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C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000682 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN
SUBJECT: FINNISH RESPONSE: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF 
THE SEPTEMBER 7-8 INFORMAL FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING 
(GYMNICH) 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 123576 
 
     ¶B. HELSINKI 675 
 
Classified By: HEATHER PISHKO FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
Subject:  Finnish Views on September GYMNICH 
 
¶1. (U) PolChief delivered subject demarche to Finnish 
CFSP Director and European Correspondent Leena-Kaisa 
Mikkola Sept. 5.  Mikkola offered the following: 
 
FINNISH GYMNICH PRIORITIES: IRAQ AND RUSSIA PCA 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶2. (SBU) From the Finnish national perspective, FM Ilkka 
Kanerva will likely raise two issues during his GYMNICH 
intervention.  First, he will highlight the importance 
of seeking to conclude a new EU-Russia Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement, which has been stalled since the 
end of the Finland's Presidency.  The Finns are 
realistic about the fact that ongoing bilateral disputes 
between Russia and several of the new MS may prevent the 
adoption of a new PCA during the Portuguese Presidency - 
- and about the fact that Portugal has not placed the 
issue high on its Presidency agenda.  However, the new 
agreement has important impacts on Finland's bilateral 
relationship with Russia, and the GOF still believes 
that attempts to move it forward must be a priority for 
the EU-Russia Summit. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Second, Kanerva will likely give his colleagues 
a brief readout on the Sept. 1-4 peace-building seminar 
that a leading Finnish NGO, the Crisis Management 
Institute (CMI), hosted for leading Iraqi Sunni and 
Shiite civil society leaders (see reftel B). 
 
KOSOVO 
------ 
¶4. (C) On Kosovo, the GOF fully agrees on the importance 
of EU-US unity in support of the Troika's final attempt 
to see Serbs and Kosovars bridge their differences over 
final status.  Meanwhile, Mikkola noted, a generalized 
concern is emerging within the EU that the CFSP Planning 
Mission in Kosovo could begin running into funding 
problems if the final status question remains 
unresolved.  Moreover, Finnish participants in that 
mission are reporting some morale problems among EU 
planners, due to the lack of a clear path forward. 
 
¶5. (C) When pressed about how Finland and other Member 
States might respond if, ultimately, Kosovo declares 
independence unilaterally, Mikkola emphasized that the 
GOF has not made a national decision on this issue yet 
and will not do so before the end of the current time- 
limited negotiating period.  However, she opined 
unofficially that Great Britain, France and Germany 
would likely recognize Kosovo in the event of a 
unilateral declaration of independence, and that she 
"could not imagine Finland staying outside that group." 
However, she emphasized that the GYMNICH would be 
extremely unlikely to produce any public statements 
regarding beyond support for Troika-sponsored 
discussions -- and "certainly no public comments 
regarding a Plan B." 
HYATT