuve, Sierla 
and Volanen all confirmed in separate meetings that 
there is strong support for NRF participation across the 
government, although as usual in Finland public opinion 
lags somewhat behind.  PM Matti Vanhanen wants 
government consensus on the matter by January. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Volker acknowledged that there have been some 
"mixed signals" from certain Allies regarding Partners' 
potential role in NRF operations.  He explained NATO 
welcomes partners, but does not want to place the NRF in 
a position of having to rely on them.  He noted that in 
joining the NRF now, Finland would be "jumping on a 
moving train," but urged the GOF to nevertheless make a 
positive statement of commitment soon.  NATO is moving 
toward rethinking the NRF's size, structure and uses, 
with an eye toward "deploying in pieces" -- something 
that should actually suit quite well the role Partners 
like Finland are looking to play.  Kanerva, Volanen and 
Sierla welcomed this information, noting that the "mixed 
signals" had fueled the anti-NRF arguments of Finnish 
NATO skeptics within the government, but that Volker's 
clarifications would help them move the issue forward. 
 
Finland's 2008 OSCE Chairmanship 
-------------------------------- 
¶7. (C) Volker discussed a range of OSCE issues with 
Kanerva and separately with Aleksi Harkonen, Director of 
the MFA's OSCE Task Force. 
 
-- Kazak Chairmanship: Harkonen said that the GOF has 
no national position yet; however, Finland is 
leaning toward a "sympathetic view" of the GOK's 
2009 bid because it does not want the issue to 
polarize the OSCE.  Volker pushed back, noting that 
Kazakhstan had a clear set of standards to meet but 
has instead moved in the wrong direction, and that 
the US strongly favors the Greece-Lithuania- 
Kazakhstan 2009-2010-2011 "package" approach. 
Germany now appears prepared to support this, and 
Volker urged the Finns, upon assuming the chair, to 
do so as well.  Kanerva said that this three-country 
package "won't be enough for those who are promoting 
Kazakhstan," prompting Volker to suggest that Finland 
and the Western democracies may need to think 
creatively about what they can achieve in a "non- 
consensus" environment. 
-- CFE: Volker said that Russia is going down the wrong 
road on the CFE and abusing the OSCE's "consensus" 
mechanisms to force an "adapted treaty." The OSCE 
must not reward this behavior by producing a 
compromise that is undesirable to Western 
democracies but "acceptable to Moscow" simply for 
the sake of consensus.  Harkonen acknowledged 
Volker's point, but noted that hammering out 
something more suitable will be difficult, 
especially for countries like Finland that are not 
members of the CFE. 
-- Missile Defense: Harkonen noted that Finland 
supported "discussions" of MD at the OSCE, so long 
as "decisions are made elsewhere."  Volker agreed, 
but urged vigilance given Russia's penchant for 
simply seeking new venues to "sow discord." 
-- Election Monitoring: Volker and Harkonen agreed that 
Russia will never be happy with an ODHIR that meets 
the western democracies' expectations, but that such 
an ODHIR must be "protected."  It remains one of the 
most important and valuable OSCE activities, and a 
strong OHDIR keeps the OSCE relevant. 
-- Funding: Volker assured Harkonen that the US would 
pay its assessed contribution on time and in full. 
Harkonen agreed on the need to maintain assessment 
current scales. 
-- Finnish OSCE Priorities will include safety and 
security of maritime inland waterways, TIP, law 
enforcement cooperation, and other issues that "glue 
OSCE member states together."  Volker encouraged the 
Finns to take a pro-active interest in Central Asian 
states, a region that could benefit greatly from 
OSCE outreach.  He expressed strong support for OSCE 
border training missions in Afghanistan/ Tajikistan. 
 
Russia 
------ 
¶8. (C) Director General for Russia Kirsti Eskelinen said 
that, for obvious geographic and historical reasons, 
Finnish-Russian relations are far deeper than any other 
EU member state's relationship.  This "strategic 
partnership" is a key to how Finland operates in other 
fora such as the OSCE or the EU, and explains the 
emphasis Finland has placed on issues such as a new 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) or Russia's 
participation in the EU-Russia "four common spaces" 
initiatives.  Despite Russia's current "international 
posturing," the GOF does feel that Russia is making 
progress on "day-to-day issues" that are of importance 
to Finland, the US and the EU. 
 
¶9. (C) Volker accepted Eskelinen's points, but noted 
that they do not change the "long list of really 
troubling" developments we have seen in Russia.  Moscow 
is in a period of clear "overexuberance," which the EU 
has confronted with neither unity nor a strategic view 
aimed at protecting its own interests, particularly on 
energy security.  Volker said that Russia appears 
interested in creating a "superpower" conflict -- which 
is something the US has no interest in.  The response is 
for the US and Europe to focus on finding ways to 
convince Moscow to engage constructively on real world 
issues like Kosovo, Iran, the Middle East, and 
Afghanistan.  Eskelinen agreed, noting that the framework 
of EU-Russian relations seeks areas for cooperation, but 
that Moscow must do its part to make the relationship 
work. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶10. (C) Finland is currently engaged in several crucial 
domestic foreign policy debates aimed at clarifying its 
future roles in Kosovo, Afghanistan, the EU and the 
OSCE, and vis--vis NATO and the NRF.  Volker's visit 
came at a crucial time and he was able to weigh in 
directly and deliver a clear message regarding the 
direction the US would like to see some of those debates 
go.  On Kosovo, the decision to re-assume a Framework 
Nation role and increase the troop presence is a very 
welcome development, and clearly a "deliverable" the 
Finns felt they could offer.  They are also making 
definite progress toward a larger role in Afghanistan, 
although this process will continue to need our careful 
shepherding (see septel).  Likewise on NRF 
participation: the right ministers have all the right 
instincts, but we will need to continue our proactive 
engagement to encourage a Finnish commitment and help 
them respond to the NATO skeptics.  As for OSCE, the 
Finns are clearly leaning toward nuanced chairmanship, 
one in which they may be inclined, for the sake of unity 
within the organization, to bow to some member states' 
heavy-handed tactics or demands. 
HYATT