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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0689/01 2501324
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071324Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3730
INFO RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 4186
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0949

UNCLAS HELSINKI 000689 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/MELISSA BUCK AND EUR/NB KEITH ANDERTON 
AND KATIE GARRY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: FI PREL PGOV MARR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: PDAS VOLKER'S SEPT. 13-15 VISIT TO 
HELSINKI 
 
REF: A. HELSINKI 416 
     ¶B. HELSINKI 639 
     ¶C. HELSINKI 682 
 
SUMMARY / INTRODUCTION 
---------------------- 
¶1. (SBU): The Embassy warmly welcomes you to Helsinki and 
views your visit as a key opportunity to advance the most 
important issues on the US-Finland agenda.  Afghanistan 
and NATO top the list, as both are the subject of intense 
domestic political discussion right now.  Many in the new 
government are eager for Finland to increase aid and 
troop commitments to NATO/ISAF, but they face a tough 
political battle with the opposition and with NATO 
skeptics within their own governing coalition.  A similar 
debate surrounds a pending decision on joining the NRF. 
Your public and private messages can help tip the 
Afghanistan and NRF arguments in a positive direction. 
Your official meetings offer opportunities to bolster our 
already strong collaboration on Kosovo and, perhaps, to 
chart a more dynamic course on Russia, democracy in the 
Near Neighborhood, and Finland's 2008 OSCE Presidency. 
On the public diplomacy side, NATO and Afghanistan will 
again be key, and we also stand to make some headway with 
strong messages on climate change, missile defense and 
the Middle East.  "Watch-out fors" include lethal weapons 
for Afghanistan, which has become politically very 
difficult here, and insistent requests by the Finns for 
POTUS and SecState meetings.  END SUMMARY. 
 
AFGHANISTAN 
----------- 
¶2. (SBU) Finland's solid contributions to NATO/ISAF and 
to Afghan reconstruction will continue; our challenge now 
is finding ways to help the GOF do more.  Afghanistan 
will receive $12 million in annual assistance for at 
least the next six years, and the GOF is finalizing the 
transfer of most if its 104 peacekeepers from a 
Norwegian-led PRT in Meymaneh to the Swedish-led PRT at 
Mazar-al-Sharif.  We hope to see Finland increase its 
troop commitments, with a view toward taking leadership 
of the Mazar PRT in 2009.  The Finns embed a small, 
highly effective civilian liaison team at Meymenah that 
targets development projects to support the PRT and which 
has won kudos from US commanders in Afghanistan for its 
effectiveness in building local community support for the 
PRT's efforts.  Taking leadership at Mazar in 2009 would 
allow Finland to implement that model there. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Domestically, Afghanistan is the subject of an 
intense political debate right now.  At the time of your 
visit, the government will be finalizing a major report 
that examines all aspects of the security situation and 
makes recommendations on how/if Finland's role there 
should expand (Reftels A and B).  The MOD and MFA would 
like to see increased troop contributions to NATO/ISAF, 
PRT leadership in 2009, and more development and 
counternarcotics assistance.  Conservative Party members 
of government -- led by FM Ilkka Kanerva and MOD Jyri 
Hakamies -- support these recommendations, but are 
running into increasingly vocal opposition not only from 
outside government, but also from the NATO nay-sayers 
within the governing coalition (in particular the Center 
Party).  We intend to include some of these skeptics in 
the events on your schedule; your public and private 
comments to them indicating the value the US attaches to 
Finland's current contributions; how impressed we are 
with Finland's PRT-CMO coordination model; and the 
importance to Washington of what Finland is doing in 
Afghanistan will be extremely timely and can help 
influence the autumn debate in a positive direction. 
 
"WATCH OUT FOR" NO. 1: LETHAL WEAPONS TO AFGHANISTAN 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶4. (SBU) Washington and Kabul have long hoped that 
Finland would make a lethal weapons donation to support 
the Afghan security forces.  However, this issue has 
become political poison here and threatens to derail our 
efforts to get Finland to do more in Afghanistan. 
President Halonen adamantly rejects the idea, and PM 
Vanhanen is clearly uncomfortable with it.  Even 
Conservatives like Hakamies, who personally support a 
donation, have backed away, recognizing that pressing too 
hard could cause Halonen (and probably even Vanhanen) to 
veto their efforts to have Finland do more in Afghanistan 
in other areas.  At this juncture, we should avoid 
pressing the Finns for a lethal donation that could 
 
derail our efforts to achieve other important goals such 
as more troops, more aid, and PRT leadership. 
 
NATO AND THE NRF 
---------------- 
¶5. (SBU) Finland has EU Battlegroup commitments through 
mid-2008, but the MOD and MFA see Finnish participation 
in the NRF as a good complement to the Battlegroups -- a 
view we have actively supported.  Conservatives in 
government would like nothing better than to join Sweden 
in formally announcing that Finland will join the NRF at 
NATO's Global Force Generation conference in November, in 
hopes of standing up troops for the Danish-led NRF in 
¶2010.  Unfortunately, the die-hard NATO naysayers in 
government (Center Party) and in opposition (about half 
the Social Democrats and some smaller parties) who 
adamantly oppose Finland's joining NATO have now begun 
alleging that the NRF is simply a 'slippery slope' to 
NATO membership.  Their argument is of course specious, 
and messages you deliver that (1) point to how the NRF 
can complement EU Battle Group participation and (2) 
clarify that NATO membership and NRF participation are 
entirely separate decisions will help keep this debate 
fact-based. 
 
KOSOVO 
------ 
¶6. (SBU) Kosovo is one of Finland's highest foreign 
policy priorities.  The GOF has been one of our 
staunchest allies and has worked hard behind the scenes 
to ensure EU unity in support of Ahtisaari's final 
status.  Finland has more than 400 troops on the ground, 
provides extensive aid, and is actively engaged in the 
CFSP Planning Mission.  The GOF is quietly becoming 
concerned that the lack of a way forward may begin to 
undermine international efforts and will not support 
delays beyond the current Troika-led negotiating period 
(Reftel C).  The GOF has not made a national decision as 
to how it will react at the end of the current 
negotiating period if Kosovo unilaterally declares 
independence, and is adamant about not publicly 
discussing any kind of Plan B.  That said, officials 
will welcome an exchange of views on this and will be 
open to Washington's latest thinking. 
 
RUSSIA, DEMOCRACY AND THE NEAR NEIGHBORHOOD 
------------------------------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) The general views of the USG and the GOF are in 
close harmony when it comes to support for democracy, 
civil society and human rights in Russia and Europe's new 
neighborhood.  Finland is already engaged in some 
activities that complement US Freedom Agenda goals, 
including support to environmental NGOs in Russia; 
educational exchanges in Russia and Belarus; and funding 
for the International Humanities University for 
Belarusian exiles in Vilnius.  GOF leaders have hosted 
high-level meetings with Belarusian opposition leaders, 
with Serb moderates, and with pro-democracy forces in 
Ukraine and the Caucuses.  The Estonian Bronze Statue 
crisis also emboldened the GOF to move away from the 
traditional Finnish propensity to acquiesce to Russia on 
tough issues.  Indeed, under the new government the GOF 
has begun publicly to challenge Moscow's policies and 
actions in ways the previous government eschewed.  The 
GOF is recognizing the need to speak out on heavy-handed 
Russian trade practices -- especially on energy issues 
and timber tariffs which directly affect Finland.  Most 
recently, MOD Hakamies used his Sept. 5-7 visit to 
Washington to identify Russia as Finland's single most 
important security challenge. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Many Finns, however, are not yet fully 
comfortable with challenging Russia, and there is 
lingering reticence about taking too high profile a role 
in pressing for greater democracy elsewhere.  You can 
nudge interlocutors in the right direction by expressing 
appreciation for what Finland (and certain Finns, like 
Ahtisaari and EU Commissioner Olli Rehn) have done in 
these areas; by encouraging greater US-EU and US-Finland 
coordination in dealing with Russia; by encouraging Finns 
to play an even more active role in showing public 
support for pro-democracy leaders; and by urging high- 
level Finnish visits to countries where they can reach 
out to democratic forces -- with Belarus, Ukraine and the 
Balkans being perhaps the best fits in this regard. 
 
FINLAND'S 2008 OSCE PRESIDENCY 
 
 
------------------------------ 
¶9. (SBU) Finland's agenda for its Presidency has some 
positive elements, as well as others that are of less 
interest.  In the latter category, for example, Finland's 
announced focus on European inland waterway issues is 
less than stirring from a US perspective; however, by 
emphasizing our priorities we can encourage more 
leadership in other areas.  One option is democracy. 
Finns can be counted on to focus heavily on the good work 
the OSCE does with election monitoring and institution 
building, although the GOF will need active support from 
us and other like-minded countries in countering the 
efforts of certain OSCE members to weaken the 
Organization in these areas.  On a particularly positive 
note, the Finns have told us that they intend to use 
their Presidency as a springboard to become more involved 
in promoting democracy and freedom within many member 
states -- an initiative that, with the right 
encouragement, could have a very positive impact on our 
Freedom Agenda priorities (see above). 
 
"WATCH OUT FOR" NO. 2: HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS 
------------------------------------------ 
¶10. (SBU) The Finns will use their OSCE Presidency (as 
well as other issues) to press for S-Kanerva and POTUS- 
Halonen meetings.  While the S-Kanerva meeting in June 
was very successful for both sides, you will want to be 
prepared to urge the Finns to be realistic about how 
difficult it is to schedule these high level visits. 
 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
---------------- 
¶11. (SBU) We have programmed a heavy dose of PD into your 
schedule, including an on-the-record speech (Topic: 
"Finland, NATO and Afghanistan"), a "background" lunch 
roundtable with leading editors and columnists, and an 
on-the-record session with the electronic media and print 
journalists.  As noted above, your messages on NATO/ISAF 
and the value the US places on Finland's doing more in 
Afghanistan are the most timely and topical at this 
moment.  In addition, there will be strong interest in 
the Administration's newest efforts to confront climate 
change; in terrorism and other security-related issues; 
and in your general assessments of the trans-Atlantic 
relationship, NATO/EU cooperation; the US role in the 
Middle East Peace Process and, to a lesser extent, Iraq; 
and the current policy environment in Washington.  All 
your PD events offer a good opportunity to present the 
facts surrounding Missile Defense, and the Finns will be 
particularly interested in whatever you can share 
regarding US efforts to create a dialogue with Russia. 
HYATT