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Viewing cable 07HELSINKI715, FINLAND LOOKS TO AFGHAN PRT LEADERSHIP IN 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07HELSINKI715 2007-09-18 13:29 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXYZ0028
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0715/01 2611329
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 181329Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3758
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0058
C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000715 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2017 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR EAID PGOV AF FI
SUBJECT: FINLAND LOOKS TO AFGHAN PRT LEADERSHIP IN 2009 
 
Classified By: POLCHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign Minister Ilkka Kanerva and other 
senior GOF officials told PDAS Volker and Ambassador Ware 
that Finland's Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security 
Policy (UTVA) gave a green light to PRT leadership in 
Afghanistan in 2009.  The move will likely involve 
"alternating" leadership at Mazar-al-Sharif with Sweden; 
will require an additional 50-60 Finnish troops, which 
should be deployed in late CY 2008; and comes as part of 
what Kanerva called a coordinated "Nordic crisis 
management approach" in Afghanistan.  Kanerva and others 
also said that Finland will offer an OMLT and additional 
humanitarian assistance.  As of PDAS Volker's visit, the 
UTVA did not approve additional development assistance; 
not surprisingly, it rejected a lethal weapons donation 
to Afghan security forces.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On Sept. 15, the GOF's Cabinet Committee on 
Foreign and Security Policy (UTVA) held discussions that 
appear likely -- from early signals -- to result in 
increased Finnish participation in Afghanistan.  Earlier 
in the week, the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs 
and Interior had submitted to the UTVA a wide-ranging 
report that examined the current security situation in 
Afghanistan and presented a range of possible ways in 
which Finland could increase its civilian and military 
crisis management presence there (see reftels).  The 
UTVA is made up of the Prime Minister and the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, Finance, Labor, 
and Development.  It is chaired by President Halonen, 
and its consensus decisions on foreign policy and 
security become the basis of all national security 
policy. 
 
Moving Toward "Yes" on OMLTs, a PRT and Humanitarian Aid 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
3. (C) The UTVA meeting coincided with PDAS Kurt 
Volker's Sept. 13-15 visit to Finland, and senior MFA 
and MOD officials who participated in its deliberations 
briefed he and Ambassador Ware on what was decided and 
what next steps might include.  Foreign Minister Ilkka 
Kanerva said that he was very pleased with the direction 
the talks took.  A staunch proponent of greater Finnish 
contributions to NATO/ISAF, Kanerva reported that the 
UTVA had generally reached consensus on PRT leadership, 
an OMLT, and more humanitarian assistance.  Regarding 
the PRT, Finland will begin negotiating with Sweden to 
take the lead at Mazar-al-Sharif, beginning in 2009. 
Thereafter, the GOF's plan involves Finland and Sweden 
"rotating" leadership of that PRT on a regular basis 
(details TBD).  According to senior MOD sources, PRT 
leadership would require Finland to increase its 100- 
troop presence to 150 or 160 -- a process that could 
begin as early as the last quarter of CY2008 (if 
military plans and political processes proceed according 
to plan). 
 
4. (C) Kanerva and others said the GOF also hopes to 
work with Sweden and Norway to introduce a "Nordic 
approach" to PRT operation in Afghanistan; from 
Finland's point of view, this would involve an effort to 
help Norway and Sweden adopt aspects of the GOF's PRT 
model, which has won praise from ISAF for the way it 
integrates civilian crisis management and development 
experts directly into the PRT's military structures.  In 
addition, Kanerva noted, the concept of a "Nordic PRT 
approach" has become a key to selling troop and other 
increases to Finnish public opinion and, more 
importantly, to skeptics within the UTVA.  Volker and 
Ambassador Ware thanked Kanerva for his efforts to press 
for these increases, and commended him for finding 
creative ways to convince the Finnish public of the 
importance of doing more.  Kanerva was also pleased to 
report that the UTVA tentatively approved an increase in 
Finnish humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, as well 
as a proposal for the GOF to begin offering training to 
Afghan security forces through an (OMLT). 
 
At Present, "No" on Lethal Weapons and "Perhaps" on 
Development Aid 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
5. (C) As expected, the UTVA unanimously rejected 
long-standing requests from the Afghan and US 
governments for lethal weapons to be donated to Afghan 
security forces.  Although the Defense Minister 
reportedly argued in favor of the donation, he and 
Kanerva dropped their demands in order to gain consensus 
on PRT leadership and humanitarian assistance.  At the 
time of the Volker meeting there was not full consensus 
on increasing development assistance.  Opposition came 
from a group within the Center Party and its Development 
Minister, Paavo Vayrynen.  On September 17, Markus Lyra, 
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, told 
Ambassador Ware that Pertti Torstila, Secretary of State 
at the Foreign Ministry, will be working to gain 
Vayrynen's support over the next month.  President 
Halonen is expected to be amenable to an increase. 
 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
6. (C) Kanerva described next steps as follows:  First, 
the MFA will draw together a detailed analysis of the 
resources necessary to take PRT leadership in 2009; to 
increase Finland's troop commitment by 50-60%; to staff 
an OMLT; and to bump up Finland's humanitiarian aid 
donations.  Within eight weeks, this will be combined 
into a single package and presented for final government 
approval, after which it will go to Parliament for 
discussion.  Kanerva and others were hopeful that 
Parliament could wrap up its scrutiny of the proposal in 
4-5 weeks, and that the policy could then move forward 
by year's end. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
7. (C) The initial signals coming out of the UTVA's 
discussion are quite positive.  Those within the GOF who 
support Finland's doing more as regards NATO/ISAF were 
clearly pleased with what they viewed as a green light 
on PRT leadership and the troop increases that will 
require.  As one participant in the deliberations 
quipped, "We didn't get everything we wanted, but we did 
better than we thought we would."  That said, Kanerva 
and other officials have been quick to note that a tough 
political discussion within the GOF on Afghanistan 
policy still looms.  "Security policy will dominate the 
fall political discussion," Kanerva told Volker and 
Ambassador Ware, adding that there are still 
"divergences of political opinion even within the 
government."  In any case, we are cautiously optimistic 
that the outcome will be positive, especially in terms 
of PRT leadership. 
 
8. (U) PDAS Volker has cleared this cable. 
WARE