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Viewing cable 07ANKARA2266, TURKEY: "ERDOGAN II" GETS PARTY-LINE VOTE OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ANKARA2266 2007-09-05 13:15 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO8619
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHAK #2266 2481315
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051315Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3631
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
UNCLAS ANKARA 002266 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY:  "ERDOGAN II" GETS PARTY-LINE VOTE OF 
CONFIDENCE 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 2223 
 
     B. ANKARA 2235 AND PREVIOUS 
 
1. (U) On September 5, the Turkish parliament gave PM Erdogan 
and his single-party Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
government a vote of confidence.  As was the case with the 
presidential election (ref A), the vote split cleanly along 
party lines, with 337 AKPers voting for their government and 
program, and all opposition parties voting against.  There 
was one abstension.  Parliament will now recess until October 
1. 
 
2. (SBU) After four-plus months of political turmoil, both 
the Turkish government and President are newly installed and 
ready to do business.  Some things remain the same, but much 
has changed -- and not only in the presidency.  Erdogan 
remains Prime Minister, with two-thirds of his cabinet 
unchanged, but his AKP has a new, resounding mandate, and the 
responsibility that goes with it.  The face of parliament has 
changed as well, with some 85 percent of the electorate now 
represented.  In addition to AKP, three opposition party 
groups -- the Republican People's Party (CHP), the 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the pro-Kurdish Democratic 
Society Party (DTP) -- reflect much of the spectrum of 
Turkish society.  Some 13 center-left Democratic Left Party 
(DSP) MPs and a handful of singleton independents round out 
parliament's composition.  All opposition parties, through 
their party-line votes and statements, have handed full 
responsibility to govern to Erdogan's AKP. 
 
3. (SBU) By their very participation in the presidential 
election process, MHP, DSP and DTP have indicated, to 
differing degrees, that they respect the democratic processes 
and may be prepared to conduct themselves as a constructive 
opposition.  For its part, the CHP has so far sulked in its 
corner; if the previous parliament is any measure, the CHP's 
approach to opposition -- as long as Deniz Baykal retains the 
party helm -- will be to say "no" at every turn. 
 
4. (SBU) Potential fault lines are many -- between staunch 
secularists and the government; between nationalists and 
Kurds; among parties vying for primacy as "the opposition"; 
on different issues, ranging from constitutional reform to 
EU-accession related reforms, from counter-terrorism to Iraq 
and beyond.  Civil-military tensions remain as well.  Once 
parliament reconvenes, we will start to get a better sense of 
just how constructive or fractious parliament will be, and on 
what issues.  While AKP has the votes to pass most 
legislation on its own, Erdogan's ability to build at least 
partial consensus -- a goal he articulated in AKP's 
government program -- will be one important hallmark of 
success. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON