Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden 00. Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Jordan Yemen Thailand

Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05 2011/06 2011/07 2011/08

Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07HELSINKI710, FINNLAND SUPPORTS EU BORDER MISSION FOR LEBANON

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07HELSINKI710.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07HELSINKI710 2007-09-17 13:10 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki 
VZCZCXRO9328
RR RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHHE #0710 2601310
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 171310Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3755
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0097
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0061
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0648
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0080
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000710 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA/MATTHEW IRWIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY IS LE EUN FI
SUBJECT: FINNLAND SUPPORTS EU BORDER MISSION FOR LEBANON 
 
REF: SECSTATE 128335 
 
Classified By: POLCHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) PolChief delivered subject demarche to Mika-Markus 
Leinonen, Office Director of the Finnish MFA's Unit for 
Civilian Crisis Management, Sept. 17.  Leinonen welcomed 
the fact that the US supports a joint EU-Arab border 
mission for Lebanon and noted that the Finnish Government 
is very supportive of the concept.  He reported that many 
EU member states joined Finland in expressing support at 
the Sept. 14 PCS, but added that "many unanswered 
questions" remain (i.e., scope; size; security parameters 
and mandate; civilian vs. military emphasis; Arab country 
participation, etc.).  Consensus is building for an EU 
fact-finding mission to the region which, like the mission 
itself, the Finns support. 
 
2. (C) Leinonen noted that at this time he could not 
reasonably comment on what type of contribution Finland 
might make to such a mission.  He opined that the long- 
scheduled drawdown of a 240-troop engineering battalion at 
the end of this year could, theoretically, free up some 
resources.  In addition, there would be fairly good 
domestic political support for a small civilian monitoring 
or training contribution.  However, Leinonen added that 
civilian border monitors, in particular, are a "very scarce 
commodity" in Finland and throughout the EU.  He also 
acknowledged PolChief's arguments regarding the need to 
minimize engagement with Syria, but suggested that to a 
certain extent the mission's success would depend on at 
least some communication with Damascus. 
WARE