VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #2186/01 2691009
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261009Z SEP 07
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6917
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7291
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 8557

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 002186 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: TAIWAN'S UN BID, ARMS PROCUREMENTS 
 
 
¶1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage September 25-26 on the aftermath of a Taipei District 
Court's decision Monday to detain an agent and a former agent of the 
Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau on suspicion of spying for 
China; on the 2008 presidential election; on the DPP's controversial 
"normal country resolution;" and on the Moon Festival Tuesday. 
 
¶2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an editorial in the 
pro-unification "United Daily News" urged the DPP to clarify to the 
Taiwan public the differences between the Republic of China and the 
Taiwan nation.  An editorial in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taiwan News," on the other hand, urged Washington 
not to delay its approval of the F-16 C/D fighter jets deal to 
Taiwan and thus send a wrong message to China.  An editorial in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" also discussed 
Taiwan's arms procurements by calling for balance between the 
island's defensive and countervailing forces.  End summary. 
 
¶3. Taiwan's UN Bid 
 
"No More Torturing:  Clarify [the Differences] between the Republic 
of China and the Taiwan Nation Now!" 
 
The pro-unification "United Daily News" [circulation: 400,000] 
editorialized (9/26): 
 
"... The DPP plays the very role of an executioner in such political 
torturing and dismemberment scenes.  Take the 'UN referendum' as an 
example:  Chen Shui-bian has been pushing for 'Taiwan's UN bid' on 
the one hand and 'name change, writing of a new constitution, and 
Taiwan independence' for the island on the other.  What he has been 
doing was apparently a move toward Taiwan independence.  But then he 
should have stated it very clearly that the 'UN referendum' is a 
'referendum on Taiwan independence.'  To everyone's surprise, when 
Washington said the UN referendum is 'a step toward a declaration of 
Taiwan independence and an alteration of the status quo,' Chen 
retracted by claiming deceptively that the 'UN referendum,' which is 
not aimed at changing the island's national name, does not violate 
the 'Four Nos' pledge.  Likewise, take the [DPP's] 'normal country 
resolution' as an example:  The resolution is clearly a declaration 
of Taiwan independence.  But the DPP stopped in the middle of its 
pushing for the resolution and changed its tone [in the resolution] 
by saying that [it hopes Taiwan will] 'complete its name change and 
the writing of a new constitution as early as possible.'  Aren't 
such convulsions in Taiwan independence...a kind of political 
torture for the 23 million people on Taiwan? 
 
"The DPP's position specified in its 'Resolution on Taiwan's Future' 
was that 'Taiwan is an independent sovereign state whose name is the 
Republic of China.' ...  But the 'normal country resolution,' be it 
the original version that advocated 'changing [Taiwan's] national 
name and writing a new constitution' or the revised one that said 
[it hopes Taiwan will] 'complete its name change and the writing of 
a new constitution as early as possible,' calls for 'de jure Taiwan 
independence' and has thus denied 'the Republic of China.'  As it 
stands now, how can the DPP not try to explain clearly to the public 
[the differences] between the Republic of China and the Taiwan 
nation? ..." 
 
¶4. Arms Procurements 
 
A) "U.S. Must Not Send Wrong Message" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" [circulation: 
20,000] editorialized (9/25): 
 
"For several years, the United States government has pointed to the 
failure of the Legislative Yuan to approve budget authority for the 
government to purchase three advanced defense weapon systems as a 
sign that Taiwan may be unwilling to take responsibility for 
building its own self-defense capabilities.  Fortunately, after 
three years of legislative boycott and delays by the opposition 
Kuomintang-led majority, the Legislative Yuan finally in June 
approved funds for the purchase of 12 P-3C 'Orion' fixed-wing 
anti-submarine aircraft, agreed to an upgrade of existing Patriot II 
anti-missile missile systems and approved further study on the 
proposed purchase of eight diesel-electric submarines. ... 
 
"Moreover, the Legislature also in June gave pre-approval to a 
budget proposal by the Ministry of National defense for NT$16 
billion in funds toward the purchase of 66 upgraded F-16 C/D Block 
52 'Fighting Falcon' multipurpose jet fighters, which Taiwan also 
urgently needs to restore the balance with a rapidly upgrading PRC 
air force, which is now equipped with powerful SU-27 'Flanker' jet 
fighters and retire the last of our obsolete F-5 fighters. ... 
While media reports indicate that the U.S. State Department is 
worried that the sale of F-16 C/D fighters will 'send a wrong 
message' to Taiwan that Washington tacitly supports the U.N. 
referendum or Taiwan's entry into the U.N., we believe it is more 
 
likely that Washington policy makers are more anxious about how 
Beijing might spin U.S. agreement to the sale. ... 
 
"While important, the differences on the referendum issue involve 
short-term political issues, but a delay in approval of a major 
defensive arms procurements, including the F-16 C/Ds, has the 
potential to harm the substantive interests of both Taiwan and the 
United States and also affect the security of other regional 
democracies. ...  In a word, the procurement of the F-16 C/D 
fighters is a necessary defense against the PRC's threat to Taiwan 
and is also vital to the maintenance of the line of defense in the 
Western Pacific for the U.S. and Japan. The timing of the 
procurement is crucial, not because of any nonexistent connection 
with the DPP's proposed referendum but because securing its approval 
from the legislative branch was by no means a simple matter and a 
future authorization can definitely not be taken for granted. 
 
"As Washington should realize, securing approval for the P-3C Orions 
and the F-16 C/D Falcons has followed three years of boycotts by the 
KMT. There is no way to guarantee what the new Legislature to be 
elected in January will do.  Failure to take advantage of the 
current window of authorization will indeed send messages to both 
the Taiwan and the PRC governments, but not necessary the message 
senior leaders in Washington intend. 
Such a delay will show that Washington places Beijing's 'feelings' 
and verbal threats above Taiwan's long-term security and could 
gravely undermine the credibility of the U.S.' own often-repeated 
demand that Taiwan take action to 'show' our will to maintain a 
self-defense capability. 
 
"The prospect of a yawning imbalance in air power in the Taiwan 
Strait will also favor the projection of PRC military power and 
influence in East and Southeast Asia and into the Western Pacific 
and give a major political boost to PRC hardliners.  Further U.S. 
appeasement of Beijing at the expense of a democratic ally could 
also send a message to regional neighbors, from South Korea to Japan 
and Southeast Asia, that they have little choice but to accommodate 
the PRC's hegemonic behavior given the questionable will of 
Washington's own resolve.  Washington's unprincipled vocal 
opposition to Taiwan's internal democratic process regarding the 
United Nations issue has already sent a wrong message to our 
citizens and to the region.  A linkage of the U.N. referendum issue 
with the question of procurement of F-16 C/Ds or other defensive 
systems will compound the error with a message that would further 
isolate Taiwan, encourage Beijing's regional ambitions and undermine 
the credibility and interests of the United States itself." 
 
B) "Taiwan's Military Juggling Act" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (9/25): 
 
"No matter how one looks at it, diplomacy -- the course Taipei has 
chosen to adopt, despite the arduousness and slowness of it -- is 
the most reasonable option to advance state interests. Sad to say, 
however, regardless of whether one is in favor of militarization of 
the Taiwan Strait or against it, Taiwan must, in the face of 
potential aggression by China, stand on guard.  But as it builds its 
defenses, the country must juggle defensive and countervailing 
measures. ...  However pessimistic this may sound, people who argue 
that Taiwan should only purchase and develop defensive weapons have, 
at best, a tenuous grasp of how military decisions are made. 
 
"Hence, the sporadic rumors that Taiwan is developing missiles 
capable of reaching major Chinese cities or, more recently, the ado 
over the possibility that Taiwan would deploy surface-to-surface 
missiles on Kinmen and Matsu.  Whether such a deployment will become 
reality or not (and the maintenance of a little secrecy on the 
matter wouldn't necessarily hurt), the very existence of a 
possibility is enough to play into Beijing's calculations should the 
moment come when it feels compelled to launch an attack against 
Taiwan.  But Taipei's juggling act involves a third ball, one that 
it must keep airborne with great caution. A state's ultimate defense 
lies not in the quantifiable -- e.g. the number of aircraft, subs 
and missile defense systems it owns -- but rather in its capacity to 
avert armed conflict in the first place. So, putting diplomacy aside 
and focusing on the purely military, Taiwan's military build-up must 
be accompanied by the necessary mechanisms mitigating the risk that 
war will come not out of will, but through error. ... 
 
"We can all be grateful that Taiwan isn't a warlike country and that 
in the Strait, only one half of the equation has adopted an 
aggressive stance. The risk to us all would be all the greater if 
both were rattling their sabers, or much more threatening if Taipei 
had chosen to go down the nuclear path.  In the end, it all boils 
down to keeping everything in balance: Building forces while 
managing to avoid an arms race that, by virtue of its 
disproportionate opponent, Taiwan cannot hope to win. It means 
reducing the risks of error by establishing better communication and 
 
greater transparency with the opponent without, on the other hand, 
revealing one's every position.  All that being said, the value of 
deploying missiles on Kinmen and Matsu, among other options, is open 
to debate, as is the veil of mystery that surrounds that 
possibility. But no matter what it does, every offensive capability 
Taiwan acquires comes with a responsibility to ensure that it 
doesn't create more danger than it prevents. ..." 
 
YOUNG