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PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3078/01 2551126
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121126Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3350
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME PRIORITY 0001

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 BAGHDAD 003078 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: UN EAID PREF PHUM PREL ECON IZ
SUBJECT: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN IRAQ 
 
REF: A. (A) BAGHDAD 2317 (B) BAGHDAD 2318 
     ¶B. (C) BAGHDAD 2736 (D) BAGHDAD 2737 
 
BAGHDAD 00003078  001.2 OF 007 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: At 2.2 million internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), Iraq now ranks third in the world among 
countries with IDP populations, behind only Sudan and 
Colombia.  Such large-scale displacement in Iraq is producing 
potentially permanent social and religious segregation. 
Coordination remains weak among national and provincial 
institutions, as does coordination within the international 
humanitarian community; these deficiencies currently result 
in ad hoc responses to both ongoing IDP needs and to 
emergencies, such as the recent truck bombs in Ninewa 
province.  The rate of displacement between February 2006 and 
June 2007 is higher than it was in the 2003-2005 period.  A 
portion of this increase is attributable to improved 
registration in some areas but, in other areas, serious 
barriers to registration persist, and thus many displaced 
persons may not have yet registered.  In what appears to be a 
sign that Iraqi,s institutions cannot keep up with the 
overwhelming demands placed upon them by continuing 
displacement, the Baghdad Provincial Council has announced 
that it will stop accepting IDP registrations as of September 
20 for most applicants.  Baghdad is the place of origin of an 
estimated 69 percent of IDPs displaced since the bombing of 
the Al-Askari shrine in Samarra in February 2006. 
USAID/DCHA/OFDA recommends a continued strategy of assisting 
IDPs in place, with a focus on livelihoods, host community 
support, and working with the Ministry of Displacement and 
Migration (MODM) to continue IDP registration in all 
locations.  In addition, the USG should work with the UN to 
move the newly appointed UN Humanitarian Coordinator,s base 
to Baghdad from Amman, and to explore further GOI capacity 
building needs at both national and provincial levels, 
specifically to improve MODM,s ability to assist IDPs and to 
respond to emergencies in general. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Most of Iraq,s displaced 
currently live in rented housing or with host families.  The 
current trend in net increases of IDP numbers is likely to 
continue, and the absorptive capacity of host communities 
will depend on the length of conflict and the levels of 
security.  The top three most frequently reported needs in 
both 2006 and 2007 are food, shelter, and employment.  Nearly 
half of IDPs do not have access to the Public Distribution 
System (PDS) food baskets.  Ongoing assistance programs 
geared toward IDPs in Iraq are limited to a handful of Iraqi 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); most international NGOs 
and most UN agencies are based in Jordan, not Iraq.  The UN 
operates some programs through national NGOs as well, but 
UNHCR, which has a lead agency role for IDPs on a global 
level, sees its role for IDPs in Iraq as limited to 
protection, camp management, and emergency shelter.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Defining the Scope of the Problem 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Iraq has struggled with the problem of displacement 
of families and communities for the past four decades, but 
the current level of 2.2 million Iraqis officially internally 
displaced, combined with an estimated 1.8 million Iraqi 
refugees in neighboring countries, levels of displacement are 
unprecedented and affect all governorates.  Iraq now ranks 
third in the world in terms of countries with internally 
displaced person (IDP) populations, behind only Sudan and 
Colombia, having this year surpassed the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda. 
 
¶4. (U) Most governorates are both receiving and generating 
IDPs, while the three northern governorates (Erbil, Dohuk, 
and Sulaymaniyah) mainly receive rather than generate IDPs. 
UN figures, drawn from GOI registration information, indicate 
that the increase from mid-May 2007 to end of June is double 
the average increase ) approximately 190,000 people 
displaced in one and a half months, versus the previous 
average increase of just above 60,000 individuals per month. 
However, per the UN cluster responsible for IDP data, this 
increase is attributable to a combination of factors, 
including increased capacity of the Ministry of Displacement 
and Migration (MODM) to register IDPs; improved transfer of 
data from the governorates to the central office in Baghdad; 
enhanced access (in the case of Baghdad) by IDPs to local 
MODM offices; some new displacement caused by inter-communal 
violence and military operations; and improved security in 
various areas to which IDPs may feel safer relocating because 
it is linked to their own tribal, sectarian or ethnic 
affiliation.  Those areas where increased data entry (versus 
actual new displacement) plays a role are Baghdad, the south, 
and the north.  Anbar is the only governorate where the 
 
BAGHDAD 00003078  002.2 OF 007 
 
 
provincial government registered the return of 2000 displaced 
families during the first half of 2007 to neighborhoods in 
Ramadi where military operations had ceased. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The figures tell only part of the story.  Such 
large-scale displacement in Iraq is producing potentially 
permanent social and religious segregation, which in turn may 
engender long-term political consequences for the country. 
The size and pace of displacement may exhaust the absorptive 
capacity of host communities, which will increase Iraqi 
dependence on external assistance.  Iraqi officials in some 
areas have responded to ongoing displacement by blocking new 
IDP registration, and nearly half of IDPs do not have access 
to the Public Distribution System (PDS).  Lack of strong 
national and provincial coordination mechanisms has, among 
other things, led to short-term solutions for assistance that 
may prove unsustainable over the long run and may detract 
from the ability to devise a broader strategy. 
 
-------------- 
Who is an IDP? 
-------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) Iraq,s population includes people displaced under 
diverse circumstances at different times, and who thus 
possess varying levels of coping mechanisms and needs.  As 
one example, USAID/OFDA met on August 16 with the Dohuk IDP 
Coordinator for the province.  In his estimation, the various 
waves of displacement since 1975 have cumulatively led to a 
situation in which 800,000 of Dohuk,s 900,000 people could 
be characterized as displaced.  Various events contributed to 
this large-scale displacement, including the 
 de-villagisation, campaign; the Anfal campaign; the 
 Arabization, campaign; fighting during the mid-nineties 
between the two Kurdish parties, and between the PKK and the 
Turkish military; Kurds expelled to Iran in the 1970s and now 
returning with no homes; Iraqis who fled 
government-controlled territory under Saddam; Iraqis who fled 
the early stages of the war in 2003 and the ongoing fighting 
between MNF-I and insurgents; and the post-February 2006 
surge in displacement. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Another example of the diversity of Iraq,s 
displaced is that of the Kurdish Herki tribe in Ninewa, who 
collaborated with the Saddam regime in the struggles against 
the Barzani and Talibani Kurds in the 1980-1990s and who were 
settled in poor conditions in military forts in Bartallah, 
Ninewa.  With the fall of Saddam, thousands more Herki from 
across northern Iraq fled to Bartallah and settled in several 
more of the military forts, living in similarly squalid 
conditions, where food, water, and health services continue 
to be scarce.  Some 300 families now reside in each of five 
forts, with thousands of other Herki living in tents and 
other primitive structures nearby. The Mosul PRT is currently 
seeking a durable solution for this group. 
 
¶8.  (U) The current levels of displacement country-wide are 
due largely to sectarian violence in the wake of the bombing 
of the Al-Askari shrine in Samarra in February 2006.  In its 
 2007 Mid-Year Review,, the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) depicts Samarra as a turning point that 
triggered the targeting of religious and ethnic identities 
and movement of IDPs from &religious and ethnically mixed 
communities to homogenous ones.8  (REFs (A) and (B).) 
Drawing from figures kept by the Ministry of Displacement and 
Migration (MODM), IOM states that whereas approximately 
400,000 Iraqis were displaced between 2003 and 2005 as a 
result of military operations, crime, and general insecurity, 
the period of February 2006 through June 2007 saw 
approximately 1.1 million Iraqis displaced.  This massive 
increase in displacement occurred primarily due to sectarian 
violence, though general lawlessness and, to a lesser extent, 
military operations, also played a role.  This analysis, as 
well as a good deal of what is known of current displacement, 
is based on a system of elaborate, continuous surveys and 
needs assessments conducted so far in 15 governorates by 
various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
consolidated by IOM to complement the registration work 
conducted by MODM.  The USG funds the surveys and the overall 
consolidation and analysis. 
 
¶8.  (U) IOM also reports that while IDPs are predominantly 
Arab, minorities are increasingly targeted.   The current IDP 
breakdown in Iraq, by ethnicity, includes Arabs (93 percent); 
Assyrians (four percent); Kurds (one percent); Turkmen (one 
percent); and others (one percent).  Moreover, the proportion 
of each sect or group displaced in the first half of 2007 
roughly matches its proportion of the overall population of 
Iraq:  Shia Muslim (64 percent); Sunni Muslim (32 percent); 
Christian (four percent); Yazidi (0.01 percent); Sabean 
Mandean (0.002 percent). 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00003078  003.2 OF 007 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Baghdad ) Different Sources, Different Numbers 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶9. (SBU ) Although Baghdad province contains only about 25 
percent of Iraq,s total population, about 69 percent of 
Iraqi IDPs displaced since February 2006 originated in 
Baghdad, according to IOM data .    The post-February 2006 
displaced from Baghdad numbered approximately 24,376 families 
(146,256 individuals) by May 10, and rose to 30,000 families 
(180,000 individuals) on July 16, according to IOM reports 
for Baghdad, which are based on MoDM estimates from the 
Ministry,s central office.  NGO figures compiled separately 
from IOM,s data support the IOM statistics.  These figures 
are substantially lower than the number of IDPs registered 
with  the Baghdad Provincial Council and the MoDM Baghdad 
branch offices, both of which are involved in registering 
IDPs in Baghdad province. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Statistics gathered from the Provincial Council 
(PC) and the MoDM Baghdad branch offices indicate much higher 
levels of displacement over the past four months.  The 
Baghdad Provincial Council,s committee for migration and 
displacement said on September 3 that about 70,000 IDP 
families (or about 420,000 individuals) are now registered as 
displaced, up from about 60,000 families at the beginning of 
August 2007; and up from 43,000 families at the beginning of 
May 2007.  The PC said it started registering displaced 
families in February or March 2006. 
 
¶11. (U) IOM says that some of the increase in IDP numbers in 
recent months can be attributed to increased data entry by 
the MoDM and to the opening of a new branch office in the 
Karkh district, which facilitates registration for those 
displaced in or to areas in west Baghdad, particularly Sunni 
IDPs (who were reluctant to register at an office in a 
predominantly Shia area of Rusafa, in the eastern side of 
Baghdad). 
 
¶12.  (SBU) A possible explanation for the large discrepancy 
in IDP numbers provided by IOM and NGOs, on the one hand, and 
by the Baghdad Provincial Council and the MoDM branch 
offices, on the other, is that IOM relies primarily on 
numbers provided by the MoDM central office, which may be 
using outdated data.  In July, for example, the director of 
the MoDM Rusafa branch office said he had not provided 
updated data to the central ministry for six months, and that 
his office had registered about 22,500 additional families 
since the last time he provided the ministry data. 
Furthermore, PC numbers are logically higher than MoDM 
numbers due to a lag in data entry and IDPs dropping out at 
various stages of the registration process.  (See REFs A and 
B.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Displacements in Baghdad Continue at a High Rate 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶13.  (SBU ) Members of the PC committee for displacement and 
migration have also speculated that some of the increase in 
IDP registrations may be attributed to new benefits the GoI 
is considering providing to IDPs, such as a monthly stipend 
of 150,000 Iraqi Dinar (ID) for a period of six months. 
However, IDP registration forms ask the applicant when they 
were displaced, and the directors general of both the Karkh 
and Rusafa branch offices said most applicants over the past 
four months claimed they were newly displaced.  The director 
general of the Karkh branch office, which opened March 29, 
2007, said that over half of the 5,587 families had 
registered since June 1.  When asked if he thought the 
registrations reflected &catch up8 since the office had 
recently opened and provided easier access to those living in 
west Baghdad, he said the office has consistently processed 
about 200 IDP files per day and that most of the 
registrations were newly displaced. 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Baghdad ) Compensation Paid to Some IDPs 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Council of Ministers has said that it will 
allocate money to provide the 70,000 displaced families in 
Baghdad province with a monthly salary of 150,000 Iraqi Dinar 
(ID) for six months.  The PC, the Council of Ministers and 
MoDM are still discussing how and when the money will be 
distributed.  In a separate initiative to encourage displaced 
families to return to their homes, the Baghdad governor,s 
office has disbursed payments of one million ID to 2,400 
families who have returned to their Baghdad homes.   Money 
has been allocated for 5,000 families to receive the one 
million ID payment. 
 
BAGHDAD 00003078  004.2 OF 007 
 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
Baghdad to Halt IDP Registration 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) PC members of the committee for displacement and 
migration  told PRTOff on September 3 that the MODM 
instructed Baghdad,s district and qada councils to stop 
accepting IDP registrations as of September 20, except for 
applicants coming from outside Baghdad and applicants 
displaced from Rashid and Adhamiya.  PRTOff visited Abu 
Ghraib the next day and confirmed with the qada council that 
they had already received the letter telling them that no 
more IDP registrations will be accepted after September 20. 
(Comment:  Post attributes this to the GoI being overwhelmed 
with registrations and looking for a reason to cut them off. 
Both the Provincial Council and the MoDM Rusafa branch office 
stopped accepting IDP registrations in August for a period of 
a couple of weeks in order to give them a chance to catch up 
with their data entry ) which they have still not done, 
despite having the extra time with no new submissions.  End 
comment.) 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Food, Shelter, Employment Needed 
USG Responds Through OFDA, NGOs, and IOs 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (U) Both IOM and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) state in June and July reports that approximately 60 
percent of post-February 2006 IDPs are living in rented 
housing, while an additional 20 percent are doubling up with 
host families or relatives, and the remaining 20 percent 
comprise a mixture of people living in abandoned public 
buildings, former military barracks, or tented camps (one 
percent) scattered around the country.  According to NGO 
surveys, the top three most frequently reported needs in both 
2006 and 2007 are food (74 percent), shelter (73 percent), 
and employment (63 percent), reflecting  a largely urban 
population cut off from homes and sources of income. 
 
¶17. (U) USG assistance to Iraqi IDPs has been administered 
through humanitarian programs implemented by USAID/DCHA/OFDA 
and the Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) 
since 2003.  PRM contributed $37 million to UNHCR,s $123 
million 2007 supplemental appeal for Iraqi refugees in 
neighboring countries, and $18.5 million to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for its $75.5 million 2007 
appeal for conflict victims inside Iraq, some of whom are 
IDPs.  PRM,s total planned funding for FY2007 is $122.4 
million, most of which would go to refugees (as opposed to 
IDPs).  This includes $1,299,000 for MODM capacity building, 
which runs through December 2007. 
 
¶18. (U) Focusing largely on post-February 2006 IDPs, 
USAID/OFDA assists around 500,000 Iraqis, working through 
five non-governmental organization (NGO) and international 
organization (IO) partners to implement a program that spans 
all of Iraq,s 18 governorates and the following sectors: 
health, water and sanitation, relief item distribution, 
shelter, income generation, host community support, and data 
collection and analysis on IDPs conducted by IOM and NGO 
partners.  Some projects are multi-sectoral and a typical 
example would include expanding a school and upgrading its 
water and sanitation facilities to accommodate IDP children, 
while simultaneously providing jobs for IDPs with the work 
involved and supporting the host community through the school 
improvements.  USAID/OFDA,s 2007 budget of $63 million 
includes $18 million in deobligation and reobligation funds, 
as well as $45 million in Supplemental funding.  Of this, $37 
million will be obligated in FY07, with $26 million to be 
allocated through an Annual Program Statement in October of 
FY08.  USAID/OFDA,s Supplemental request for FY08 is $60 
million. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Public Distribution System Not Reaching Enough IDPs 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶19. (U)  According to an April 2007 World Food Program (WFP) 
assessment, 47 percent of IDPs in Iraq do not have access to 
the Public Distribution System (PDS), which has provided food 
baskets to Iraqis since 1995.  Other surveys break this down 
into those with no access and those who report inconsistent 
access, but the overall figures seem to range from 39-47 
percent without access of one kind or another.  IOM reports 
that the inability to access PDS rations is worst in Basra 
(60 percent with no access), Kirkuk (47 percent), and Babylon 
(44 percent).  The most frequently reported obstacle to PDS 
access is insecurity along food transportation routes, which 
prevents food from getting from Baghdad to the governorates, 
and also at times inhibits the movement of food within 
 
BAGHDAD 00003078  005.2 OF 007 
 
 
governorates.  The other major obstacle IDPs face is 
transferring their PDS registration so that they can access 
the food in their new location.  One suggestion that has been 
raised for addressing this problem is to delink the PDS 
registration with voting registration, because the fact that 
they are linked makes some governorates reluctant to register 
IDPs in their areas of displacement.  Another possible, 
albeit temporary, solution is for WFP to assist the GOI with 
delivery and distribution.  According to UNAMI, WFP has 
offered the GOI Ministry of Trade assistance with the PDS, 
but has not received a response. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Ministry Of Displacement and Migration Continues to Struggle 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU)  The June 2007  Forced Migration Review, issued 
by the Refugee Studies Centre states that, regardless of the 
level of resources available, Iraq still &lacks the capacity 
to plan the programming of those resources to address the 
needs of its population.8  This is an aspect of IDP 
management and assistance brought to light by the response to 
the current cholera outbreak in the north of the country and 
the recent truck bombs in Ninewa.  While the current cholera 
outbreak in Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk is affecting more than 
the displaced in those areas, its initial stages demonstrated 
the lack of cohesion both between the national government and 
the provinces, and among different authorities within 
governorates.  This lack of coordination in turn affects the 
ability to mount a timely and adequate response to 
emergencies, including new IDP movements. 
 
¶21.  (SBU) Through PRM funding to IOM, the USG has supported 
capacity building for MODM over the past two years.  These 
efforts do not yet appear to have succeeded in building 
sufficient capacity in MODM to respond either to crises or to 
on-going phenomena, such as displacement.  IOM has worked to 
re-draft the institutional mandate (basic law) of the 
Ministry, and to put together organizational structure, job 
descriptions, and standard operating procedures, yet none of 
these have been finalized by the Ministry.  MODM has 
reportedly submitted for review by the Legal Committee of the 
Council of Ministers a simplified version of the basic law, 
but it has not been passed.  Nor has MODM finalized the 
national policy on IDPs that UNHCR has worked arduously to 
draft with the Ministry.  The draft policy, which is 
underpinned by the UN Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, provides for the establishment of a Strategic 
Guidance Committee (SGC), to include key Ministries, the 
Prime Minister,s office, and the UN, and the establishment 
of a National Coordination Committee on Displacement (NCC), 
which would bring donors and NGOs to the table as well.  So 
far, MODM has held one IDP coordination meeting (on July 9) 
with the UN, NGOs, and donor governments and, though regular 
meetings were promised, has not followed through.  Part of 
the problem may be linked to the fact that the MODM Minister 
(Dr. Abdul Samid Rahman Sultan) is currently leading more 
than one ministry, as he has also been designated the 
Minister of Health. The problem, however, seems to be 
systemic. 
 
¶22.  (SBU) IOM has contracted to the International Medical 
Corps (IMC) to provide technical support and training, and 
MODM,s focus has at times appeared to be limited to data 
management.  Yet a number of problems persist in the 
registration of IDPs, in addition to those mentioned above 
for Baghdad.  (Refs C and D)  These problems range from 
governorates granting residence only to IDPs who can prove 
that they originate from that governorate, to local 
authorities ordering MODM to cease registration in some 
governorates (making IDPs ineligible for assistance), to 
requiring  IDPs to be sponsored by someone who lives in the 
governorate (as in the case of the three northern 
governorates).  An IDP,s ability to register affects his or 
her access to basic services and food. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Other Humanitarian Actors Have Left Iraq 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶23. (SBU) Much of the traditional international humanitarian 
community relocated to Amman, Jordan, following the 2003 
Canal Hotel bombing in Baghdad that killed 22 UN staff 
members.  Their departure has resulted in a situation in 
which the bulk of the humanitarian community operates via 
national staff out of neighboring Jordan, coming and going 
particularly to Erbil and the north.  The geographic divide 
between humanitarian actors based in Amman and those in 
Baghdad makes coordination within even the traditional 
international humanitarian community extremely challenging. 
Three international NGOs continue to operate in Iraq.  As far 
as USAID/OFDA has been able to ascertain at this point, both 
 
BAGHDAD 00003078  006.2 OF 007 
 
 
Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF)-Switzerland and Qandil, a 
Swedish NGO, have bases in Dohuk (MSF is operating out of the 
Dohuk hospital), while MSF-France is in Sulaymaniyah. 
International NGOs do not appear to have remained in Baghdad. 
 
¶24.  (SBU) The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) has a total of 60 expatriate delegates working on Iraq 
in the region.  Of that total, 13 are permanently based 
inside Iraq in the north (Erbil and Sulaymaniyah).  The rest 
of the expatriate contingent is based in Amman and travels 
into Iraq for periods of time.  ICRC currently has 385 local 
staff in Iraq (this does not include the Iraqi Red Crescent). 
 ICRC offices are in Basra, Najaf, and Baghdad, in addition 
to the two in the north.  ICRC is also establishing offices 
in Trebil on the border with Jordan and in Arabiya on the 
border with Syria.  Its Iraq program currently stands at $75 
million annually, and it issued a budget extension in May for 
an additional $29 million, signaling that the delegation felt 
comfortable in expanding the operation.  ICRC travels in 
unmarked cars and without armed escorts, but is thinking of 
slowly starting to introduce the use of its symbol in the 
north.  The ICRC office in Baghdad was bombed in October 2003 
and this event is still very much in the minds of the 
delegates.  Hence, they are likely to move quite cautiously 
before establishing a permanent presence inside Iraq.  ICRC 
is hoping to do so and has been looking at Basra and Najaf as 
possible entry points, but will not act until the security 
situation is more conducive to such a move. 
 
¶25.  (SBU) There are national NGOs providing humanitarian 
assistance to IDPs, of which the best known is the Iraqi Red 
Crescent Organization (IRCO).  IRCO is the primary 
implementing partner of MODM and appears to have a geographic 
breadth that covers all of Iraq.  Though there are positive 
reports of IRCO distributions of relief items at the 
provincial level, there are concerns from a number of sources 
about both the nature of their activities and their lack of 
accountability with cash contributions.  They have also 
become associated with tented camps as a solution for IDP 
needs, whereas experience has shown that Iraqis are generally 
not comfortable with tents as even temporary accommodation; 
in addition, tents are inappropriate for the extreme weather 
conditions in Iraq during much of the year.  USAID/OFDA 
received a report recently that, in one instance, IRCO was 
not present in a camp it had established and appeared to have 
abandoned it. 
 
¶26.  (SBU) UNHCR is still largely focused on Iraqi refugees, 
despite its global mandate for IDPs in conflict settings that 
resulted from reforms of the humanitarian system undertaken 
as of 2005.  Seemingly at odds with the global agreement 
within the international humanitarian community, UNHCR staff 
on the ground maintain that the agency,s role with relation 
to IDPs in Iraq is limited to &protection, camp management, 
and emergency shelter,8 per a division of labor worked out 
among UN agencies.  Still, UNHCR is the only UN operational 
agency to have placed an expatriate staff member in Baghdad 
for part of 2007, and although it currently has none in 
Baghdad, UNHCR has said it intends to place someone long-term 
as of mid-September.  In addition, as stated above, UNHCR has 
worked closely with MODM to help draft IDP policy.  But when 
pressed as to why UNHCR,s $123 million appeal for Iraq 
appears exclusively geared toward refugee needs in 
neighboring countries and the needs of non-Iraqi refugees in 
Iraq (e.g, Palestinians), with no provisions for IDPs, 
UNHCR,s response is that it can not appeal for what it can 
not implement, and it can not implement in the current level 
of insecurity in Iraq. 
 
¶27. (SBU) The UN,s international ceiling for Iraq is slated 
to move from 65 to 95 international staff members in-country 
(as opposed to Amman).  However, UN staffers have privately 
noted to USAID/OFDA that the bulk of the current staffing 
allowance is absorbed by security and support units such as 
fleet management, and that in reality this includes only two 
international staff from operational agencies in Baghdad ) 
i.e., UNHCR and UNDP ) in addition to a small inter-agency 
team of expatriate staff in Erbil, led by the UNAMI 
representative (an ex-UNHCR staff member) and including UNHCR 
and UNDP.  Staff have expressed fear that the increase will 
not significantly improve the UN,s capacity to handle IDPs. 
Other agencies, such as UNICEF and OCHA, have indicated to 
USAID/OFDA that they strongly prefer to be based in Iraq, but 
they express frustration with what they describe as repeated 
denials by UN security officials of their requests for even 
TDY stints in Baghdad.  David Shearer has been appointed as 
the new Deputy Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General (D/SRSG) and Humanitarian Coordinator.  He 
 
SIPDIS 
comes with strong humanitarian credentials, but is to be 
based in Amman rather than in Baghdad.  (He is slated to 
arrive in Amman on September 12.) 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00003078  007.2 OF 007 
 
 
¶28. (U) The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) 
began an $8.6 million program in May for Iraqi refugees in 
Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.  ECHO is reportedly planning an 
additional $5.4 million, which will be programmed through the 
Iraqi Red Crescent.  (Note:  Some donors are reportedly 
reluctant to contribute to humanitarian needs in Iraq because 
Iraq is perceived as a relatively wealthy country and 
because, in the case of European donors, they see it largely 
as a U.S. problem.  End note.) 
 
------------------------------- 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
------------------------------- 
 
¶29. (U) The current trend in net increases of IDP numbers is 
likely to continue, and the absorptive capacity of host 
communities will depend on the length of the broader conflict 
in Iraq.  NGO surveys indicate that of Iraqis displaced to 
another governorate, only 44 percent express the intention to 
return to their place of origin, while 81 percent of those 
displaced within their own governorate say they intend to 
return to their homes of origin, once security permits. 
Overall, 55 percent of those assessed intend to return to 
their place of origin, 23 percent intend to settle in their 
current location, 19 percent express a desire to resettle in 
a third location, and two percent were undecided.  Given 
these numbers, the most logical and time-tested strategy is 
to assist IDPs in place with humanitarian funding, and plan 
for a return of approximately half of total IDPs with 
longer-term resources. 
 
¶30. (U) Humanitarian resources generally focus on the most 
vulnerable.  Depending on resources, USAID recommends 
bolstering the support currently invested in host 
communities, as this is more sustainable and appropriate than 
camps or permanent new housing.  This support includes 
enhancing host/guest family and neighborhood support services 
to provide needed shelter and basic services (to include both 
non-food items and, for the most vulnerable, food) in a 
manner that would not be perceived as legitimizing the 
"permanent" separation/segregation of groups.  Not only does 
permanent new housing exceed current humanitarian resources, 
but it runs the risk of legitimizing social segregation and 
permanent demarcation of group boundaries.  It is also 
crucial to repair and upgrade existing housing, which can be 
done at a relatively low cost, and can be done both quickly 
and carried out in many areas simultaneously.  Such a measure 
could address and enhance shelter and living conditions for 
all groups in the short term, and delay the need for highly 
contentious permanent housing construction.  In addition, 
micro-credit and micro-finance programming, as well as other 
employment support, should be emphasized.  At the same time, 
USAID and other USG actors should engage in longer-term 
planning for IDP housing and, where possible, reintegration 
or resettlement. 
 
¶31. (SBU) USAID further recommends that the USG: 
 
-- immediately engage with MODM to continue registration in 
Baghdad after September 20, and to remove barriers to 
registration in other provinces; 
-- work with the GOI Ministry of Trade to accept the World 
Food Program,s offer to assist with the Public Distribution 
System; 
-- work with the UN in New York to move the UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator,s base to Baghdad, along with at least one OCHA 
staff; and 
-- explore further GOI capacity-building needs at both 
national and provincial levels for MODM to assist IDPs and 
respond to emergencies in general. 
BUTENIS